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ORGANIZED LABOR, THE ENVIRONMENT, 
AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 
James C. Oldham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WALTER REUTHER typified much of what is best in organized labor. He was a man of high intensity, with persistent vision 
and lofty goals. Sometimes his flights into idealistic prose must have 
seemed flatulent to the rank and file,1 but he strove to keep union 
ideals visible and to keep the labor movement on the cutting edge of 
social change. 
In 1970, not long before his death, Walter Reuther reached this 
judgment: 
I think the environmental crisis has reached such catastrophic pro-
portions that I think the labor movement is now obligated to raise 
this question at the bargaining table in any industry that is in a 
measurable way contributing to man's deteriorating living environ-
ment. And I believe the UAW is obligated to raise this matter at 
the bargaining table in 1970.2 
Mr. Reuther's exhortation was heeded in Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
at the 1970 United Auto Workers (UAW) Annual Convention. 
There it was resolved: 
Unchecked pollution by the automobile and related industries is of 
• Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Georgetown University Law 
Center. B.S. 1962, Duke University; LL.B. 1965, Stanford University; M.S.B.A. 1967, 
University of Denver.-Ed. 
I am indebted to many in the development of this Article, but I should like 
especially to acknowledge two groups whose contributions have been invaluable: the 
members of my seminar, Public Responsibilities in Private Collective Bargaining, con-
ducted during the spring of 1972, and the many officers and employees of the United 
Auto Workers who were consistently generous with their time, thoughts, and informa-
tion. Particularly helpful was John Yelton, Administrative Assistant to Olga Madar-
the Vice President of the United Auto Workers whose responsibilities encompass con-
servation and the environment. It was through Mr. Yelton that I became the 
temporary custodian of the United Auto Workers questionnaires, which are discussed 
in some detail herein. 
I. A 1952 speech to the CIO Convention, at which Reuther succeeded Philip 
Murray to the presidency, is illustrative. As free labor, he said, 
We have a job ••• of doing much more than just bargaining for our membership. 
We have to assume ever-increasing social responsibilities •••• We must find a way 
to realize the tremendous spiritual reservoir that resides within a free people, and 
translate that power into constructive approaches to the world's problems-if we 
do that, we can win the battle for peace and freedom. 
Quoted in J. FITCH, SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY OF ORGANIZED LABOR 208 (1957). 
2. Press Conference, Jan. 8, 1970. Excerpts are printed in The UAW's Fight Against 
Pollution IO (undated), a booklet collecting articles concerning environmental prob-
lems that have appeared in the UAW Washington Report. 
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direct concern to auto workers not only because they are citizens 
concerned for their environment but because there is a direct threat 
to their jobs and their job security. The worker's stake in resolving 
this problem for society and the nation is compounded by the stake 
in his own job. We shall raise this issue sharply in 1970 negotiations 
in discussions with the companies ...• 8 
Mr. Reuther's declaration and the subsequent UAW resolution 
raise a host of practical and legal questions. Among them: 
-Will the companies listen? 
-Must the companies listen? 
-Can contract provisions with meaningful environmental lan-
guage be reached that are not trade-offs for bread-and-butter 
demands? 
-Is ratification by membership a realistic expectation? 
-Will the environmental provisions be implemented at the local 
level? 
Legally, the overriding issue is the extent to which the duty to 
bargain under the Taft-Hartley Act4 can be said to encompass matters 
of environmental concern to the employee in his role as a member of 
the community. A related inquiry is whether employees can, without 
fear of reprisal, take a stand against adverse ecological effects of their 
employer's operations, particularly if the employees' jobs contribute 
to the problem. To phrase the latter question under the Taft-Hartley 
Act: Is a concerted refusal by employees to perform work which is 
ecologically destructive an exercise of section 7 rights which is 
thereby protected by section S(a)(l) of the Act? This question is 
complicated by the potential conflict between the union, as a col-
lective representative, and the consciences of individual employees. 
Relevant also to those inquiries is the recently enacted Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).5 This statute, even 
though almost diluted in its coverage by limitations imposed at the 
appropriations stage,6 has enormous potential. Whether the potential 
3. Quoted in I BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 19 (1970). 
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970). The Taft-Hartley Act, officially known as the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, amended several provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 732, 49 Stat. 449, and added several new pro-
visions to the law. Through the remainder of this Article, the current law will be 
called the Taft-Hartley Act. 
5. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970)). 
6. House and Senate conferees on the Labor Department appropriation bill for 
fiscal 1973 agreed to "exempt" employers with 15 or fewer employees from OSHA. The 
"exemption" took the form of a ban on expenditures for inspection of any such small 
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will be realized remains uncertain,7 but federal intervention was 
clearly needed to invigorate both industry and organized labor on 
in-plant health and safety conditions. 8 The impact that OSHA will 
have on out-plant environmental problems is uncertain. Some im-
provements precipitated by OSHA will benefit the outside environ-
establishment. Thus, with no supportive legislative hearings, the conferees eliminated 
OSHA protections for some 15 million employees, or one fourth of those previously 
covered by the Act. See 80 LAB. REL. REP. 308 (1972). These limitations did not, how• 
ever, take effect because President Nixon vetoed the entire appropriations bill, which 
covered the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare. A new appro• 
priations bill (H.R. 16654), which reduced the exemption to three employees or less, 
was then subjected to a pocket veto by the President. Therefore, the Act is being ad• 
ministered as it was written-with no exemptions. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration is at present operating under a continuing appropriations 
resolution. 
7. That the OSHA administrators, as presently constituted at least, may not be 
taking the bold, sweeping actions necessary to apply the statute as fully as possible 
may be indicated by the recently decided "walk-around time" problem. At issue was 
whether, under OSHA, employees who exercise their statutory right to accompany 
OSHA inspectors during plant tours of safety conditions have the concomitant right to 
receive wages for the time spent during the inspection. The matter was raised by the 
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW), and the agency determined that 
walk-around time is not paid time. This decision was reached by the Solicitor·s 
Office of the Department of Labor despite the language of section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657 
(e) (1970), that employee representatives "shall" be given an opportunity to accompany 
the inspector and the provision of section ll(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), prohibiting 
discrimination against employees for exercising "any right afforded by this [Act]." The 
Labor Department was not bothered by the fact that Mobil had originally left the 
salaries of the "walkers" intact, but changed this policy after the company was cited 
for three "serious violations" and ninety "other violations." See Office of the Solicitor, 
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Memorandum for Assistant Secretary George C. Guenther (March 
1, 1972). 
The union is resisting this narrow interpretation. On February 14, 1973, a suit, 
Leone v. Mobil Oil Co., Civil Action No. 285-73, was filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia requesting damages and a declaratory judgment on 
the "walk-around time" issue. Furthermore, OCAW negotiations concerning 415 agree-
ments with oil companies that expired on December 31, 1972, have included demands 
that independent consultants survey plants periodically for hazards and that a labor-
management committee police health and safety conditions. According to OCA W 
International President Grospiron, success over this issue would give workers a say in 
determining whether working conditions are safe. He was careful to add that the 
public as well as workers might be affected by plant conditions since "if dangerous 
gases are loose in the plants, they're bound to blow downward to the community." 
OCAW Press Release, Jan. 4, 1973. 
8. See generally J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITIER WAGES: RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP 
REPORT ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB (1973). Also of siguificance in this regard are 
the results of the 1970 UAW strike against General Motors (Gl\f), which reflect the 
importance of in-plant health and safety problems at the bargaining table. According 
to Irving Bluestone, director of the General Motors Department of the UAW, in 40 
out of the 155 plants engaged in local negotiations, management granted 1915 demands 
related to working conditions which were "onerous, dangerous, uncomfortable." Of 
these, the largest group by far, 673, dealt with "improvement of the plant environment." 
This category included such diverse demands as insect and rodent control; ventilation 
installation and improvement; noise pollution; cleanliness of cafeterias and locker 
rooms; and removal of all oil, water, and other debris from the floors. News from 
UAW, Nov. 10, 1971. 
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ment as well,9 but the business expenditures that will be required 
to comply and to stay in compliance with OSHA may delay con-
structive attention to community-oriented environmental problems 
at the bargaining table. 
The legal issues inherent in treating out-plant pollution under 
the Taft-Hartley Act cannot be fully evaluated without a realistic 
appreciation of practical considerations and industrial experience. 
For this reason, considerable empirical information has been collected 
from a variety of sources.10 The examination and evaluation of this 
data will precede the legal analysis. The data, it is hoped, will resolve 
two questions: What is the effect of out-plant pollution on the 
workers, and what has been the response of labor unions to date? 
II. THE IMPACT OF OUT-PLANT POLLUTION AND THE 
ATTITUDE OF EMPLOYEES 
Early in this century, Louis Brandeis reflected on the concept of 
collective bargaining. He stated: 
Two lines of development consistent with industrial democracy seem 
to me possible. Both preclude the present arrangement of the so-
called individual contract between the employer and employee. 
The one possibility is a great advance in collective bargaining 
and trade unionism. 
The other possibility is the development of cooperation. 
Cooperation to be effective means something very different from 
mere profit sharing. It means giving to the workman not only a share 
of the profits, but a share of the responsibilities and management, 
and a utilization of the latent powers in him. There now exists in 
9. A striking example was recently provided by the OCAW concerning asbestos 
workers and asbestos-contaminated burlap bags. At the plant in question, it was 
alleged that not only was the workers' health in danger, but also that members of 
the public were placed in jeopardy because they might inhale asbestos contained in 
bags that had been used to store asbestos and then sold to nurseries. Washington Post, 
Feb. 15, 1972, at A3, col. 4. 
IO. In general, the information was collected from national and international unions 
headquartered in the United States through correspondence, questionnaires, and 
personal visits by the author. In addition, the environmental protection agencies of 
every state were- contacted. In the fall of 1971, a series of questions was sent to the 
approximately 135 unions headquartered in the United States with membership 
exceeding 5000 workers, and at the same time letters were sent to the state environ-
mental protection agencies. Follow-up letters were sent to the unions and agencies 
during the summer of 1972. These efforts generated responses from approximately 60 
unions (44% of those contacted) and 38 state agencies (76%)-
Additional information and data were secured through personal visits in "Washing-
ton and elsewhere. Of special significance in this connection were two valuable sets of 
documents entrusted to the author by the UAW: (I) the questionnaires referred to in 
the acknowledgements at the outset of this Article, which the UAW sent during 1970 
to 430 local unions and which requested information on occupational health and 
safety matters, including environmental concerns that extend beyond the confines of 
the work place, and (2) reports of actual health and safety settlements achieved by 
about 75 local unions after the termination of the 1970 General Motors strike. 
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this country among businessmen an undeveloped and-to a con-
siderable extent-unconscious feeling that something in the line of 
this true cooperation is essential; and there is reason to believe that 
within a comparatively short time we shall have a marked develop• 
ment of such cooperation.11 
Brandeis' prophecy proved wrong; instead of employer-employee 
"cooperation," collective bargaining was the vehicle which gained 
widespread acceptance.12 Fundamental to any concept of collective 
bargaining is the question of what is to be bargained about. Al-
though considerable law has developed regarding the subjects that 
must be bargained over,18 the first step for the employees and their 
union representatives is to sort out priorities and to determine what 
to press for at the bargaining table. 
Do the individual workers or their unions care about subjects, 
such as community environmental problems, that have not tradition-
ally surfaced at the bargaining table? The answer depends on many 
factors, some of which are immediately apparent. The views of the 
rank-and-file workers will be different from those of their inter-
national representative. The interest of the local union in bargain-
ing over "social" issues will generally be less than that of a pro-
gressive international.14 The views of the individual workers will 
11. Letter to Winthrop Talbot, in 2 l.ErrERS OF Loms D. BRANDEIS, 1907-1912, at 
587 (M. Uroksky &: D. Levy ed. 1971). 
12. Brandeis' prophecy may yet be fulfilled. A recent article by a student of 
workers' management and community control outlines the growing willingness of 
Europeans to experiment with worker self-management and the increased discussion 
such strategies are receiving in the United States, particularly in the UAW. Case, P'ision 
of a New Social Order, THE NATION, Feb. 14, 1972, at 200. See also Senator Wagner's 
concept of a labor-management "partnership," discussed in text accompanying notes 
254-57 infra. 
13. In both the Wagner Act and its successor, the Taft-Hartley Act, the duty of 
employers to bargain pertained to "wages, hours and other conditions of employment." 
Taft-Hartley Act § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). See also Taft-Hartley Act § 9, 29 
U.S.C. § 160 (1970). What constitutes "wages, hours and other conditions of employ-
ment," is not spelled out in the statute, and it is this skeletal phrase which has been 
fleshed out by Board and court decisions. See text accompanying notes 173-228 infra. 
14. Recall the remarks of Walter Reuther in note 1 supra. Consider also the 
remarks of Irving Bluestone of the UAW: "But we have never lost sight of the fact 
that we are just one little piece of the total society. And that our effort must be to 
move the totality of the society along. We have tried to fashion our collective bargaining 
proposals so that what helps our people also is in tune with the needs of society." 
Johnson&: Kotz, The Unions-III, For Young Workers, Old Leaders, Washington Post, 
April 11, 1972, at AS, col. 6, col. 7. 
At the local level, the idealistic union goals often espoused by international spokes-
men may lose some of their allegiance. As authors of one study concluded: "Almost all 
workers were convinced of [the union's] value as a form of job security; only a 
minority showed 'emotional identification' with its organized goals." L. SAYLES 8: G. 
STRAUSS, THE LoCAL UNION 132 (1967). 
A graphic illustration of the tension between international goals and local interests 
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depend on their skills, their age, their dependents, and like determi-
nants. Job security always looms large at the local level, and this 
remains true notwithstanding increasing alienation of younger work-
ers from both their jobs and the unions to which they belong.111 
To evaluate how these generalizations apply to environmental 
matters, three inquiries are pertinent. First, to what extent are jobs 
being jeopardized by pollution cleanup requirements? Second, are 
individual workers affected to any great extent by the polluting 
effects of an employer's operations? Third, are there individual 
workers who are prepared to disregard job security to resist the per-
formance of certain types of work that have injurious environmental 
consequences? Answers to these questions should facilitate a judg-
ment on the importance of out-plant environmental issues to the 
laboring public. 
A. Job Security 
As workers in the paper industry, we are aware of the pollutants 
which result from our productive operations. We are aware of the 
fact that workers and management must continually search for new 
means to reduce and eliminate such pollutants. 
However, we are also becoming increasingly aware of the real 
danger of losing many of our jobs because of incessant and strenuous 
demands that our industry immediately eliminate all forms of pollu-
tion, regardless of cost and irrespective of the present state of abate-
ment technology in the industry.16 
occurred in the UAW's 1970 GM strike. During that struggle, the GM division of the 
international union asked if its Local No. 160 would permit 306 of its 5000 hourly 
workers to cross picket lines in order to work on auto emission and safety develop-
ments. According to Irving Bluestone, the UAW did not "want to give GM the oppor-
tunity to place the blame on UAW for holding back progress on pollution control." 1 
BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 664 (1970). Local No. 160, however, refused to 
cooperate and voted against letting the 306 workers continue their pollution control 
efforts. Id. See also note 114 infra. 
15. As Leonard Woodcock, President of the UAW, has written: 
Those who sit below the salt, and that still includes most wage-earners and their 
families, are not in a position to take a bold, intransigent stand against pollution 
and the employers who are its major perpetrators. Even though they have 
traditionally been and remain the chief victims of pollution, working people are 
obliged by the insecurity of their jobs and lives, by their families' needs and by 
their loyalties to wives and children, to give "the smell of the paycheck" priority 
over a wholesome working and living environment-when they are offered no 
other choice. 
Woodcock, Labor and Politics of Environment, SIERRA Cura BUI.I,,, Dec. 1971, at 11, 14. 
16. United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC, A Position Paper on 
Air and Water Pollution Control Measures in the Paper and Allied Products Industry 
1 (undated) (emphasis original) [hereinafter UPP Position Paper]. This position paper 
better operating efficiency and lower water costs, yielding a ten per cent return on the 
Soon after the issuance of this paper, the United Papermakers and Paperworkers 
merged into the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers to form the United Paper-
workers International Union. 
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The foregoing statement by the United Papermak.ers and Paper-
workers Union has represented and may still represent a relatively 
common position throughout organized labor.17 Such a stance is 
based on the often unarticulated but major premise that "[m]ost 
pollution abatement expenditures do not increase productivity and 
do not produce a :financial retum."18 Since job security occupies such 
a prominent position in the hierarchy of employee concerns, the 
impact of environmental activities on job opportunities must be 
carefully considered. 
I. Calculation of Pollution Abatement Costs 
The assumption that expenditures for pollution abatement offer 
no corresponding :financial benefits has been used by industry in 
resisting environmental controls. This argument may be used in 
union negotiations-without union restraint on wages and benefits 
the increased costs of pollution control may lead to closing a plant.10 
Alternatively, the argument may be offered to mobilize union op-
position to environmentally beneficial legislation or regulation.20 
Yet, beneath the surface of such appeals lies a difficult problem: How 
can cost estimates placed by industry on the pollution abatement 
requirements applied to any given plant be objectively evaluated? 
Some researchers have alleged that cleanup estimates prepared by 
consultants for industry have led in several instances to a dilution 
of otherwise applicable environmental standards, even though it 
could be demonstrated that the estimates were based on significant 
misapprehensions. As a result, the suggestion has been made that 
environmental agencies must develop the staff capability to make 
their own cost studies or to analyze the cost studies submitted to 
them.21 
One of the difficulties with industry's cost estimates is that the 
:figures tend to be gross projections of capital expenditures required 
for pollution abatement, which do not take into account offsets that 
would accrue to the company in the form of federal tax credits, 
depreciation allowances, savings because of better operating effi-
ciency, and revenues from the sale of products recovered in the 
abatement process. As noted in a study on pollution costs prepared 
17. See, e.g., the reference by Leonard Woodcock to the sentiments of the workers 
in note 15 supra. See also text accompanying notes 98-102 infra. 
18. UPP Position Paper, supra note 16, at 4. 
19. See pt. III. A. infra. 
20. See text accompanying note 162 infra. 
21. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 1293 (1972). 
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for the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), these offsets are not insignificant.22 
In fact, Carl Gerstacker, Chairman of the Board of the Dow Chemi-
cal Company, maintains that, by care and ingenuity, pollution con-
trol can be profitable. In a speech to the Economic Club of Detroit 
in early 1972, Gerstacker flatly stated that Dow had made good 
profits on the capital it had spent for pollution control.23 He and his 
22. The report states: 
Although these studies focused on adverse economic impacts, it should be 
noted that there will be positive economic impacts as well. An example of positive 
economic impacts, which were not addressed by the microeconomic studies, is 
increased profits and employment (a) in the industries that produce pollution 
abatement equipment and services, (b) the industries that produce relatively low-
polluting products, and (c) some of the firms in the industries that are impacted 
by environmental regulations (i.e., firms that absorb the market shares previously 
held by firms that are not efficient when measured by their use of total resources, 
including the environment, and thus close when they must incur pollution abate-
ment costs). 
Examples of positive economic impacts, which were not addressed by either 
the microeconomic or macroeconomic studies, are (a) possible productivity in-
creases where environmental regulations stimulate technological developments 
(e.g., changes in production processes which both increase productivity and reduce 
pollution), and (b) increases in the average level of productivity in some industries 
as environmental regulations result in the closing of plants that are inefficient in 
their use of total resources. Further, no attempt was made to quantify the eco-
nomic benefits of a cleaner environment (e.g., higher crop yield, increased man-
hours of productive work) or to compare these benefits with the costs of pollution 
abatement. Finally, since the macroeconomic analysis employs the conventional 
national income accounts framework, it overstates the net costs (or understates the 
net benefits) to society because such accounting fails to include the benefits of a 
cleaner environment. 
U.S. COUNCIL ON EN\'IRONMENTAL QUALITY, DEPT. OF Co~n.IERCE & ENVIRONMENTAL PRO• 
UCTION AGENCY, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL: A SUMMARY OF RECENT 
STUDIES 4-5 (1972) [hereinafter CEQ STUDY]. 
23. Address by Carl A. Gerstacker, Feb. 22, 1972. Some of the examples given by 
Gerstacker were: a 7.2 million dollar cooling tower investment which would produce 
better operating efficiency and lower water costs, yielding a ten per cent return on the 
investment; a 2.7 million dollar investment to recover chlorine and hydrogen pre-
viously lost to the atmosphere, yielding 900,000 dollars per year in savings in operating 
costs; a 750,000 dollar investment to reduce solids discharged into the Mississippi, re-
sulting in 250,000 dollars annual savings in material and water costs; and pollution 
control projects installed in 14 latex plants at a cost of 2 million dollars, expected to 
cut operating costs by approximately 2 million dollars a year. 
These are dramatic examples; Gerstacker acknowledged that they were selected for 
that reason and not all experiments by Dow had been so successful. But the point is 
significant: Pollution abatement processes are capital expenditures with concomitant 
revenues and savings, arguably to the point of no net cost. 
There is further support for this proposition. In a speech before the Town Hall of 
California on March 14, 1972, Richard Cheney, President of the Glass Container Manu-
facturers' Institute, stated that reclamation and recycling of bottles alone was approach-
ing one billion bottles per year. Secondary uses of the reclaimed material, including 
glasphalt paving, bricks, blocks, and terrazo floors, were being developed. 
Perhaps the most advanced system for mining the "urban ore" of discarded mate-
rials was designed by the Black Clawson Company for the Franklin, Ohio, refuse-pro-
cessing plant. Using magnets, the plant is capable of processing 150 tons of trash per 
day, from which 27 tons of paper fiber, 9 tons of ferrous metals, 9 tons of crushed 
glass, and 1,500 pounds of aluminum are normally recovered. Aside from establishing 
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fellow officers are convinced that the company can average its entire 
pollution abatement program at zero net cost. 
Given this testimony of actual and potential offsetting revenues 
attending pollution control, environmental agencies should require, 
at a minimum, that corporations bear a burden of proof that in-
cludes not merely a gross analysis but a net cost analysis as well. 
Unions can often assist in this regard since capital expenditures for 
pollution abatement will undoubtedly be discussed at the bargaining 
table in conjunction with the company's ability to accommodate 
wage and fringe benefit demands.24 
2. Pollution Abatement Costs and Plant Closings 
Even if the premise that pollution abatement expenditures do 
not produce a financial return is accepted, it does not resolve 
whether such expenditures actually eliminate jobs, or whether they 
constitute a make-weight rationale for shutting down plants which 
were marginal to begin with. Unquestionably, a number of indus-
trial facilities have been and will continue to be closed down, 
ostensibly because of financial inability to surmount required pol-
lution abatement costs,!l5 
This problem has led the EPA to attempt an "early-warning 
system" which will permit early identification of industrial plants 
that may be in jeopardy because of environmental requirements.26 
The plan has been structured so that the EPA will alert the Depart-
ment of Labor to EPA enforcement actions in time for the Depart-
ment to take "prompt and appropriate action to avoid or minimize 
unemployment problems."27 Initial attention will be focused on 
a pollution-free waste disposal system, the plant can apparently operate profitably. Pub-
lic Relations Dept,, American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Facts, Fall 1971, at 12. 
Finally, governmental incentives should not be overlooked. For example, the In-
ternal Revenue Service has indicated that as a consequence of President Nixon's 1972 
environmental message to Congress, it will be "clarifying the availability of tax exempt 
treatment industrial revenue bond financing for the construction of recycling facilities 
built by private concerns to recycle their own wastes." 2 BNA ENV. REP. (Current De-
velopments) 1486 (1972). There have also been proposals in Congress that would enable 
the Small Business Administration to make loans to facilitate alterations or changes 
in plant, equipment, or production methods caused by federal or state pollution reg-
ulations. 3 id. at 344, 431 (1973). 
24. Cf. NLRJ3 v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
25. Media reports have documented a number of these situations. See, e.g., Calame, 
Fearing Loss of Jobs, Union Battle Efforts To Clean Environment, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 
1971, at 1, col. 6; Scates, A Choice: Pollution or Poverty, Washington Post, Jan. 23, 
1972, at A3, col. l; Udall &: Stansbury, Selling Ecology to the Hard Rats, Washington 
Post, April 25, 1971, at Bl, col. I. 
26. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 856 (1971). 
27. Id. at 884 (1971). 
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economically depressed areas; and, if the cooperative program is 
successful, plans will be formulated to extend it to the Department 
of Commerce, the Small Business Administration, and the Economic 
Development Administration.28 
The EP A's early-warning system presupposes that plant closures 
caused by environmental requirements constitute a serious problem 
for American industry and for organized labor. However, there are 
reasons to think that the problem is not as severe as labor or media 
reports would indicate. For instance, there is evidence that most of 
the plant closings simply hasten the inevitable. According to the 
CEQ study previously mentioned: 
Most of the firms or plants that will be forced to close are 
currently marginal operations (e.g., smaller, older, less efficient pro-
ducers) that were already in economic jeopardy due to other competi-
tive factors. In such cases, the impact of environmental standards is 
only to accelerate closings that would have occurred anyway. The 
pollution abatement costs either eliminate already slender profit mar-
gins or reduce them to a level at which they fail to justify the 
required capital expenditures in pollution abatement equipment (in 
terms of an adequate return on investment).29 
The over-all conclusion of the report was that, although not 
inconsequential, "the impact of those pollution control costs that 
were estimated and examined would not be severe in that they 
would not seriously threaten the long-run economic viability of the 
industrial activities examined."30 And from a macroeconomic stand-
28. Id. 
29. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at IO. In terms of numbers, the report states: 
There are approximately 12,000 plants currently operating in the industrial ac-
tivities studied. Of these it is expected that approximately 800 would close in the 
normal course of business between 1972 and 1976. It would appear from the con-
tractors' evaluations that an additional 200-300 will be forced to close because of 
pollution abatement requirements. Many of these additional closings would appear 
to involve plants that were vulnerable for other reasons and, hence, that were 
likely to have closed anyway a few years later. 
Id. See also Udall &: Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4, col. I, quoting former environ-
mental official Ben Linsky to the effect that "[a]ny plant so marginal that a small addi-
tion to its cost threatens a shutdown is probably being carried on faith credit and has 
been sick for a long time." 
30. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at 3. That pollution control costs are not inconse-
quential is highlighted by continuing announcements of plant closings or shutdowns 
caused by pollution cleanup requirements. Recent examples include a Maryland sulphu-
ric acid plant of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, an Arizona mining and milling facility 
operated by Duval Corporation, the Weyerhauser Company Sulphite Pulp Mill in 
Everett, Washington, and a California plant that manufactures particle board. 2 BNA 
ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 920, 1059-60, ll48, 1238, 1293 (1972). Over all, the 
EPA reports that during the second quarter of 1972, environmental regulations were a 
factor in the closing of three plants and the curtailing of production in three others. It 
is projected that nine additional plants might close and one more might curtail pro• 
duction in the near future. There were a total of 21 closings and 13 curtailments be-
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point, the study indicated that "the national economy will not be 
severely impacted by the imposition of pollution abatement stan-
dards."31 
Clearly, there have been and will continue to be valid instances 
of plant closings precipitated by environmental control requirements 
imposed on industry. However, insistence upon careful net cost 
data should keep these instances to a low number, affecting a mini-
mal percentage of the work force. For those employees whose jobs 
are displaced, new approaches are feasible such as the protective 
legislation being advanced by the UAW.32 In view of these considera-
tions, it is fair to conclude that the job scare attending pollution 
abatement efforts has been overdrawn. It should not be the basis for 
a retraction of environmental requirements except in cases that 
have received extremely close attention and documentation. 
B. The Effect of Out-Plant Pollution on Workers as 
Members of the Community 
The extent to which industrial workers are affected by out-plant 
pollution caused by the industrial facilities in which they work de-
pends on a number of factors, chief among which are the type of 
industry and its geographic and demographic setting. As to the 
latter, there are three principal situations in which out-plant pol-
lution is likely to affect workers significantly: the company town, 
the "captive community," and the urban industrial setting. 
I. The Company Town 
The company town, although rare today, was historically a rela-
tively familiar feature of American business.33 Because of a plant's 
tween January 1971 and June 1972. In the same time period, 44 closings and 13 curtail-
ments were threatened. 3 id. at 572 (1973). 
31. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at 11. The approach used to prepare the CEQ Study 
was to conduct one macroeconomic analysis and eleven microeconomic analyses, each of 
which was performed by an independent consulting firm under the guidance of the 
Council of Economic Advisors. Id. at 3, 5. The eleven microeconomic studies addressed 
the following industries: automobiles, baking, cement, electric power generators, fruit 
and vegetable canning and freezing, iron foundries, leather tanning, nonferrous metals 
smelting and refining, petroleum refineries, pulp and paper mills, and steel-making. Id. 
at 6. 
32. See text accompanying notes 79-85 infra. 
33. See, e.g., s. BUDER, PULLMAN-AN ExPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL ORDER AND COM-
MUNITY PLANNING, 1880-1930 (1967); J. ARMSfR0NG, FACTORY UNDER THE ELMS: A HIS· 
TORY OF HARRISVILLE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1774-1969 (1969). Usually the company town 
was created because of geographic necessity, but sometimes the efforts were altruistically 
motivated, such as the case of Pullman, Illinois. 
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remote location, the workers in such a setting generally have no 
choice about where they live; their lot is company-owned housing. 
Obviously, the influence of the employer permeates the lives of the 
employees beyond the eight hours per day when the employees may 
physically be at the plant. It is for this reason that the National 
Labor Relations Board and the courts have upheld the position of 
the workers that such things as rent of the company housing consti-
tute "conditions of employment" that are mandatory subjects for 
bargaining.34 
2. The Captive Community 
Another situation, which closely parallels that of the company 
town, might be termed the "captive community." Here, even though 
independent businesses, housing, and other commercial amenities 
exist, the community is nevertheless extraordinari~y dependent upon 
a single corporate entity that operates a major industrial plant in the 
area. Dependence will occur primarily because the corporation is 
the chief employer in the town, but there will also be indirect con-
nections between the corporation and other community interests and 
services such as real estate and banking.35 This pattern is not uncom-
mon in rural communities throughout the United States. A good 
example is the town of St. Mary's, Georgia. In this community of 
about 1,800 residents, nearly all of the wage earners are employed 
by the Gilman Paper Company.36 The mill also indirectly supports 
many of the remaining 3,400 residents of Camden County. Until 
34. See, e.g., American Smelting &: Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th 
Cir. 1953); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949). 
35. A community can be "captive" to industry in other ways as well. Even though 
an industrial complex may not employ the bulk of the workers in a community, the 
industrial activity which does exist may create pollution that captivates the entire area. 
A case in point is Helena, Montana, as revealed in a 1972 study by the EPA. There, 
the EPA bluntly concluded: 
Atmospheric concentrations of sulphur dioxide in the Helena Valley exceed 
Montana air quality standards and levels reported in federal criteria to be associ-
ated with deleterious effects on human health, vegetation, and materials. Industrial 
operations of American Smelting and Refining Company and Anaconda Company 
in East Helena are the responsible sources. 
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECfION AGENCY, HELENA, MONTANA, AREA ENVIRONMETAL 
POLLUTION STUDY 1 (1972) [hereinafter HELENA, MONTANA STUDY]. 
The American Smelting and Anaconda Plants referred to employed a combined 
total of 260 workers out of a population of roughly 29,000. Id. at 6-7. Since these 
workers cannot escape the reach of their employer's emissions, their conditions of em-
ployment extend beyond the work place in much the same fashion as in the company 
town. 
36. Shuck & Wellford, Democracy and the Good Life in a Company Town, HARPERS, 
May 1972, at 56, 57. 
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recently, all workers at the mill were required to live in St. Mary's;87 
they reportedly encounter the influence of the mill in virtually all 
of the commercial enterprises that the community harbors.38 
If St. Mary's, Georgia, is typical, these captive communities may 
have been saved by their industrial captors from economic desue-
tude.39 Small communities frequently solicit the introduction of 
industry in order to secure new jobs and other advantages for their 
residents.40 Nevertheless, it is clear that in these communities the 
lives of the workers are intricately interwoven with the fate of the 
resident corporation. And, occasionally, the chamber-of-commerce 
advantages of attracting industry tum sour. The community may 
become subject to political manipulation,41 or there may be environ-
37. Id. at 58-59. 
38. Shuck and Wellford described the situation at St. Mary's in the following man-
ner: 
The workers [sic] who does move to St. Mary's is drawn into an intricate web 
of economic and financial relationships, the strands of which all lead back to the 
mill. He has probably bought his house from the major real estate company in St. 
Mary's, controlled by the Brumley Family. [Brumley is the mill's manager.] He has 
probably mortgaged his house and car to St. Mary's State Bank, also controlled by 
Brumley, and purchased life and home owner insurance from Flem Hall, cashier 
at this bank. The mortgage funds probably come from First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association in Brunswick, of which Brumley is a Director •••• 
Id. at 59. 
39. Id. at 63. 
40. For a study of labor market behavior in selected small communities, see R. WIL· 
COCK & I. SOBEL, SMALL CITY JOB MARKETS: THE LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS AND 
WORKERS (1958). As the authors note: 
Within recent years, significant labor market changes have been created by the sub-
stantial amount of geographic decentralization of American industry. Factories, in 
many cases branch plants of large firms, have been moving not only into the sub-
urbs of large urban centers but also into small communities beyond the orbit of 
large metropolitan labor market areas. For many of these small communities, the 
new plant represents, if not the only industrial employment, at least a major pro-
portion of such job opportunities. Among the results of small town industrializa-
tion are better-balanced populations, with fewer young persons "lost" to the cities, 
higher living standards for many residents and a higher utilization of labor force 
potential. 
Id. at 5. Occasionally, this desire to attract industry subordinates other goals such as 
environmental protection. As put by H. S. Houthakker, a member of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisors, "It is conceivable that a depressed area may want to at• 
tract industry at the expense of a less stringent ambient air standard; the citizens of 
that area should be able to have some influence on the choice involved •••• " Quoted 
in Woodcock, supra note 15, at 13. Leonard Woodcock has characterized Mr. Houthak-
ker's statement as the "old and ever-new government-industry partnership against the 
unorganized, the unemployed, the poor and their communities." Id. at 14. Nevertheless, 
the residents of small communities do frequently agitate for industry at any cost. In 
Midland, Michigan, citizens staged a mass rally to protest the delays which construc-
tion plans on an atomic power plant had suffered because of environmental require-
ments. Detroit News, Oct. 13, 1971, at 2A, col. 1. Another example, ironic in retrospect, 
is Everett, Washington, currently suffering because of the shutdown of mills due to 
environmental requirements. That city was once billed by the Chamber of Commerce 
as "The City of Smokestacks." Scates, supra note 25, at A3, col. I. 
41. This was alleged to have occurred in St. Mary's, Georgia. See Shuck & Wellford, 
supra note 36. 
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mental abuses to which the residents become subject and over which 
they have very little control. An infamous example of the latter 
occurred years ago in Donora, Pennsylvania, where several residents 
were killed and a great many hospitalized because a stagnant cloud 
of coal dust had lodged in the valley in which the community sits.42 
More recent examples have occurred in Buffalo Creek Valley, West 
Virginia, and Providence Valley, Elkton, Maryland. In February 
1972, at least ll5 persons died in Buffalo Creek Valley and more 
than 80 per cent of the homes of the Valley's 5,000 residents were 
destroyed as a result of the collapse of a huge bank of slag and indus-
trial waste built up over the years by the Buffalo Mining Companyf8 
In Providence Valley, residents who were made ill by fumes exuding 
from the chemical plant located there were awarded damages by a 
county court for their "very real, substantial and unreasonable in-
juries, both physical and in the enjoyment of their properties."44 
The chemical plant was the only industrial operation in the valley, 
which has about 200 residents. 
For the chemical workers and miners living in Providence Valley 
and Buffalo Creek Valley, and for workers similarly situated in other 
captive communities, it is obvious that their lives were and are 
affected around the clock by the operations of their employers. Their 
"conditions of employment" encompass much more than the cir-
cumstances attending their eight-hour working shifts each day. 
3. The Urban Industrial Community 
The third and most pervasive geographic setting in which work-
ers' lives are affected by the adverse environmental impact of their 
employers' operations is the familiar urban industrial area within 
42. See Roueche, The Fog, in B. RouECHE, ELEvEN BLUE MEN 194 (1953) and in 
EcoLOGICAL CRISIS-READINGS FOR SURVIVAL 125 (G. Love & R. Love ed. 1970). 
43, Caudill, Buffalo Creek Aftermath, SAT. REv., THE SOCIETY, Aug. 26, 1972, at 16. 
44. Capurro v. Galaxy Chem. Co., Nos. 33lll & 3357, Slip Op. at 5 (Cir. Ct., Caroline 
County, Md., June 3, 1972). Judge Wise found it particularly significant that the presi-
dent of the corporation testified under oath when speaking of corrective measures that 
might be taken "that he considered corporate survival his first priority, above any 
consideration of the interests of the Plaintiffs and the plant neighborhood.'' Slip Op. 
at 4. The damage suit in question proceeded under a nuisance theory, and was the 
aftermath of an earlier injunction suit that had been successfully maintained by the 
residents. Slip Op. at 2-3. 
Pertinent also is a recent award by a jury to a Sumter, South Carolina, farmer of 
lll5,000 dollars for damage to his land caused by the pollution of a local stream by 
four Sumter industries. According to the farmer, raw waste dumped into the stream 
damaged his timber, produced an offensive odor, intensified the mosquito problem, and 
generally depreciated enjoyment of his property. The jury awarded 10,000 dollars in 
actual damages and punitive damages of 125,000 dollars. 3 BNA ENV. REP. (Current 
Developments) 95 (1973). 
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which manufacturing or processing facilities are located. Because of 
the proximity of the homes of many workers to their place of work, 
these employees are affected to a significant extent by pollution 
emanating from their employers' industrial facilities.45 According to 
a 1965 Census Bureau Study, 34 per cent of all blue-collar workers 
(craftsmen, operatives, and laborers) lived within three miles or less 
of their place of work, and an additional 15 per cent lived four or 
five miles away.46 While generalized data may not be available or 
feasible regarding patterns of dispersion of stationary source indus-
trial pollutants, studies indicate that instances of dispersion in excess 
of several miles are common.47 
45. As noted by Udall and Stansbury: 
Increasingly, younger labor leaders realize that most workers live near their plants 
in some of the worst urban neighborhoods, and that the very poisons environ-
mentalists hope to remove from the outside community do their greatest damage 
inside the blue-collar work place. For these reasons, the industrial worker stands 
to gain more than anyone else from the ecology movement. 
Udall&: Stansbury, supra note 25, at B5, col. I. See also Woodcock, supra note 15, at 15. 
46. U.S. BUREAU OF nm CENsus, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1963 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SURVEY, HOME-TO-WORK TRAVEL, ADVANCE REPORT 
12 (1965). Similar geographic distributions in percentage terms were found to exist for 
clerical or sales workers, and for professional and managerial employees. For "service 
and private workers," 51 % were found to live three miles or less away from their work. 
Id. Two observations on these data should be made, however. First, while the geo• 
graphic distribution from home to work of white- and blue-collar workers may be 
similar, the place of work of the blue-collar worker will more often be at a source of 
industrial pollution than the place of work of the white-collar worker, Second, there 
are numerically more blue-collar workers than employees in the other categories, 
and, in that sense, blue-collar workers are the class most affected by pollution from 
stationary sources. For example, according to the 1965 study, 35% of workers living 
one mile or less from their place of employment were blue collar (craftsmen, opera• 
tives, and laborers) compared with 23% of professional and managerial employees. For 
workers living two or three miles from work, the comparison was 38% to 23%, respec-
tively. Id. 
In some heavy industrial areas, the disparity between the number of blue-collar 
and professional or managerial employees is considerably greater. For example, accord-
ing to 1970 census data for the Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, Indiana, Standard Met-
ropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), approximately 45% of the workers who reside in 
the area are craftsmen, operatives (except transport), and nonfarm laborers, compared 
with the 17% who are professional and managerial employees. U.S • .BUREAU OF THE 
CENsus, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS TO POPULATION AND HOUSING, CENSUS TRACTS: 
GARY-HAMMoND-EAsT CHICAGO, !ND., STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA 17 
(1972). The heavily industrial cliaracter of the SMSA is reflected in the fact that 44% 
of all employees living in the area are engaged in manufacturing, and over 82% re-
ported their place of work as being within the SMSA. Id. at 9, 17. 
47. For example, in the Environmental Protection Agency's study of Helena Valley, 
Montana, see note 35 supra, dispersion of sulphur oxides at levels exceeding acceptable 
air quality criteria carried from the East Helena Industrial Complex for distances well 
in excess of five miles. HELENA, MONTANA STUDY, supra note 35, at 1, 10, 25-44. For 
additional studies containing similar data, see U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPT. OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, IRONTON, 0Hio-AsHLAND, KENTUCKY-HUNTINGTON, 
WEST VIRGINIA, AIR POLLUTION .ABATEMENT ACTIVITY, PRE-CONFERENCE INVESTIGATIONS 
62-63 (1968); U.S. PUBLIC HEALm SERVICE, DEPT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
PARKERSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA-MARIETIA, Omo, AIR POLLUTION .ABATEMENT ACTIVITY 48-
55 (1967). 
April 1973] Organized Labor and the Environment 951 
The extent to which the lives of industrial workers are affected 
by the polluting activities of their employers may be evaluated 
further by considering the results of an empirical study undertaken 
by the UAW during 1970. In February of that year, the UAW 
International Headquarters sent an "Environmental, Occupational 
Health and Safety Questionnaire" to over 400 local unions.48 Al-
though many of the questions dealt with in-plant safety conditions,49 
48. The questionnaire, which is reproduced in Appendix A infra, was completed by 
430 local UAW unions, the bulk of which (152) are located in Michigan. Geographically, 
the next largest grouping (69 locals) is Canadian. The remainder is distributed through-
out the United States, although the number of locals located in New England, the 
Rocky Mountains, and the Deep South is small. 
The questionnaire utilized by the UAW was a successor to a questionnaire fashioned 
by the OCA W and circulated in 1969 pertaining to occupational health and safety mat-
ters. The OCA W circulated its questionnaire to 508 locals, of which 130 provided 
usable responses. In conjunction with this questionnaire, the OCAW held a series of 
regional conferences throughout the United States and Canada to discuss hazards in 
the industrial environment. A representative transcript of one of these conferences, 
together with the tabulated results of the questionnaires and elaborative testimony, 
was presented to the House Education and Labor Committee in hearings on OSHA. 
Hearings on H.R. 81J, H.R. J809, H.R. 1291, and H.R. 1JJ7:J Before the Select Sub-
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
2, at 1179-217, 1233-307, 1484-86 (1969) [hereinafter H.R. 81J Hearings]. The question-
naire in blank was also printed. Id. at 1217-18. Comparable testimony on behalf of the 
OCAW was presented to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Hearings on 
S. 219J and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st 8: 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1007-72 (1970) [hereinafter S. 219J 
Hearings]. 
Subsequent to the distribution of the UAW questionnaire, OSHA was passed, and 
for this and other reasons the questionnaire was never analyzed by the UAW except 
in a general way. In 1971, the returned questionnaires were released to the author's 
custody, facilitating a computer analysis of the results. The original data were refined 
in two ways: according to (1) the size of the local and (2) the type of production taking 
place at the plant. With regard to size, the largest two groupings were locals with less 
than 100 members (81 locals or 19% of those surveyed) and those with more than 1000 
members (67 locals or 16%), Surmising that relatively different patterns of answers to 
the questionnaire might attend these two groups, they were isolated for cross-tabula-
tion purposes. A similar isolation was fashioned around the type of production. Two 
categories were created: "service and assembly" and "heavy industry," which together 
encompassed 274 of the 430 locals. These two categories were also selected for cross-
tabulation on the assumption that significant differences in questionnaire responses 
would be revealed. For some purposes, the size of the locals proved irrelevant; for ex-
ample, the number of bargaining units was not significantly greater with larger locals 
than with smaller locals. However, as demonstrated in the succeeding text and notes, 
the assumption that the size of the local was a significant determinant generally proved 
to be correct, in contrast to the type of production, which did not reveal as many differ-
ences as had been expected. 
49. See Appendix A infra. The in-plant data is relevant to this Article in two ways: 
first, in-plant problems are often related to out-plant pollution, as when ventilation 
causes fumes to be discharged into the outside environment; second, the attitude of 
management to in-plant safety and health issues may be helpful in assessing the re-
sponsiveness of companies to the well being of workers as members of the community 
affected by company operations. 
Only about one fifth of the locals reported that the employer measured industrial 
air contaminants and physical agents, and even fewer employers released data to em-
ployees. Only 17% of the locals had asked the companies to monitor standards on a 
regular basis, with the requests coming predominantly from larger locals. 
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a number of questions related directly to the out-plant pollution 
effects of the industrial facilities for which the local unions are 
certified bargaining representatives. 
When asked whether their members knew if their plant was 
contributing to pollution of the surrounding air, water, and land, 
59 per cent of the 430 unions answered that the plants were con-
tributing to pollution. In locals with membership exceeding 1,000, 
this figure rose to 78 per cent. 5° Fifty-seven per cent of the locals 
indicated that their plants did not have devices to purify wastes 
before discharge into the air or water; however, this condition 
was more prevalent in the plants associated with small unions than 
those associated with large ones.51 
Seventy-eight locals, or 18 per cent of those responding, indicated 
that their plants had been cited for air or water pollution violations 
by a governmental agency. This figure rose to 26 per cent for local 
unions affiliated with heavily industrial plants, and to 37 per cent 
for local unions with membership exceeding 1,000. 
These results, while not surprising, represent a disquieting con-
firmation of the pervasiveness of polluting activities by a broad cross 
section of industry as recently as 1970. Even more disturbing are the 
figures that describe the polluting activities which individual em-
ployees are required to engage in as part of their employment obli-
The availability of medical care on the work premises and the presence of company• 
sponsored medical testing correlated with the size of the local unions. Significantly, 
36% of all local unions reported that their companies had no safety or health programs, 
although more of the large locals, 79%, reported such programs. 
Responding to a call for suggestions, the most frequent recommendation was the 
establishment of a safety committee. To remedy the effects of harmful substances in 
the work place, 31 % of the locals called for better ventilation; there was no indica-
tion, however, that the employees were concerned with the effect of harmful fumes once 
they were aired outside the work place. 
More than 40% of the locals reported that the poor safety attitude of the companies 
was their chief difficulty, Undoubtedly, these figures do not represent a fully objective 
point of view; only 9 of the 430 unions indicated that indifference of the membership 
to health and safety issues caused any problems. Other figures substantiate this point: 
40% of the unions indicated that they did not spot check the safety or health engineer-
ing equipment used by their members. 
Presumably the foregoing plant conditions will undergo radical changes as the im-
pact of OSHA is felt. The data revealed by the UAW questionnaire can certainly be 
viewed as a belated corroboration of the need for the Act. 
Exact responses for both in-plant and out-plant data may be obtained from the au-
thor. 
50. The corresponding figure for small unions is 44%, 
51. In locals with less than 100 members, 73% reported that there were no waste-
purifying devices, whereas the negative responses in large unions amounted to 37%, 
Among those locals associated with plants that have been labeled "heavy industry" or 
"service and assembly," a lack of purifying devices was reported in 55% of the cases 
in both categories-a figure corresponding closely to the over-all percentage given in 
the text (57%), 
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gations. When asked if their members are assigned job tasks by plant 
management that result in air or water pollution, 37 per cent of the 
locals answered affirmatively. In heavy industrial unions, the figure 
rose to 43 per cent, and, in unions with membership exceeding 
1,000, the figure climbed to 46 per cent. These statistics are highly 
germane to any discussion of possible protection available under the 
Taft-Hartly Act for employees who refuse to perform environ-
mentally injurious work.52 
A final series of questions and answers of significance to the out-
plant pollution issue relates to how employees' lives are affected out-
side the plant. Seventy-six locals, more than 17 per cent, knew of 
instances when their members' lives had been directly affected by 
pollution caused by the plants at which they worked. Such examples 
were cited by almost one fourth of the large unions responding to 
the questionnaire, as well as by one fourth of those plants which are 
heavily industrial. Moreover, other questions and answers reveal that 
additional members may have been affected by out-plant pollution. 
When asked if emissions from company smokestacks caused damage 
to employees' cars parked in the company lot during working hours, 
33 per cent of all unions reporting indicated "yes," and in the large 
unions ill effects were reported in 55 per cent of the cases. 53 
Thus, particularly in the larger unions, the instances in which the 
environmental effects of employer operations have an adverse impact 
on employees' lives are numerous. The problems of out-plant pollu-
tion and their relationship to the unions and the individual workers 
are not merely theoretical. It is not surprising to find that workers 
are increasingly resistant to participation in the polluting activities 
of their employers. 
C. Individual Resistance 
Years ago, it might have been thought rare for an employee to 
exercise social conscience in any fashion that might jeopardize his 
employment. However, with the coming of an era in American 
society in which individual and minority protests are frequent such 
52. See pt. IV. B. infra. 
53. The corresponding figures for damage to cars in service and assembly and heavy 
industry were 38% and 39%, respectively. More unions (40% over-all) reported the 
presence of emissions in the parking lots than reported damage to cars. 
It can be argued that the parking lot situation should be analyzed as an in-plant 
condition because the effects occur on company property. However, employees fre-
quently park not in company lots but in nearby commercial lots. In both cases, the 
nature of the damaging factor-emissions from company equipment-is the same. 
Therefore, the parking lot problem is one with clear out-plant implications. 
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actions by employees are no longer unusual. More often than not, at 
issue in these instances has been alleged racial discrimination, 54 but 
recently there have been examples directly involving the environ-
ment. 
Illustrative of the environmental protests is the case of Gilbert 
Pugliese, a millwright. After having been a steelworker for twenty-
eight years, Pugliese one day refused to push a button that would 
have sent several hundred gallons of oil into the Cuyahoga River at 
the Cleveland plant of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation.55 
Although the spillage of oil was a minor feature of the company's 
polluting activities, Pugliese recognized that the discharge could 
be avoided if the oil were pumped into drums, and he simply took 
a stand.56 When this first happened in 1969, Pugliese was immedi-
ately suspended for five days. He was threatened with permanent 
suspension, but the company decided not to risk a revolt of the 
workers and humored him for two years. However, in the summer 
of 1971, a foreman insisted that Pugliese again punch the oil dis-
charge button. Risking eighteen years of seniority and his entire 
livelihood, Pugliese refused.57 Eventually, due to support from fellow 
workers and embarrassment caused by adverse publicity, the union 
had to support Pugliese-reportedly in order to avert a wildcat 
strike.58 Pugliese kept his job, and Jones and Laughlin initiated a 
procedure to use drums and pumps to dispose of the waste oil;59 but 
it was an involved and tawdry process which would not have ended 
happily without the power of the press.60 
There have been other examples of resistance by employees to 
action by, or job requirements of, their employers that would have 
54. See NLRB v. Tanner Motor, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), discussed in note 
353 infra, in which two employees who campaigned for nondiscriminatory hiring of 
blacks by their employer were disciplined. Consider, too, the experience of Polaroid 
Corporation in 1970-1971 when a small group of its black employees formed the Polar-
oid Revolutionary Workers Movement to force Polaroid to cease doing business in 
South Africa. This experience, which received considerable coverage in the press, is 
summarized in Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and The Employee's Duty of 
Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279, 282 (1971). 
55. This case is described in Ehrenreich 8: Ehrenreich, Conscience of a Steelworker, 
THE NATION, Sept. 27, 1971, at 268. 
56. Id. at 269. Even though a relatively minor act of pollution, the oil discharges 
were in violation of the Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 
u.s.c. § 407 (1970)). 
57. Ehrenreich &: Ehrenreich, supra note 55, at 269. 
58. Id. at 270. 
59. Id. at 271. 
60. For a discussion of the possibilities Pugliese might have explored under the 
Taft-Hartley Act, see pt. IV. B. infra. 
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had injurious environmental consequences. In 1970, Captain Wil-
liam Guthrie, a pilot for Eastern Air Lines, was fired because of 
his refusal to continue to empty the pressurization and drain cans 
of his aircraft after take-off.61 Guthrie was reinstated after his con-
duct generated publicity adverse to Eastern and had been the subject 
of a resolution by the Air Line Pilots Association calling for an 
industry-wide practice of drainage prior to take-off.62 Refusal to 
participate in environmentally damaging activities also led a group 
of employees of the Corps of Engineers to file suit in February 1972 
against the General Services Administration (GSA) in opposition to 
the GSA's plan to build a federal office building in downtown 
Mobile, Alabama.63 The employees charged that the GSA had not 
filed an environmental impact statement as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act,64 and that the planned structure would 
add to the congestion problems of the downtown area. More recently, 
three General Motors employees reported to work wearing gas masks 
to protest the pollution in the plant caused by gasoline-powered 
fork-lift trucks.615 After refusing their foreman's request to remove 
the masks, the three employees were permitted to file a grievance but 
were then suspended from work. 
Incidents such as these testify to the growing impatience of 
today's worker with authoritarian behavior by employers who may 
not have fully explored whether social interests can be accommo-
dated without sacrificing profits.66 This growing impatience should 
be recognized not only by employers, but also by unions. Unions are 
in an ideal position to back up employees such as Pugliese and 
Guthrie; it should not take the threat of a wildcat walkout to jar 
a union into action. 67 
61. Letter from J.J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Assn., to James C. Old-
ham, Nov. 4, 1971 [hereinafter O'Donnell Letter]. 
62. See note 107 infra. 
63. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 1356 (1972). 
64. 42 u.s.c. § 4332 (1970). 
65, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1973, § A, at 6, col. I. The Vice President of the 
UAW local said that in mid-1971, GM had agreed to replace gas-powered trucks, as 
they became obsolete, with electric ones. Id. See also text accompanying note 124 infra. 
66. For examples of such accommodation, see note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
67. At the opposite extreme from the Pugliese case are those instances, generally 
involving public employees, when union strike activity has harmful environmental ef-
fects. The strike of New York City sanitation workers in 1971 is a case in point. In 
litigation commenced by public officials seeking a preliminary injunction, the New 
York supreme court held that a common-law action would lie against union leaders 
who allegedly conspired to engage in an unlawful strike that resulted in the discharge 
of raw sewage into Long Island Sound, disrupted ecological balances, and endangered 
beach areas. Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1971), Tevd. 
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III. THE UNION RESPONSE TO OUT-PLANT POLLUTION 
The environmental involvement of national and international 
unions headquartered in the United States has been erratic and 
relatively inconclusive. Nevertheless, there have been union re-
sponses to environmental problems in general and to the operations 
of their own companies in particular-responses that merit examina-
tion. Preliminary consideration will be given to the one issue on 
which several unions have focused, "environmental blackmail." 
A. Environmental Blackmail 
In the view of some observers, the plant closure cry raised by 
industry when faced with environmental controls is often disin-
genuous and constitutes what has been termed "environmental 
blackmail."68 A number of unions, particularly the Oil, Chemical, 
and Atomic Workers (OCAW) and the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), are beginning to recog-
nize these smoke screens and call the employers' bluff primarily 
through contract negotiations and union policy statements. Other 
unions, notably the UAW, are concentrating their efforts on legis-
lative protection to cushion the impact of curtailed operations re-
sulting from pollution regulation. 
Of union responses to the blackmail issue, perhaps the most 
widely cited instance of refusal to capitulate was taken by the OCA W 
when Union Carbide announced that federal environmental require-
ments would force the closing of its plant at Marietta, Ohio. Faced 
with steadfastness by the OCAW, Union Carbide backed down and 
on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972). The basis for the 
court's ruling was "a new rule that persons maliciously polluting or contaminating the 
environment may be enjoined by the chief executive officer of a county or town whose 
residents are adversely affected by the offensive conduct, or by private citizens reasonably 
affected." 67 Misc. 2d at 212, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The court reasoned: 
The conscience of our community is saturated with environmental awareness, and 
those deliberately contaminating the environment as an illegal tactic are conspicu-
ously wrongdoers. For the law to ignore this would be to forfeit all credibility. Just 
as new torts have emerged with new technology, new torts must emerge with 
changing population pressures and acknowledged social responsibilities. 
67 Misc. 2d at 213, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 751. 
68. Calame, supra note 25, at 21, col. 4. After referring to an effort by environ-
mentalists for new laws that would help call the bluff of business, the author stated: 
"This reflects a view that many company threats about layoffs and plant closings 
amount to 'environmental blackmail.'" Udall &: Stansbury, supra note 25, at Bl, col. 
2, quote Norman Cole, head of the Virginia State Water Pollution Control Board, as 
stating: "'An industry's first response to environmental orders is often to create a job 
scare. It tries to bluff its union and its congressmen into calling off the dogs. If com-
panies spent as much time and ingenuity cleaning up as they do stalling, the whole 
country would be better off.'" See also Reid, Ecological Blackmail: "Jobs vs. Clean 
Air," ENv!RONMENTAL AcnoN, Aug. 21, 1971, at 13. 
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indicated that it would seek ways to avoid any significant layoffs 
while complying with the environmental order.69 Similar experiences 
have been reported by other unions.70 
In addition, the OCA W introduced a strong resolution at the 
1971 AFL-CIO Constitutional Convention, proposing that "when-
ever environmental protection measures force the partial or full 
closure of a facility with resultant job losses, displaced workers shall 
be protected in their economic well-being."71 Suggested protection 
included early retirement with pension, extended severance pay, and 
transfer to other facilities. Costs of the protection were to be borne by 
the employer where feasible, but by the government if necessary.72 
The resolution also included a provision urging legislation to inhibit 
employers from using the threat of unemployment as a method of 
avoiding compliance with pollution control regulations; under this 
scheme, an employer could be enjoined from "lay[ing] off ... any 
worker until the necessity of such layoff or layoffs has been proven, 
with the burden of proof on the employer and with public hearings 
and opportunity for cross-examination of employer witnesses pro-
vided. "73 These provisions constituted two points of a sixteen point 
resolution urging a strong stand on many aspects of environmental 
abuse.74 However, the OCAW resolution was referred to the AFL-
CIO Committee on Resolutions, where it was badly emasculated.75 
69. Calame, supra note 25, at 21, col. 4; Udall & Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4, 
col. 1. 
70. In Ticonderoga, New York, an International Paper Company mill threatened to 
move if it was forced to comply with a state air pollution order. The union initially 
supported the company's resistance, but then began to realize that the highly skilled 
pulp and paper workers it represented could not easily be replaced-that, in fact, In-
ternational Paper could not move without them. Union support of the company ceased 
and International Paper stayed in Ticonderoga and complied with the order, Udall 
& Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4, col. 2. 
The American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO) in Tacoma, Washing-
ton, was initially supported in its resistance to a pollution order by workers who feared 
that the company might close the Tacoma plant, as it had the ASARCO plant in 
Selby, California, rather than comply with cleanup orders. But ASARCO gets its copper 
ore from the Philippines and obviously must remain near the Pacific Coast. With 
Oregon and California already on the record as being against dirty smelters, many of 
the men began to question their role as "pollution pawns." Id. at Bl, col. 2; B4, col. 4. 
71. AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 72, Environmental Protection, Ninth Constitutional 
Convention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971), reprinted in Appendix B infra. 
72. Id. 
73. Id, 
74. Id. Fourteen of the 16 points of the OCAW resolution, which dealt with mat-
ters other than environmental blackmail, were supported by a separate resolution in-
troduced by the Colorado Labor Council. (The OCA W is headquartered in Denver.) 
AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 13, Ecological and Environmental Problems, Ninth Constitu-
tional Convention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971). 
75. See AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 124, The Environment, Ninth Constitutional Con-
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Other unions have concentrated on contract negotiations in their 
efforts to blunt any adverse impact of environmental regulation. In 
at least three contracts, the IAM has secured the following provision 
in collective bargaining agreements: 
Pollution Control-The contracting parties agree that pollution con-
trol is a company responsibility-if the shop is closed by a govern-
ment agency, because of an alleged violation of an established 
pollution control standard, all employees covered by this Agreement, 
shall receive full compensation and their regular rate of pay, for all 
time lost.76 
The provision is a broad one, and its open-ended nature could 
generate a number of arbitration cases in the event of a plant shut-
down. For example, the phrase "for all time lost" must have some 
implied limitation, such as the use of due diligence by employees 
to seek comparable employment elsewhere. It is significant, too, that 
the bargaining units covered by the foregoing provision are all quite 
small.77 
Most unions have not sought to deal with the problem at the 
bargaining table. The typical pattern of behavior has been either 
to capitulate when an employer insists that a marginal plant be shut 
down rather than cleaned up~ or to aid the employer in seeking 
exceptions to the pollution abatement orders that affect the plants 
in question.78 
The UAW's campaign against environmental blackmail has been 
more visible and different in emphasis. In June 1971, Leonard 
Woodcock, President of the UAW, presented to the Subcommittee 
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee, 
which at the time was holding hearings on the economic impact of 
environmental control requirements, a statement about the plight 
of the working person in environmental blackmail situations and 
proposed legislation to deal with the problem.79 The basic thrust of 
vention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971) [hereinafter Resolution No. 124], reprinted 
in Appendix B infra. 
76. IAM Contract with Harig Mfg. Corp. at 19 (effective June I, 1970); IAM Con-
tract with Powers Label Co. Division, Duncan Parking Meter Maintenance Co. at 12 
(effective June I, 1970); IAM Contract with R. Krasberg & Sons Mfg. Co. at 10 (effec-
tive June 1, 1970). 
77. The units are 106 employees at Harig Mfg. Corp., 5 employees at Duncan Park-
ing Meter Maintenance Co., and 30 employees at R. Krasberg & Sons Mfg. Co. Letters 
from Albert Epstein, Director of Research, IAM, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 30, 1971; 
Dec. 13, 1971. 
78. See, e.g., text accompanying note 164 infra. 
79. Hearings on Economic Dislocation Resulting from Environmental Control Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1971) [hereinafter Dislocation Hearings]. 
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the proposed legislation was to give workers who are displaced or 
otherwise affected by an employer's pollution abuses the right to 
bring a class action in a state or federal court against the corporation 
and its officers and directors for damages.80 These damages would 
include, among other things, all lost wages and fringe benefits, com-
pensation for loss of seniority rights, costs of retraining necessary to 
obtain other employment, and moving expenses; damages would be 
offset by any unemployment compensation or other benefits collected 
by the employees.81 Affected employees would, however, be required 
to have sought suitable employment elsewhere before they could 
recover damages. 82 The proposed legislation further would provide 
that there would be a conclusive presumption in favor of workers 
when layoffs, shutdowns of plants, or down-grading of jobs resulted 
from a governmental order precipitated by environmental pollution, 
and the Secretary of Labor would be empowered to bring suit if 
requested by individuals.88 Woodcock pointed out that the basic 
concept of his proposed legislation was not new-it had recently 
been implemented by the Congress as part of the AMTRAK legis-
lation. 84 He further suggested that a cost-sharing program might be 
set up so that the government would assist employers in meeting the 
expenses necessitated by the Iegislation.85 
Subsequently, under the direction of its Education and Con-
servation Department, the UAW has actively sought support for 
the legislation proposed by Woodcock. In addition to disseminating 
widely the statement Woodcock had made to the Air and Water 
Pollution Subcommittee,86 the UAW succeeded in interesting the Ur-
ban Environmental Conference (UEC) in the environmental black-
mail issue. The UEC is a group organized by Michigan Senator 
Philip Hart during late 1971, and the group is actively working with 
the union on ways to stop environmental blackmail as one of its 
three national priority projects.87 
As a result of UAW and UEC activity, a draft of a bill, entitled 
"Environmental Controls Adjustment Act of 1972," has been pre-
80. Id. at 286. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 288. 
83. Id. at 288-89. 
84. Id. at 287-88. The rail passenger legislation is contained in 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 
(1970). 
85. Dislocation Hearings, supra note 79, at 290. 
86. See, e.g., UAW's Woodcock Blasts Industry's Environmental "Game Plan," EN• 
VIRONMENTAL J., Sept. 1971, at 31. See also Woodcock, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
87. The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 9, 1971, at Al6, col. 1. 
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pared by the staff of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee. 
In its present draft status, the bill would provide sweeping economic 
protection for workers who lose their jobs as a result of plant shut-
downs or reorganizations necessitated by pollution regulations.88 
The approach of the bill is to administer grants through the states 
by coordinating disbursements with unemployment compensation 
programs already in operation at the state level. Even though the bill 
is only in the formative stages, it is worth observing that operating 
through state unemployment compensation structures could be quite 
cumbersome, and could be inequitable to employees of the same 
corporation who happened to reside in different geographic locations. 
Union interest in protective legislation is reportedly having an 
effect on legislative enactments directed primarily to other issues 
but which collaterally affect worker dislocation. For example, sec-
tions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
197289 also speak to the problem of environmental blackmail. One 
section requires the Administrator to consider potential economic 
and social dislocations when deciding whether to establish effluent 
limitations.90 Furthermore, under section 507(e),91 the Administrator 
is ordered to evaluate potential loss or shifts of employment resulting 
from pollution enforcement. Specifically mentioned for investigation 
are threatened plant closures or job reductions. Employees who lose 
or are threatened with the loss of their jobs as a result of effluent 
limitations imposed by the Act can request an investigation in which 
the employer will explain the actual or potential effect of such a 
limitation on employment and the justification for any discharges or 
layoffs. The Administrator is then directed to report on these rela-
tionships and include any recommendations he thinks appropriate, 
all of which are to be available to the public. 
This same question was dealt with on a broader scale in title 
VIII of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1972.92 
The bill, which was eventually vetoed by President Nixon, required 
the Administration to investigate employment losses actually or al-
legedly resulting from enforcement of any federal environmental 
quality law. This investigation was to consider the extent to which 
the community would be dislocated and any possible alternatives to 
88. The bill is presently in discussion draft form only. 
89. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. 
90. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 302(b)(l), added by Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 846. 
91. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 507(e), added by Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 890. 
92. H.R. 16071, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., tit. VIII (1972), in 118 CoNG. REc. 18357-58 
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972). 
April 1973] Organized Labor and the Environment 961 
the employment loss. After the employer filed a report showing the 
employment consequences of compliance with the law, the Secretary 
of Labor would certify the workers unemployed as a result of pol-
lution standards. Certified employees could then receive unemploy-
ment compensation equal to sixty per cent of their former weekly 
wage for seventy-eight weeks, mortgage and rental payments for up 
to a year, and re-employment assistance, all to be funded under a 
100 million dollar authorization. The employer was forbidden to 
discharge or discriminate against any employee who aided in the 
enforcement of this or other pollution laws. When the Secretary 
found such discrimination, he could order reinstatement of the 
employee and fine the employer 1,000 dollars for each day the vio-
lation continued. The Secretary was also empowered to make low 
interest loans to aid private industry in developing pollution control 
facilities when necessary financing was unavailable from private 
sources. These expenditures were to be covered by a separate 100 
million dollar authorization. As explained in debate by its leading 
sponsor, Senator Williams, the rationale for the bill was that "in 
protecting future life for our children and grandchildren, we owe 
an immediate obligation to our current work force. We have no 
right to force upon them the exclusive costs of redeeming our en-
vironment for future generations."93 
Foreshadowing the eventual veto, various administration officials 
made known their objections to the legislation. Secretary of Labor 
Hodgson was opposed, not only because he viewed the program as 
"inadequate" and financially uncertain, but also because the "De-
partment of Labor . . . has always favored having only one un-
employment program, rather than a series of programs tailored to 
specific workers 'adversely affected' through a particular circum-
stance."94 Caspar Weinberger, Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, objected on budgetary grounds and on the theory that 
revenue-sharing met the same objectives "in a more effective and 
responsive manner."95 
To Senator Muskie's mind, the bill was necessary to assure that 
the "jobs and livelihoods of workers, their families, and their com-
munities are not used as pawns in industry efforts to undercut pol-
lution control regulations."96 However, because of the veto, the 
93. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 17718 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Williams). 
94. Letter from James D. Hodgson to Senator Randolph, Sept. 14, 1972, in 118 CONG. 
R.Ec. 17719 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972). 
95. Letter from Caspar Weinberger to Senator Randolph, Sept. 9, 1972, in 118 CoNG. 
R.Ec. 17720 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972). 
96. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 17728 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Muskie). 
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threat and reality of environmental blackmail are still essentially 
unregulated. 
Nevertheless, the water pollution provisions and the draft legis-
lation previously discussed represent a start toward the UAW goal 
of shielding the workers from environmental blackmail. Un-
doubtedly, the full protection goal of the UAW has little political 
feasibility, but if further compromise legislation should be enacted, 
it could advance the willingness of organized labor to combat en-
vironmental pollution at the bargaining table and elsewhere. 
B. General Environmental Involvement 
Unions can be categorized into three groups according to the 
degree of attention devoted to environmental problems.97 Some have 
expended virtually no energy in considering the problem. Others 
have passed resolutions at international conventions pertaining to 
various environmental subjects. Finally, a few unions have engaged 
in some sort of affirmative action on environmental problems, such 
as negotiating contract provisions or sponsoring legislative or educa-
tional campaigns. 
I. Inactive Unions 
Not surprisingly, the first category is the largest in terms of the 
number of international unions-although not in terms of the num-
ber of members represented. Of the sixty unions responding to a 
series of questions sent by the author to 135 national and interna-
tional unions headquartered in the United States, thirty-five fell 
within the first category.98 A number of these unions represent 
nonindustrial, white-collar workers who do not suffer the primary 
effect of stationary source industrial pollution.99 But some of the 
97. This categorization excludes attention to in-plant occupational safety and 
health problems. 
98. See note 10 supra. 
99. E.g., Actors Equity Assn., American Postal Workers Union, National Assn. of 
.Broadcast Employees & Technicians. However, even among these unions, pollution takes 
its toll. For example, the Musicians' Guild indicates, "Our members have a great deal 
of problems with [a]ir pollution as they cannot sing properly and are subject to 
inflammation of throat and nose due to foul air in densely populated urban centers." 
Letter from Joan Greenspan, Asst. Executive Secretary, Musicians' Guild, to James C. 
Oldham, Oct. 28, 1971. Furthermore, noise caused by airplanes, traffic, horns, and sirens 
disrupts concerts in which Guild members are performing. The Guild has been active 
in supporting local bills for control of noise and for securing better enforcement of 
local ordinances in existence. 
Other unions associated with nonindustrial employers are also taking affirmative 
environmental action. See, e.g., the example of the Communication Workers Union in 
note 160 infra. 
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unions in this category, such as the Teamsters, are quite large and 
are very much involved with polluting industries.100 This is not to 
say that these unions, or the seventy-five unions that did not respond 
at all, have no concern for the safety and health of their workers. 
Although the record of organized labor on occupational health may 
be less than outstanding,101 there are nevertheless many unions that 
allocate all of their resources available for safety and health to prob-
lems occurring in the workplace, thereby excluding problems extend-
ing into the community at Iarge.102 
2. Unions Adopting Environmental Resolutions 
Unions in the second category-those that have confined their 
interest in the environment to adopting resolutions-have often 
been content with resolutions that are merely affirmations or retreads 
of resolutions adopted at the annual AFL-CIO Convention.108 The 
100. The Teamsters have sponsored a three-year study on the adverse environmental 
conditions facing the professional truck driver, but the study is of an occupational 
health and safety variety, and the Teamsters are keeping the results of this study 
confidential. Letter from Abraham Weiss, Research Director, Teamsters, to James C. 
Oldham, July 27, 1972. 
101. See generally J. PAGE 8: M. O'BRIEN, supra note 8. 
102. For example, Mr. M.B. Wigderson, Staff Vice President of the Air Line 
Employees Assn,, in a letter to the author dated November 2, 1971, stated: 
We have not had any ground swell from our membership demanding that we 
negotiate into the agreements contractual language which would tend to deal with 
environmental or ecological features concerning the operation of an air line. We 
do have contractual language which deals directly with safety and health, but in 
all honesty, anti-pollution theories were not involved. 
From the foregoing, I think you would be safe in assuming that the white 
collar workers who make up the membership of this Union do not feel that the 
Union in and of itself should be the vehicle to carry on anti-pollution campaigns. 
A statement from the Bakery Workers' Union puts it more directly: "I know the 
unions could do more than they have about the ecology of the country, but we feel 
there are more pressing matters of immediate concern." Letter from Vaughn Ball, 
Director of Research and Education, Bakery 8: Confectionary Workers' Union, to James 
C. Oldham, Oct. 28, 1971. 
These statements are admittedly realistic and perhaps representative of a widely 
held view within organized labor. But the times are changing, and so, too, may that 
point of view. As put by Joseph T. Power, General President of the Plasterers' Union, 
in a letter to the author dated Dec. 2, 1971: 
In my opinion, organized labor has every justification to interject themselves 
[sic] into the involvement of anti-pollution and concern over the establishment 
and functioning of environmental programs. 
Organized labor has the same moral responsibility that was evident in spear 
heading other social legislation and the implementation there of, such as social 
security, health, education, safety in the work place, etc. 
103. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Resolution No. 20, The Environment, 
28th Biennial Convention (May 29-June 2, 1972), which reads: 
RESOLVED, that the 28th Biennial Convention of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC: 
I. Joins with the AFL-CIO in the struggle to conserve our environment and stem 
the tide of pollution; 
2, Recommends that because of air pollution and the tremendous drain on energy 
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AFL-CIO resolutions, in tum, have tended to be quite bland, partic-
ularly when compared with those resolutions referred to the Resolu-
tions Committee from which the final product originated.104 
Other unions have independently formulated environmental 
resolutions. Some of these are so general as to be of limited useful-
ness.105 Others make specific suggestions about legislative enactments 
and appropriations,106 which could prove useful if the unions en-
fuels by internal combustion engines for automotive vehicles, we urge that the 
National Air Pollution Control Administration give top priority to developing 
alternative sources of power for such vehicles; 
4. As a means to protect workers from losing their jobs and to discourage com-
panies from relocating to areas having more lenient pollution laws, we urge 
that the federal air and water pollution acts should be amended to provide 
national emission standards on all sources of air and water pollution. 
5. Urges strengthening the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency and 
centralization of the administration of federal anti-pollution activity; and 
6. The Amalgamated, through its publication, legislative activities and educational 
activities, will continue to fight for a cleaner environment. 
104. Reference was made earlier to the OCAW and Colorado Labor Council resolu-
tions introduced at the Ninth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO. See notes 
71 & 74 supra and accompanying text. The OCAW resolution (which was identical to 
the Colorado Labor Council Resolution except for the addition by the OCAW of points 
one and two) is set out in Appendix B infra. The resolution reported out of the Reso-
lutions Committee of the AFL-CIO and adopted by the Convention, however, is 
considerably watered down compared to that offered by the OCAW, even though the 
end product is alleged by the AFL-CIO to cover the substance of the OCAW resolution. 
See Resolution No. 124, supra note 75, reprinted in Appendix B infra. Most of the 
features of the adopted resolution were presented to the Democratic and Republican 
National Conventions as the AFL-CIO 1972 platform proposals. See AFL-CIO, Platform 
Proposals (1972). 
The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO has independently adopted a 
resolution on the environment. After calling generally for mobilization of resources 
and organizations to combat environmental pollution and for a national plan to deal 
with the problems, the statement in conclusion resolved: 
7. The Industrial Union Department make every effort to see that the burden of 
technological change is borne not only by the worker but-in the transition to 
new means of production-by the whole community on whose behalf the change 
takes place. 
8. The Industrial Union Department condemns and rejects the environmental 
blackmail of those who would intimidate the worker with economic threats. 
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, A Resolution on the Environment (1971). 
105. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Resolutions, 34th 
Annual Convention (May 1971); Office & Professional Employees' Intl. Union, Resolu-
tion No. 38, Convention, Miami :Beach, Fla. ijune 1971), the operative paragraph of 
which reads as follows: 
RESOLVED that the Office & Professional Employees International Union and 
its membership support those organizations whose objectives are to have all govern-
ments in our countries (Canada and the U.S.) introduce and enforce strong and 
stringent anti-pollution controls and laws so that our children and their children 
should inherit a world which is not only fit to live in, but a world which retains 
those natural beauties and other attributes essential not only to the physical but 
also to the intellectual and spiritual well being of mankind. 
106. See, e.g., American Fedn. of State, County & Municipal Employees, Resolution 
No. 70, Contamination of the Natural Environment, Convention (1970). Consider also 
the following resolution of the Office & Professional Employees International Union: 
WHEREAS, under authority of the National Environmental Policy Act, Presi-
dent Nixon created a Council on Environmental Quality, and 
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deavor to see that these suggestions are implemented. Still others 
have fashioned resolutions relating specifically to the type of business 
in which most of their members work, or around a particular event 
with which the union was involved.107 
Resolutions may be useful in focusing the attention of union 
members on particular matters of concern to the international. But 
WHEREAS, this three member group was to ride herd on other federal agencies 
reviewing the environmental impact of their projects before construction began, 
and 
WHEREAS, the Council, which is getting more than one hundred such reports 
monthly and the volume is threatening to break down the system, was only granted 
a first year budget of one million dollars which allowed only twenty-one profession-
als on the staff, and 
WHEREAS, the Council needs additional funds to beef up its staff with 
qualified persons so that what started out as an effort to exercise responsible 
environmental concern over public works can be continued for another year, now, 
be it 
RFSOLVED: that all citizens concerned about the effect of dams, highways and 
other public work projects on the environment should be speaking up for the fact 
that the Council on Environmental Quality needs more money, let it be 
RFSOLVED FURTHER: that this, the 12th Convention of the OPEIU, urge 
all members to contact their Congressmen to insure that this Council is properly 
funded so that it can continue its vital work. 
Office & Professional Employees Intl. Union, Resolution E.B. No. 10, Council on 
Environmental Quality, Convention, Miami Beach, Fla. Uune 1971). 
107. A representative example of resolutions relating to the type of business of the 
employers with which a union negotiates is the following resolution, adopted by the 
Newspaper Guild National Convention, June 26-30, 1972: 
CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 
The Newspaper Guild, as a strong International voice, should provide a good 
example in newspaper recycling by printing Guild international and local publica-
tions on recycled paper. The Guild should, after starting printing on recycled 
materials, urge the printing industry to adopt a policy of using recycled paper in 
its operation in order to prevent depletion of our ever-diminishing forest reserves. 
The Guild further urges that the printing industry limit its emissions and use 
every effort to persuade paper processing plants to take measures to reduce the 
chemical efiluents despoiling rivers and polluting the air to the detriment of the 
health and well-being of the population at large. 
An example of a resolution surrounding a particular event is the experience previ-
ously referred to of the Air Line Pilots Association in support of Captain William Guth-
rie's efforts to ensure drainage of pressurization and drain cans of aircraft prior to 
take-off. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. The Board of Directors of the Air 
Line Pilots Association adopted the following resolution in 1970: 
WHEREAS the dumping of Kerosene from the Pressurization and Drain cans 
of jet aircraft has become a major concern of the Air Line Pilots Association and 
the National Air Pollution Control Administration, and 
WHEREAS the NAPCA has asked airlines to voluntarily halt dumping millions 
of pounds of jet fuel each year into the skies near airports, 
THEREFORE BE IT RFSOLVED that it shall be Association Policy to strongly 
urge all airlines whenever possible to drain all Pressurization and Drain cans on 
jet aircraft prior to take-off. 
O'Donnell Letter, supra note 61. 
Perhaps the Association was co-opted; President O'Donnell advises that Captain 
Guthrie "is now actively working with the company on ecological matters." Id. Presi-
dent O'Donnell also indicated that the Association has supported the redesign of jet 
engine burner cans and studies of the effect of fuel spillage on runways. In Mr. 
O'Donnell's judgment, "It has not been necessary for our Association to force to the 
bargaining table these problems. The airline companies have instituted programs with 
great vigor when technological research has produced a better, cleaner product." Id. 
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in terms of real-world accomplishments, they are significant only 
to the extent they are ultimately translated into action. This does 
not often happen. 
3. Affirmative-Action Unions 
There are a few unions that have taken some sort of action on 
community environmental problems. Occasionally this action is so 
oriented toward compromise that the union becomes the hostage of 
the industry. A prime example is the record of the United Mine 
Workers (UMW), with its long history of environmental involve-
ment-involvement that has been deferential to industry and gen-
erally ineffective.108 This has been particularly unfortunate in the 
mining industry since its operations are often conducted in the 
captive-community geographic setting, where the lives of employees 
108. An example of the priorities of the UMW is seen by the statement of Joseph 
P. Brennan, Director of UMW Research and Marketing before the Illinois Pollution 
Control Board, March 12, 1971. Regarding the dangerous sulfur dioxide (SO~ emissions 
resulting from the use of high sulphur coal, he stated: 
While we acknowledge the need for air polution control and the need for regula-
tions to help bring such control about, we want to present to you today the other 
side of the coin. We are asking that in the rush to enact the strongest possible air 
pollution abatement regulations you do not destroy the lliinois coal industry and 
the jobs, wages and other benefits which that industry brings to your State. 
While continuing to stress the advantages that coal brought to Illinois, he recognized 
"the legitimate demands of the citizen of lliinois for air pollution abatement." His 
problem, however, was that "inevitably these demands will be translated into regula-
tions, regulations which will impose financial and technological burdens on industry." 
His solution to this dilemma was to call for more advanced technology, and for 
greater "pressure" to be applied to the electric utilities who would then voluntarily 
refrain from polluting. He concluded: 
[IJhere are those who suggest we can no longer wait, that we must have the 
maximum reduction of pollution now. I recognize that this is a popular course, 
I also recognize that those who espouse it can do so without fully recognizing the 
consequences upon the people who mine and transport Illinois coal. Unfortunately, 
I do not believe that this is in the interest of the State. Certainly it is not in the 
interest of its miners, and on their behalf I would ask that you do not impose 
S02 emissions regulations which are pending •••• 
Any discussion of the UMW should take into account the new leadership of the 
union which was voted in as a result of the court-ordered rerun of the 1969 election. 
To demonstrate the new direction of the leadership, upon taking office on December 
22, 1972, President Arnold Miller promptly discharged 20 of the 24 members of the 
International Board. Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1973, at A9, col. 2. Miller announced 
that henceforth the union would seek stricter enforcement of coal mine safety standards, 
and that he had warned one of the coal companies against firing a UMW safety com-
mitteeman who pulled men out of a mine containing too much methane gas. Id., Jan. 
5, 1973, at A2, col. 4. 
In terms of a change from the types of policies represented by Mr. Brennan's state-
ment, one of the more dramatic examples came when the UMW asked the Senate 
Interior Committee to prohibit strip mining of coal unless the land could be properly 
restored. Miller's position was that "we cannot allow the corporate interests in their 
zeal for profits to destroy our ecological balance, destroy our land and create panic 
among those who labor to produce the wealth of our country." Id., March 15, 1973, at 
A28, col. 8. 
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are inextricably tied around the clock to the operation of the 
mines.100 
But there are unions in this third category that are struggling to 
·wrestle community environmental problems into the open and to 
marshal! resources to deal with them. The most active have been the 
UAW and the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers.110 
a. The United Auto Workers. Much has been said already about 
the UAW. In addition to that union's environmental blackmail cam-
paign, it has made significant efforts to educate the membership 
about environmental concerns. During the 1970 GM strike, the 
international union required rank-and-file employees to attend strike 
education classes for two hours per week; some of these sessions were 
devoted to environmental matters, utilizing both films and materials 
specially prepared for the sessions by the UAW Conservation and 
Resource Development Department.111 Additional environmental 
109. Consider, for example, the disasters in the mining communities at Donora, 
Pennsylvania, and Buffalo Creek Valley, West Virginia, described in the text accom-
panying notes 42-43 supra. 
110. These unions generally adopt internal environmental resolutions in conjunc-
tion with their other activities. The 1972 UAW resolutions on ecology and natural 
resources covered much ground, including air and water pollution, population, re-
cycling, urban planning, transportation, environmental education, land use, pesticides, 
and nuclear power. Most pertinent to the present Article was the resolution on en-
vironmental blackmail which provided: 
Industry has a long and continuing record of resistance and delaying tactics to 
avoid the costs of eliminating their pollution. One strategy in this attempt is that 
of playing on the economic fears of workers and communities to create opposition 
to clean-up efforts. To put an end to such "environmental blackmail," legislation 
must be enacted to safeguard workers from job-loss fear caused by plants threaten• 
ing to either close or move to other countries rather than abate their pollution. 
Plants should be forbidden by law to engage in economic intimidation. Plants 
claiming "impossible" pollution control costs should first be required to provide 
their company's financial records to a public show cause hearing and completely 
substantiate such financial claims before any government permission for plant 
closure is considered. 
Employees should not have to bear the burdens and sacrifices involved in cor-
recting environmental pollution caused by their employers. 
UAW supports passage of legislation which guarantees workers restitution 
whenever they lose wages, fringe benefits, protections or security rights because of 
plant shutdowns or layoffs resulting from environmental pollution or its cor-
rection by their employers. Moreover, such legislation should provide the right for 
workers to sue for damages for harm done to them under such circumstances. We 
must continue to urge Congress for legislation allowing the Highway Trust Fund 
to be properly allocated to all forms of transportation. 
UAW, Resolution on Ecology and Natural Resources, 23d Constitutional Convention, 
Atlantic City, N.J. (April 23, 1972) (emphasis original). 
111. Interview with John Yelton, Administrative Assistant to UAW Vice President 
Olga Madar, Detroit, Oct. 29, 1971. The UAW has typically required two hours of 
picket line duty per week during a strike as a prerequisite to the collection of strike 
benefits of forty dollars per week. However, in the 1970 strike there was no need for 
extensive picket lines, thus facilitating the alternative of education sessions. Previously 
there had been annual education sessions for local union leaders, but the GM strike 
education sessions marked the first significant educational series involving the rank and 
file, Representative of the prepared materials were a four-page pamphlet entitled 
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education programs have been sponsored by the UAW as a part of 
ongoing programs held at the union's Family Education Center at 
Onaway, Michigan.112 
The UAW's environmental efforts have not been uniformly suc-
cessful. For example, an attempt by UAW Vice-President Olga 
Madar to secure environmental information from GM during the 
1971 Campaign GM experience produced only the most sketchy and 
superficial results.113 Also, the UAW's resolve to treat community 
What Kind of World Will They Have? (Oct. 1970) and a booklet, complemented by a 
suggested outline, entitled Conserving Our Resources-What We Can Do (1970). 
112. For example, the UAW sponsored a 1970 symposium entitled "The Impact of 
Urbanization on Man's Environment," held at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York and at the UAW's Family Education Center, Onaway, Michigan, June 13-20, 
1970. Portions of this symposium were subsequently published by the UAW for its own 
education programs and for distribution elsewhere. United Nations &: UAW, Sym-
posium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment, Statement and Con-
clusions (1970); L. Woodcock, The Crisis of Our Environment, UAW's Views Presented 
to a United Nations Conference (1970). 
113. At the annual meeting of shareholders held on May 21, 1971, Olga Madar 
stated: 
People are now aware of the extent, the danger and the causes of pollution. 
They are committed to the American dream that citizens of this nation can have 
an impact on organizations, industry and government in bringing about change. 
Reporting your actions on pollution control and prevention makes General Motors 
a patriotic ally with the citizens of this nation. And it would increase the salability 
of the product. Affirmative action also to prevent pollution beyond that required 
by government regulation is also essential and needed. We now know, after the fact, 
as we attempt to repair the damages, that prevention is less costly in taxes not only 
to citizens, but also to stockholders, and in fact what we have learned is that the 
dividend factor is substantially reduced because of the increase in taxes in terms 
of cleaning up the damage which has been done in the past. 
. . • I would think that, in terms of affirmative action, that General Motors 
would make public in its annual reports whether or not any toxic materials used 
in the manufacturing process are coming in contact with our public waterways 
or are in any way causing air pollution. 
General Motors Corp., Annual Meeting of Shareholders, May 21, 1971, Transcript at 
190-91. 
James Roche, Chairman of the :Board of General Motors, did not respond at the 
meeting to the above points. Later, raising the matter again, Ms. Madar wrote to Mr. 
Roche. Along with a series of questions concerning employment and training of 
women, the following questions were put: 
Is General Motors involved in affirmative action to prevent pollution beyond 
that required by government regulation? 
Is General Motors making public or registering with government agencies the 
toxic materials used in the manufacturing process which come in contact with our 
public waterways or are causing air pollution? 
Letter from Olga Madar, Vice President, UAW, to James M. Roche, Chairman, :Board 
of Directors, General Motors Corp., Sept. 18, 1971. 
Chairman Roche's answers, conveyed to Olga Madar by Irving :Bluestone, who had 
received them from George Morris, Vice President of the General Motors Industrial 
Relations Staff, were quite general. They indicated that General Motors had been 
applying more restrictive pollution control codes than required by law, and, with 
regard to planned expenditures, the corporation was spending 64 million dollars in 
1971 on industrial air and water pollution. Concerning automobile emission controls, 
the corporation indicated it was not exceeding government standards, but was spending 
150 million dollars on its 1971 program. Letter from James M. Roche, Chairman, :Board 
of Directors, General Motors Corp., to Olga Madar, Vice-President, UAW, Nov. 16, 
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environmental problems at the bargaining table in 1970, admittedly 
complicated by the prolonged GM strike, does not appear to have 
been implemented at the local level to any significant degree. This 
conclusion stems both from the refusal of local union members to 
cooperate in continuing auto emission control work during the 
strike114 and from an analysis of the health and safety results achieved 
by seventy-five GM locals. 
Environmental bargaining by the UAW locals during 1970 was 
not successful, but neither was it inconsequential. Although environ-
mental issues were raised in almost all cases, rarely did they clearly 
address the environment outside the plant. Of the approximately 750 
environmental protection demands put forward by the 7 5 local 
unions reporting back to the Intemational,115 76 per cent dealt with 
ventilation-basically with requests for new or refashioned air 
freshening or climate control systems.116 It is dubious whether these 
issues can properly be categorized as out-plant environmental con-
cerns. Obviously, the reason for any ventilation or exhaust system in 
an industrial setting is to remove noxious elements from the in-plant 
atmosphere. The reports to the international did not indicate con-
cern by the locals over any potentially adverse effects outside of the 
plant caused by the release of these elements. The only references 
1971; Memorandum from Irving Bluestone, Director, General Motors Dept., UAW, to 
Olga Madar, Vice-President, UAW, Nov. 24, 1971. 
114. See Kerwin, Pollution Small Issue to Strikers, Detroit News, Oct. 19, 1970, at 
7 A, col. 1, cols. 1-4: 
The [UAW]'s image as a pacesetter [in pollution control] was tarnished last 
week by rebellious rank-and-file members who apparently consider a strike more 
important than protecting the environment. The UA W's hierarchy was unable to 
get Local 160 to relax its strike enough to permit 300 of its members to work on a 
crash program at the General Motors Technical Center in Warren to control auto 
emissions .••• 
But even more embarrassing is the failure of UAW leadership to persuade its 
pickets to permit workers from other unions-building tradesmen-to install 
pollution control equipment at GM factory sites during the strike •••• 
At its national union convention last April, delegates-prompted by the late 
UAW President Walter P. Reuther-vowed to make pollution control a "bargain-
able issue" at the negotiating table in 1970. 
Industry spokesmen scoffed at the idea that such a technical item could be 
bargained over. They also predicted that the item would get lost since workers 
were more interested in "bread and butter" issues as [sic] higher wages, early 
retirement and restoration of the cost of living scale. 
Their suspicions apparently were confirmed last week by adamant pickets who 
apparently place pollution control low on their priority list. 
115. As mentioned in the acknowledgments at the outset of this Article, the UAW 
made available to the author both the questionnaires and reports filed by the GM 
locals that listed the health and safety demands made during the 1970 negotiations and 
the eventual settlement reached on each issue. All references are to the demands 
categorized as involving environmental controls. No further citations will be given for 
figures that summarize these reports. 
116. This figure increased to 86% when items related to ventilation, such as exhaust 
equipment and maintenance, are included. 
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made to this subject were two requests for larger, more efficient ex-
haust stacks inside the plants;117 it is possible that these exhausts 
would be filtered or in some way detoxified before release, but if so 
it is not apparent from the demands. The conclusion is inescapable 
that, although clearly affecting the outside environment, ventilation 
is generally regarded by the locals as only an in-plant concern.118 
There were several instances in which local unions demanded 
that emission controls be placed on all air-polluting equipment.119 
Three locals even pressed the demand that existing machinery not be 
operated until the controls were installed.120 In all cases the company 
pronounced itself dedicated to the eventual elimination of pollution 
-and thus, studies were proposed and commended. Only twice were 
promises of specific remedies made.121 
Several other union demands showed a tendency to treat the out-
side as the refuse area for in-plant emissions. One request was made 
to vent the exhaust from a hose cutting area directly outside,122 while 
another was that tar be poured away from the workers, preferably 
outside.123 It apparently did not occur to or interest these locals to 
press for the elimination or reduction of the offensive wastes-it was 
easier to request that they be disposed of elsewhere. The Chevrolet 
plant in Buffalo reversed these positions, however, demanding ab-
117. These were made at the Chevrolet Plant in Tonawanda and the Hydromatic 
Plant. 
118. Whether ventilation issues present a new concern or a long-standing problem 
to the locals is unclear because of the terminology used. Since the demands and settle-
ments are essentially internal documents, they employ descriptive terms and labels that 
have little meaning to outsiders. Accordingly, a demand that an additional air make-up 
unit be placed on the left side of aisle J-15 in Department B-18 does not reveal whether 
the request originates from a new awareness of the pollution hazards caused by indus-
trial processes employed in the department or merely a more traditional desire to have 
a cool, comfortable worksite. 
119. See notes 120-21 &: 127 infra. In two instances, the company agreed to repair 
the damage to employees' cars resulting from briquette plant emissions. (Chevrolet Metal 
Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Grey Iron.) 
120. At one plant, the demand was bluntly put: "The Briquette Plant shall not be 
permitted to operate at any time until an Emission System is installed and operating." 
Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw. Similar positions were taken at Chevrolet 
Plant, Grey Iron, and at Delco Morraine. 
121. In both instances, the response came in regard to a demand concerning a 
briquette plant, see note 119 supra. Both provisions involved the same local. Following 
completion of the strike, management promised to operate the plant "in compliance 
with applicable local, state and federal emission control regulations which require that 
such facilities include an emission control system. Management also states that when 
the emission control system on the briquette plant is shut down for major repairs, 
productive operations on the facility will be suspended until such repairs are com• 
pleted." Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Grey Iron. 
122. Rochester Products Plant. 
123. Chevrolet Plant, Norwood. 
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solute use of outside areas during nonworking time because the 
ventilation inside was so poor. 
Six UAW locals demanded that gasoline-powered trucks used 
within the plant be replaced with electric battery-operated vehi-
cles.124 Coming from GM employees, this demand has particular 
irony. In most instances, management agreed that as the present 
equipment wore out, it would be replaced with electric models if 
they could be purchased at comparable cost. Also of interest were 
five complaints about gas fumes. One settlement specified a switch 
to butane fuel,125 and another indicated that in the future only un-
leaded gas would be used.126 
There were ten demands that specific machines or production 
processes be enclosed to retard the spread of fumes, vapors, and 
particles. The usual target was paint spraying, welding, or grinding 
operations, although asbestos dust and methylene dichloride were 
also singled out.127 The specificity of these requests reflects an in-
creased sophistication regarding the dangers of particular elements 
and processes and the increasing evidence linking gases and partic-
ulates to respiratory diseases. 
b. The International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper 
Mill Workers. A second union that has taken steps to come to 
grips with community environmental problems is the International 
Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers.128 This 
union's environmental involvement spans a period of several years. 
In early 1970, the union successfully negotiated contract language 
with the Kamloops Pulp and Paper Company, Ltd., in British 
Columbia, establishing a joint union-management environmental 
protection committee to educate employees on pollution matters 
both on and off the job, to receive information, and to make sugges-
tions on environmental problems.129 Previously, the International 
Executive Board of the union had outlined a six-point action plan 
for a pollution abatement program, which, in part, directed the 
124. Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Buffalo; Chevrolet 
Plant, Grey Iron; Chevrolet Plant, Livonia; Chevrolet Plant, St. Louis. Notably, the 
same demand at the Delco Morraine Plant was met with a flat company agreement 
to replace two of the gas trucks with electric vehicles. 
125. General Motors Assembly Division, Fremont. 
126. Rochester Products Plant. 
127. A.C., Flint; Central Foundry, Bedford; Central Foundry, Saginaw; Chevrolet 
Metal Castings, Saginaw; Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Warren; Chevrolet Parts, Saginaw; 
Chevrolet Truck; Delco-Morraine; Fisher Body, Mansfield; Fisher Body, Pittsburgh. 
128. This union no longer exists independently. See note 16 supra. 
129. Intl. Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite 8: Paper Mill Workers, News Release, July 1971. 
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union's Research and Education Department to collect information 
on the extent of pollution in the mills with which the union bar-
gained and to carry out an intensive public-information program.180 
Later in 1970, the union sponsored a workshop on "Man and His 
Environment" for more than 250 local union leaders, at which an 
official position paper approved by the Executive Board was ex-
plained to local representatives. The position paper recommended, 
among other things, the establishment of pollution control commit-
tees in all local unions, collection of factual material, and affiliation 
with specific antipollution groups.131 
In 1971, the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers refined its 
position paper into a detailed environmental program for local 
unions. This program, which was later adopted by the international 
union,132 contains specific proposals for implementing an environ-
mental plan of action at the local level.183 Suggestions in three areas 
are of particular interest, relating to (1) in-plant activities of the 
workers, (2) the joint environmental control committee, and (3) 
collective bargaining issues. In the plant, the formation of an en-
vironmental-concerns committee is recommended, accompanied by 
the appointment of individuals to provide media assistance and to 
attract guest speakers. Furthermore, it is suggested that two members 
of this committee act as an in-plant study group to discover ways by 
which plant operations could become more ecologically sound.184 
The joint environmental control committee recommended by 
the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers Union is designed to 
have an equal number of management and union representatives, 
whose responsibilities shall be "to consider, investigate and make 
proposals to the company with respect to the environmental prob-
lems arising from the operation of the plant."135 The committee's 
130. Id. 
131. 1 BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 616 (1970). 
132. Letter from Richard A. Estep, Director, Department of Research and Educa-
tion, Pulp, Sulphite&: Paper Mill Workers Union, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 4, 1971. 
133. Intl. Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite &: Paper Mill Workers, Project III-An Environ-
mental Program for Local Unions Gune 8, 1971) [hereinafter Project III]. 
134. Id. at I. These members are instructed at some point to "ask other members 
of the union ••. to describe or write down job actions they perform which might 
be harmful. A list should be compiled and submitted through the pollution committee 
or grievance committee for action." Id. This suggestion is directly pertinent to the 
discussion regarding protected, concerted activities of individual employees who resist 
the performance of environmentally harmful jobs. See pt. IV. B. infra. 
135. Project III, supra note 133, at I. The committee would also be consulted for 
its approval concerning the possible ecological consequences of new building plans. 
These consultations would likely be resisted by management since considerations of 
design and operation of new buildings may constitute a "management prerogative," 
See text accompanying note 201 infra. 
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powers, however, include only investigation, record-keeping, and 
recommendation for action.136 
In the area of collective bargaining issues, the program suggests 
that local unions attempt to make the term "unfair environmental 
practice" as much of a byword as "unfair labor practice" and that 
they seek a stipulation in all contracts that "no company take eco-
nomic reprisal against an employee because he reports his company's 
pollution violations to public authorities."137 Also, it is recom-
mended that the unions push for full public disclosure of financial 
records to support any claim of high pollution abatement costs,138 
and "bargain to require companies which reduce their work forces as 
a result of environmental cost pressures to continue to pay the wages 
of those employees who lose jobs for a specified period of time after-
ward."139 Finally, it is recommended that stipulations be achieved in 
contracts that "a given percentage of investments and profits be 
utilized for environmental research."140 The program acknowledges 
that "[£Jew collective bargaining sessions to date in any industry have 
been able to induce management to accept concepts of this nature," 
but suggests ways to marshal community support, such as taking out 
newspaper ads, meeting with ecology groups within the community 
and with the workers themselves, approaching local politicians, and 
writing letters to the editors of newspapers.141 
c. Other unions. Negotiated contract provisions which encom-
pass community environmental problems are rare. Occasionally, 
general provisions have been secured, such as the following language 
136. Project III, supra note 133, at 1-2. 
137. Id. at 2. 
138. Id. at 2. 
139. Id. at 2. This recommendation states further that after dismissal, employees 
should be paid before stockholders, and laid-off workers should be given relocation as-
sistance. Giving employees preference over shareholders would require that management 
carefully consider corporation law. For instance, officers and directors may be placed in 
a position of risking a breach of their fiduciary duties to shareholders. 
140. Id. at 2. The suggestion that a percentage of investments and profits be speci-
fied in the contract and devoted to environmental research, albeit courageous, faces 
formidable obstacles under the Taft-Hartley Act and interpretive case authority. For 
instance, one of the principles most frequently encountered for delineating those areas 
that are reserved to management for decision is that management retains the preroga-
tive of making decisions on capital expenditures. It should be recognized that if the 
tactic is attempted by a union, and if the union's insistence threatens to go to impasse 
or assumes strike proportions, an unfair labor practice charge alleging refusal to bargain 
can be anticipated. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 
(1964). The fiduciary duties of officers and directors under corporation law could also be 
a problem. Thus, this provision raises more serious, and to some extent different, con-
siderations than the other contract recommendations contained in the union's program 
for local unions. 
141. Project III, supra note 133, at 2. 
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which appears in contracts negotiated by the Glass Bottle Blowers 
Association: "Environmental Control Program: The Company will 
continue to cooperate with the Union in all legitimate labor-manage-
ment activities in this area."142 A more substantive provision is the 
health and safety section of the contract recommended by the United 
Farm Workers Organizing Committee. That provision, among other 
things, deals specifically with pesticides and establishes a health and 
safety committee comprised of workers' representatives, the members 
of which are to be given "free access to all records concerning the 
use of economic poisons" and are to participate with the company 
in the formulation of rules and practices relating to the health and 
safety of the workers.148 No worker under the agreement would be 
required to work when in good faith he believes that to do so would 
immediately endanger his health or safety.144 These provisions are 
preceded by a preamble which recites the danger to the earth's 
ecology inherent in improper use of "economic poisons," and which 
concludes that "in hope of taking progressive steps to protect the 
health of the farm workers and consumers, Company and Union 
agree that the subject of economic poison is a necessary and desirable 
subject for this collective bargaining agreement."145 
Many of the activities of the OCAW have previously been men-
tioned;146 but even though the OCA W has a progressive attitude on 
environmental matters, no local union agreements have been nego-
tiated dealing exclusively with the environment beyond the actual 
confines of the work place. As one union spokesman said, "This 
should not be interpreted as a lack of concern. Rather, it is an in-
ability to effect controls over an area where we lack jurisdiction."147 
142. Letter from Harry L. Moore, Director of Legislation, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 
to James C. Oldham, Aug. 16, 1972. 
143. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. Contract§ 18. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra. 
147. Letter from Frederick A. Linde, Presidential Assistant, Health, OCAW, to James 
C. Oldham, Nov. 22, 1971. This concern over jurisdiction would appear to conflict with 
a previous report that the OCAW planned to make pollution problems a subject for 
contract negotiations. See 1 BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 20 (1970). Perhaps 
the previous report contemplated pollution problems that have a significant bearing on 
the in-plant environment. By contrast, Olga Madar of the UAW has stated: 
[W]e have said that, for the first time, we will make the problem of general envi-
ronmental pollution a bargaining issue in our next negotiations. Pollution at the 
work place has been a subject for discussion for a great number of years but much 
more needs to be done to protect the health and safety of our membership in the 
plants. 
This year, hopefully, we are going to tackle these two together. That's not going 
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The jurisdictional question under the Taft-Hartley Act is a 
serious one.148 In Canada, where the Taft-Hartley impediments do 
not apply, contractual bargaining on out-plant environmental prob-
lems has occurred with more frequency. In a study performed by the 
Canadian Labour Congress, it was reported that all five of the unions 
which were considered149 had at one time tried unsuccessfully to 
negotiate clauses relating to the control and elimination of pollu-
tion.1110 All of the unions planned "to press this issue in their future 
negotiations,"1111 and in at least one instance, the Steelworkers upheld 
their promise. Article 22 of the 1970-1972 agreement between the 
Steelworkers and Cominco, Ltd., provided as follows: 
The Company and the Union affirm their joint objective of achiev-
ing a work environment in the Company's operations and a general 
environment in the communities which these operations affect, which 
is pollution free to the extent practical, recognizing the nature of 
the Company's industrial operations.152 
This provision, although basically a statement of good intentions, 
to be easy because it's going to be difficult to get the kind of contractual language 
which will comply with the legal structures in collective bargaining. 
Madar, Ecotactics, in 11th Farmer Labour Teacher Conference, Report, Solution to 
Pollution, Matter of Life and Death, at 39, 41 Gune 20-21, 1970). 
148. See pt. IV. A. infra. 
149. The five unions were the Pulp, Sulphite&: Paper Mill Workers, the UAW, the 
OCAW", the Glass Workers, and the Steelworkers. Canadian Labour Congress, Draft 
Report of Survey Results Concerning Environmental Activities of Five Unions 2 (un-
dated). 
150. Id. at 4. 
151. Id. The questionnaire was circulated by the Canadian Labour Congress in re-
sponse to a request from the Swedish Embassy preliminary to Sweden's hosting of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972. Letter from Jim 
MacDonald, Director, Social &: Community Programs Dept., Canadian Labour Congress, 
to James C. Oldham, July 6, 1972. Mr. MacDonald attended the United Nations Con-
ference, and subsequently observed that the minimal attention given "the working 
environment" in the "Action Plan" recommendations was "a cause of dissatisfaction to 
those of us who were 'worker' delegates in our respective national delegations." Id. 
Noting that the United States delegation to Stockholm did not include a trade unionist, 
Mr. MacDonald observed: "By and large [the United States delegates] brought little 
credit to your nation." Id. 
The Canadian Labour Congress has been attentive to pollution problems for several 
years. In addition to the 1971 questionnaire and resultant report, the Congress has 
prepared an educational film on pollution problems and devoted the citizenship month 
campaign of February 1971 to the theme of the environment. Letter from George Home, 
Director, Political Education Dept., Canadian Labour Congress, to James C. Oldham, 
Nov. 26, 1971. 
152. Agreement, Trail, Kimberly, H.B., Benson Lake, and Bluebell Operations, Be-
tween Cominco, Ltd., and Locals 480, 651, 901, 949 &: 7293 of the United Steelworkers 
of America, July I, 1970-June 30, 1972, at 59. This provision was renewed and now 
expires on May 30, 1973. 
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has nevertheless facilitated the creation of a labor-management com-
mittee on pollution.153 Shortly after the signing of the agreement, a 
Steelworker official with jurisdiction over Western Canada instructed 
his locals "that a pollution clause be made one of the major priorities 
in your next negotiations," and that "it is an issue that should be 
pressed to a strike issue unless we get verifiable evidence from the 
Companies that they have done something and are willing to put a 
clause on pollution in our collective agreements .... "154 While it is 
unlikely that local unions would treat an environmental provision 
as a strike issue, management consent to that type of provision is 
feasible without a strike threat, given the provision's generality. The 
widespread adoption of such a provision would be a useful first step 
in treating community environmental problems at the bargaining 
table and would facilitate the treatment of environmental questions 
through the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth elsewhere 
in the contract.155 
The preceding examples of union involvement in community 
environmental problems have been some of the more visible to date. 
There have been other sporadic instances of union involvement, such 
as occasional union "discoveries" of pollution with which manage-
ment is then confronted156 or which are lodged with the appropriate 
environmental protection agency.157 A few unions have been 
153. Schreiner, Steelworkers in Forefront in Anti-Pollution Battle, The Western 
Steelworker, April-May 1972, at 7, col. 1, col. 3. 
154. Id. at 7, col. 3. 
155. Grievance and arbitration clauses come in various sizes and shapes. The scope 
of the grievance provision may be broader than that of the arbitration provision. Ty-
pically, however, the two provisions will be coextensive and will provide for the treat-
ment of issues involving "the meaning, interpretation or application" of the provisions 
of the collective bargaining agreement. 
156. Compare the experience of a Rochester, New York, UAW local shop chairman 
who wrote to the International describing chemical discharges from his plant which were 
polluting nearby streams. After ascertaining that the water was in fact polluted, UAW 
headquarters took the matter up with GM's Director of Labor Relations. The reply 
from GM stated that the water sample had been taken from a sewer line, and that, in 
any event, local industrial waste engineers from the city had tested the plant's effiuent 
and found it "acceptable to their system and within existing codes." Letter from Bill 
Reece, Shop Chairman, Local 1097, UAW, to Walter P. Reuther, President, UAW, 
April 27, 1970; Letter from Irving Bluestone, Director, GM Department, UAW, to 
George Morris, Director, Labor Relations, General Motors Corp., July 5, 1971; Letter 
from George Morris to Irving Bluestone, July 16, 1971. 
157. For example, in 1971, the Safety Committee of Local No. 1974 of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers discovered pollution in a creek flowing 
east of the Western Electric plant where union members were employed. Test samples 
were sent to the Omaha Testing Laboratories, and later the EPA was contacted. Re-
portedly, the union's evidence was convincing, notwithstanding the fine reputation of 
Western Electric on environmental matters. As a result, the company took steps to 
rectify the problem. Berger, Western Electric Found Polluting Nearby Stream, The 
Short Circuit, Dec. 1971, at 3. 
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vigorous participants in the formulation of environmental trade 
associations comprised of labor, management, and professional rep-
resentatives.158 Others work with their companies or with civic 
organizations in cooperative efforts to promote conservation and en-
vironmental programs.159 A few imaginative attempts to combat 
pollution have also been made by nonindustrial unions.160 
C. Union Activity Through State 
Environmental Protection Agencies 
In correspondence with the environmental protection agencies 
of the 50 states, responses were received from 38 agencies, 76 per cent 
of those contacted. Generally, most agencies responded that, while 
they were hopeful that significant union activity in support of en-
158. The Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, together with several 
other unions, was instrumental in the organization of the Western Environmental Trade 
Association (WETA). Letter from Hugh D. Bannister, President, Western Pulp&: Paper 
Workers, to James C. Oldham, July 24, 1972. The Trade Association has a broadly 
representative board of directors and has been active in major environmental projects 
on the West Coast. See WETA, A Prospectus, 1 ·wETA Newsletter, July 1972. 
159. For example, the Glass Bottle Blowers Association indicates that it has worked 
extensively with companies to mount recycling campaigns as well as on research proj-
ects, Letter from Harry L. Moore, Director of Legislation, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. 
to James C. Oldham, Aug. 16, 1972. Similar cooperative efforts have been reported be-
tween the Air Line Pilots Association and the air line companies. See note 107 supra. 
160. For instance, Mr. Joseph Beirne, President of the Communication Workers of 
America, l\-Tote to the Chairman of the Board of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company in June 1971 to emphasize the union's belief that the Bell System owed more 
to the community than providing the best telephone service at the lowest possible 
prices. In addition to recommending that the Bell System evaluate the mining methods 
of its copper suppliers and the reforestation programs of companies from which it buys 
timber for telephone poles, President Bierne stated: 
Along these lines, the Bell System could help to speed the development of a low 
emission motor vehicle. As one of the nation's largest purchasers of motor vehicles 
with a fleet of some 128,000, it would seem reasonable that AT&T should exert 
some of its vast market power on the automobile manufacturers. The Bell System 
could provide a real economic incentive for producing low emission motor vehicles 
if it would adopt a firm policy of making all of its purchases in a given period of 
time, say five years for example, from the automobile company which is the first to 
offer a motor vehicle which meets the 1975 standards as provided for by the Act. 
If such a policy were adopted it would have its most beneficial effect if it were 
announced as soon as possible and well before the date on which compliance with 
the Act would be required. This would give the same opportunity and incentive 
to all of the auto makers and it would firmly place AT&T on the side of cleaner 
air before other major U.S. corporations, Such a policy would entail little or no 
cost to the operating companies and i[t] would be wholly consistent with the an-
nounced objectives of the Corporation, 
Letter from Joseph A. Beirne, President, Communications Workers of America, to H. L. 
Romnes, Chairman of the Board and President, AT&T, June 30, 1971. 
Another example of an effort by a nonindustrial union to combat pollution is pro-
vided by the American Federation of Teachers. That union commissioned a classroom 
teacher from Kansas City, Missouri, to prepare a detailed lesson plan on environmental 
problems for use in the school systems. Letter from Robert D. Bhaerman, Director, 
Department of Educational Research, American Fedn. of Teachers, to James C. Oldham, 
Nov. 18, 1971. See American Teacher, April 1970, at 11, for more of the specifics of this 
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vironmental abatement would be forthcoming, very little activity of 
this type had yet come to their attention. The agencies were asked 
if they had encountered any specific instances of union members 
refusing to perform acts in the course of their employment which 
would have violated federal or state environmental laws. They were 
also asked whether unions had taken any affirmative action in an at-
tempt to bring employers into compliance with pollution control 
legislation or ordinances. Finally, general information and com-
ments regarding labor union activity in the area of environmental 
protection were solicited. 
A few agencies were simply unresponsive.161 However, most re-
sponded to the questions even though they could provide very little 
information. Half of the responding states had nothing tangible or 
significant to report. 
In a number of instances, however, participation by labor in en-
vironmental protection agency hearings was reported. In three states, 
labor union testimony against the imposition of environmental con-
trols was described.162 Nevertheless, there were five states in which 
testimony had been given or active support othenvise demonstrated 
to the environmental protection agencies in favor of the imposition 
of controls.163 In three states, controls were favored by organized 
project. Unfortunately, the lesson plan concepts did not materialize to the extent orig-
inally intended. Letter from Robert D. Bhaerman to James C. Oldham, June 27, 1972. 
What was accomplished is summarized in American Teacher, April 1972, at 11. 
161. For example, Mr. Tommy Gingles, Assistant Executive Director, Air &: Water 
Pollution Control Commn., State of Mississippi, indicated that the author's letter had 
been referred to the Commission's legal staff, which replied: "We have no comment on 
this matter and to our knowledge, Mississippi statutory law is silent on this subject." 
Letter from Tommy Gingles, to James C. Oldham, Jan. 5, 1971. 
162. Letter from William A. Munroe, Chief, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, State 
of New Jersey, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 23, 1971; Letter from Aaron L. Bond, Chief, 
Health&: Air Quality Control Section, New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency, 
to James C. Oldham, July 19, 1972; Letter from Gerald R. Severson, Attorney, Texas 
Air Pollution Control Services, to James C. Oldham, July 3, 1972. Mr. Bond referred 
to invitations extended to labor unions to participate in a hearing on copper smelter 
emissions, stating that "the interest of the labor union is in supporting the position of 
the industry that no further control of emissions is desirable." 
163. Letter from John E. Daniel, Attorney, Bureau of Environmental Health, Ala-
bama Dept. of Public Health, to James C. Oldham, Dec. 2, 1971 [hereinafter Daniel 
Letter]; Letter from Norman E. Schell, Director, Div. of Air Pollution Control, Arizona 
State Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, Feb. 23, 1972 [hereinafter Schell Letter]: 
Letter from Frank P. Partee, Director, Kentucky Air Pollution Control Comm., to James 
C. Oldham, Dec. 2, 1971; Letter from Martin A. Ferris, III, Special Assistant Attorney 
General, Bureau of Air Quality Control, Maryland Environmental Health Administra-
tion, to James C. Oldham, Dec. 3, 1971; Letter from Ed Gatzemeier, Industrial Hygiene 
Engineer, Montana State Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 15, 1971. Also of 
interest in this regard are the views of James W. Murry, Executive Secretary of the 
Montana State AFL-CIO, who urged the EPA "to hold firm on the emission standards it 
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labor, but additional time was requested before the controls would 
become applicable, or controls were supported only on the condition 
that no loss of jobs would result.164 
In at least one instance, a labor union had sought an environ-
mental protection agency's assistance in bringing an action against an 
employer.165 Three states indicated that employees or union mem-
bers had individually reported employers to environmental protec-
tion agencies.166 And in one state, criminal sanctions had been sought 
by an environmental protection agency against individual employees 
for polluting activities.167 
One state agency was familiar with a local public information 
program which had been supported by a labor union,168 but in 
several additional states, the role played by labor unions was to im-
pede pollution abatement. In two of these instances, labor pickets 
precluded or interrupted the installation of pollution abatement 
equipment or waste disposal efforts,169 and in three states, it was 
set" for various smelters in the state. EPA Hearings on the Montana Air Implementation 
Plan, held in Helena, Mont., Aug. 30, 1972. 
164. Schell Letter, supra note 163; Letter from John C. Soet, Chairman, Air Pollution 
Control Commn., Michigan Dept. of Public Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 11, 1971; 
Letter from Daniel M. Barolo, Sanitary Engineer, Div. of Air Resources, New York State 
Dept. of Environmental Conservation, to James C. Oldham, July 20, 1972. 
165. In New York, an incident was reported in which union representatives ap-
proached the Department of Environmental Conservation concerning the etching of 
automobile windshields of aluminum plant employees caused by fluorides. Ultimately, 
the matter was settled between the employees and the company, and it was stated that 
"this was definitely through union action." Letter from Harry H. Hovey, Jr., Associate 
Director, Div. of Air Resources, New York State Dept. of Environmental -conservation, 
to James C. Oldham, Nov. 10, 1971. See also note 157 supra. 
166. In Rhode Island, two incidents of disposing plating rinses into state waters were 
reported by anonymous employees to the applicable environmental agency. Letter from 
Raymond J. Joubert, Senior Sanitary Engineer, Div. of Water Supply &: Pollution Con-
trol, Rhode Island Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, July 11, 1972. In Missouri, an 
incident was reported where union members approached the air conservation commis-
sion during contract negotiations and requested that certain actions be taken against 
their company. Once the contract was negotiated, no further complaints were filed. 
Letter from H.D. Shell, Acting Executive Secretary, Missouri Air Conservation Commn., 
to James C. Oldham, Nov. 9, 1971. And in Virginia, employees of a railway company 
complained to the state air pollution control board about choking fumes emanating 
from diesel engines being operated in the railroad yards. Letter from Hamilton Crock.-
ford, Information Officer, Virginia State Air Pollution Control Bd., to James C. Oldham, 
Nov. 4-, 1971. 
167. In Arkansas, it was reported that "misdemeanor charges have been brought 
against individual employees of a corporate employer for open burning in violation of 
the Air Code." Letter from James M. McHaney, Attorney, Arkansas Dept. of Pollution 
Control&: Ecology, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 9, 1971. See also note 67 supra. 
168. Daniel Letter, supra note 163. 
169. An incident was reported in New Jersey in which a union's picket line pre-
vented proper disposal of odor-causing wastes at an industrial operation. Letter from 
Herbert Wortreich, Chief Enforcement Officer, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, New 
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reported that employees had failed to use already installed pollution 
control equipment.170 
D. The Present State of Union Concern 
Did Walter Reuther's call to arms on environmental concerns in 
February 1970171 do any good? Certainly it was a catalyst for some 
action, such as the UAW's energetic collection of data, the flurry of 
resolutions by international unions, and a handful of negotiated con-
tract provisions. In retrospect, 1970 appears to have been labor's 
ecology year; less attention has been focused on environmental con-
cerns since then. Resolutions have been fewer, and no outpouring of 
contract negotiation efforts has occurred. Nothing of consequence 
was done with the data collected by the UAW. Admittedly this is no 
surprise--out-plant environmental concerns are relatively far down 
the priority list for the typical union, at least when it comes to real-
world negotiations and attendant trade-offs. Exacerbating the situa-
tion has been the depressed but inflationary economy and more than 
customary concern about job security. 
Perhaps it is time again to sound the alarm. One thing is clear 
from the UAW questionnaires: The matter is not solely academic. 
Untended out-plant environmental pollution by corporate employers 
is widespread, it frequently demands complicity of the workers, and 
it very often directly affects the lives of individual employees. With 
the economy again on an upward incline, and given the continuance 
of wage guidelines that restrain labor's traditional negotiating room, 
extraordinary attention might be directed to nonwage demands; per-
haps 1973 can be another ecology year for labor. 
What is the range of action which organized labor has at its dis-
posal? Resolutions are easy, and legislative action also can be pur-
sued, as the UAW has shown.172 Safety and health questions can 
generally be isolated and given a more central role in negotiations 
Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, to James C. Oldham, July 11, 1972. A labor 
disagreement that involved a craft union stopped progress on the installation of pollu-
tion abatement devices in Louisiana. Letter from John E. Trygg, Technical Secretary, 
Louisiana Air Control Commn., to James C. Oldham, July 24, 1972. See also note 114 
supra. 
170. Letter from William D. Christen, Hearing Commissioner, Indiana State Board of 
Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 22, 1971; Letter from Raymond G. Buergin, Air 
Quality Engineer, Air Quality & Occupational Health Section, Kansas State Dept. of 
Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 5, 1971; Letter from Carl G. Beard, II, Director, 
West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commn., to James C. Oldham, Nov. 5, 1971. 
171. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
172. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra. 
April 1973] Organized Labor and the Environment 981 
and in daily plant operations, especially with the momentum pro-
vided by OSHA. But there are two further possibilities that could 
be of major significance-if the law supports or protects them. One 
is to bring out-plant pollution questions to the bargaining table. The 
other is for unions to encourage their members to balk at performing 
work that directly results in pollution and to seek contract language 
to protect any such workers from discipline or discharge. Whether 
or to what extent these courses of action are permitted by the Taft-
Hartley Act is the inquiry to which the remainder of this Article is 
devoted. 
IV. .APPLICATION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY Acr 
A. The Duty To Bargain on Environmental Matters 
The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts created no express division 
of subject matter into mandatory and nonmandatory categories for 
purposes of the duty to bargain.173 The Supreme Court accepted the 
NLRB's use of this distinction in the Borg-Warner case174-a step 
173. A preliminary question should be acknowledged. It is fair to ask whether it 
is philosophically wise, even if legal, to extend collective bargaining to encompass out-
plant pollution. It may be argued that collective bargaining is cluttered enough without 
the imposition of this additional area and that the NLRB is without the resources to 
accommodate more unfair labor practice cases. Moreover, the varied interests of local 
and international unions will detract from the uniform development of national envi-
ronmental standards. 
In response, it is not suggested that environmental problems of unionized employers 
would be relegated solely to the bargaining table. Were that the case, surely a patch-
work pattern would result. However, from an "arsenal of weapons" standpoint, it is 
not harmful to add the bargaining process to those recourses available to individuals 
who suffer environmental degradation-especially when workers often suffer the most. 
Clearly, this conclusion obtains for the company town and the captive community, 
and it may be appropriate for the urban industrial setting as well. 
For the individual workers, no risk of a crazy-quilt pattern attends the possibility 
that they might resist the performance of environmentally injurious work. It is true 
that thorny discharge or grievance cases may occur, but policy implications would be 
minimal. Relevant by analogy are conflicts between work requirements and employees' 
religious beliefs that have been dealt with in grievance and arbitration procedures. See, 
e.g., A.O. Smith Corp., 72-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 1[ 8134 (1972) (Volz, Arbitrator); 
International Shoe Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2813 (1946) (Klannon, Arbitrator); Goodyear Tire 
&: Rubber Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2722 (1945) (McCoy, Arbitrator). There admittedly would 
be widespread plant shutdowns if all employees who perform work contributing to 
pollution simultaneously refuse to do their jobs. Raebum W. MacDonald, Chief En-
gineer for the Maine Environmental Improvement Commission, has said that "should 
employees refuse to work in factories that have not yet met their pollution control 
obligations protracted layoffs would result in connection with the type of industry 
existing in Maine." Letter from Raeburn W. MacDonald to James C. Oldham, Nov. 30, 
1971. But realistically this will not happen, and some environmental progress might 
result from bringing the operations of employers that are presently violating applicable 
pollution standards into compliance. Perhaps similar progress can occur where oper-
ations of employers are not patently illegal but are unconscionable. 
174. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
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that was viewed as unfortunate by many observers.175 Subsequent to 
Borg-Warner, the Supreme Court has continued to refine the con-
tours of the duty to bargain in terms of the mandatory-permissive 
distinction. The cases are relatively well known, but a review may be 
helpful, particularly in light of the comments from the Court in the 
recent Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision.176 
I. Supreme Court Vicissitudes 
In Borg-Warner, the central issue was whether the employer 
could lawfully insist that its collective bargaining contract with some 
of its employees include a "ballot" clause calling for a prestrike secret 
vote of those employees concerning the employer's last offer.177 In a 
five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the conclusion of the NLRB 
that the employer's insistence on this clause was an unfair labor 
practice.178 Writing for the majority, Justice Burton determined 
that the duty to bargain under the Taft-Hartley Act was limited to 
those subjects falling within the phrase " 'wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions of employment' ";179 other subjects could be 
discussed voluntarily at the bargaining table but could not be in-
sisted upon.180 Justice Burton concluded that the ballot clause re-
lated "only to the procedure to be followed by the employees among 
themselves before their representative [might] call a strike or refuse 
a final offer."181 In his view, it settled no term or condition of em-
ployment; the clause merely called for an advisory vote of the 
employees. In dissent, Justice Harlan persuasively reviewed the 
175. Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. 
L. REv. 1057, 1074-86 (1958); St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's 
Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 269, 280 (1973); Comment, 
Requirement Under Taft-Hartley Act To Bargain in Good Faith, 44 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 220 
(1960); Note, The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 MINN. 
L. REv. 1225 (1959); Comment, Bargaining on Nonmandatory Topics Constitutes Re-
fusal To Bargain, 11 STAN. L. REv. 188 (1958). 
176. Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
177. 356 U.S. at 343. Also under consideration was a "recognition" clause whereby the 
employer sought to extend recognition to an uncertified local union, rather than to 
the international certified by the Board. Since such a clause would have directly 
contravened the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court, with no dissents, found that the em-
ployer's insistence on such a clause was an unfair labor practice. 356 U.S. at 350, 362. 
178. 356 U.S. at 349-50. 
179. 356 U.S. at 349, quoting Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) 
(1970)). Although the company had met the requirements of good faith as to the man-
datory subjects of bargaining, the Court concluded that insisting upon permissive 
subjects "is, in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within the 
scope of mandatory bargaining." 356 U.S. at 349. 
180. 356 U.S. at 349. 
181. 356 U.S. at 350. 
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legislative history of both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts to sup-
port his conclusion that the decision of the majority sanctioned "an 
intrusion by the Board into the substantive aspects of the bargaining 
process which goes beyond anything contemplated by the National 
Labor Relations Act or suggested in this Court's prior decisions 
under it.''182 Justice Harlan was unable to agree with the majority 
regarding the classification of the ballot clause. Noting that the 
phrase "other terms and conditions of employment" had "been ac-
corded by the Board and courts an expansive rather than a grudging 
interpretation,"183 Justice Harlan could see no distinction between 
the ballot clause and other developments affecting "the employer-
employee relationship in much the same way" such as the timing of 
strikes or voting by employees to determine their preference before 
the union's decision to strike.184 
In 1964, the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in the Fibre-
board case185 enhanced the "grudging interpretation" of the statu-
tory phrase. There the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Warren, affirmed the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit186 that contracting out work previously 
performed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject 
for mandatory bargaining. The Chief Justice, in an opinion joined 
by four other members of the Court, 187 noted that the peaceful 
resolution of industrial disputes would be furthered by the Board's 
holding that contracting out is a mandatory subject of bargaining.188 
The Court found substantiation for its conclusion in general indus-
trial practices through which "contracting out in one form or another 
has been brought, widely and successfully, within the collective bar-
gaining framework."189 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas 
and Harlan, concurred, largely for the purpose of articulating what 
he viewed as the narrow scope of the majority holding.HlO He stated: 
182. 356 U.S. at 351-52. 
183. 356 U.S. at 353. 
184. 356 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan further argued that even if the ballot clause was 
a permissive subject, a good faith insistence upon it should not result in an unfair labor 
practice: Merely because the one party is not required to negotiate about a subject 
should not mean that the other is prohibited from insisting upon it. 356 U.S. at 353-54. 
185. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
186. Local 1304, Steelworkers v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
187. Justice Goldberg did not participate in the consideration or decision of the 
case. 
188. 379 U.S. at 210-11. 
189. 379 U.S. at 211. 
190. 379 U.S. at 217-18. 
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It is important to note that the words of the statute are words 
of limitation. The National Labor Relations Act does not say that 
the employer and employees are bound to confer on any subject 
which interests either of them; the specification of wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment defines a limited category 
of issues subject to compulsory bargaining. The limiting purpose of 
the statute's language is made clear by the legislative history of the 
present act.191 
Justice Stewart acknowledged that "[t]here was a time when one 
might have taken the view that the National Labor Relations Act 
gave the Board and the courts no power to determine the subjects 
about which the parties must bargain-a view ex.pressed by Senator 
Walsh when he said that the public concern ends at the bargaining 
room door,"192 but he reasoned that "too much law has been built 
upon a contrary assumption for this view any longer to prevail, and I 
question neither the power of the Court to decide this issue nor the 
propriety of its doing so."193 
Senator Walsh, of course, had been referring to the Wagner Act. 
That Act, as is later indicated in more detail,194 picked up the phrase 
"other conditions of employment" from pre-existing statutes, all of 
which support an expansive reading of the words. If Justice Stewart 
was obliquely admitting this fact in Fibreboard, he must have justi-
fied his narrow reading of the phrase by reliance on the legislative 
background of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. 
Justice Stewart noted the rejection in conference of the House of 
Representatives' approach of enumerating specific subjects which 
must be bargained about; however, he concluded that even though 
less limiting language was ultimately agreed upon, the final version 
adopted "the same basic approach in seeking to define a limited class 
of bargainable issues."195 But, the language enacted in section 8(d)196 
of the Taft-Hartley Act was virtually identical to the language pre-
viously utilized in the Wagner Act and other statutes; how these 
words came in 1947 to acquire a meaning exactly opposite of that 
which had prevailed before is difficult to understand. As Justice 
Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Borg-Warner,197 the rejection 
191. 379 U.S. at 220. 
192. 379 U.S. at 219 n.2. For the text of Senator Walsh's statement, see text ac-
companying note 253 infra. 
193. 379 U.S. at 219 n.2. 
194. See text accompanying notes 229-40 infra, 
195. 379 U.S. at 221. 
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
197. 356 U.S. at 355-56. 
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in conference of the "laundry list" approach of the House bill logi-
cally supports a broad reading of the language which Congress finally 
adopted.108 Justice Stewart's treatment of legislative history in the 
Fibreboard case is, at best, cavalier. 
Having concluded that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley 
Act supported a narrow reading of the phrase "other conditions of 
employment," Justice Stewart then enumerated illustrative subjects 
which he visualized as within this limited concept. Easily included 
are such things as hours of work, quantity of work, periods of relief, 
safety practices, and aspects of job security.199 However, not all deci-
sions that affect job security are encompassed. Some such decisions, 
such as the volume and type of advertising expenditures or product 
design, are not embraced because their impact on job security is too 
remote. 200 Others, such as investment in labor-saving machinery or 
liquidation of assets, are excluded because they constitute the prero-
gative of management. According to Justice Stewart: "Nothing the 
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bar-
gain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at 
the core of entrepreneurial control."201 To extend the duty to bar-
gain in this fashion would, according to Justice Stewart, "mark a 
sharp departure from the traditional principles of a free enterprise 
eonomy"-"a path which Congress certainly did not choose when it 
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act."202 
This final conclusion by Justice Stewart is highly debatable. 
Moreover, Justice Stewart was writing for only three of the eight 
Justices sitting for the Fibreboard case; the majority opinion by 
Chief Justice Warren did not speak of a narrow interpretation of 
"other conditions of employment." In fact, the potential reach of 
198. See also notes 245-52 infra and accompanying text. 
199. 379 U.S. at 222. 
200. 379 U.S. at 223. The trouble with these examples is that they are relative. 
There surely can be instances in which product design or advertising volume will 
affect employees sufficiently to merit bargaining. As noted by Chamberlain and Kuhn: 
Changes in the bargaining unit and shifts in market control and competition may 
lead unions to insist upon broadening the scope of bargaining. For example, it 
may be impractical for a single small firm to undertake an extensive advertising 
program to expand sales, but numerous small companies, bargaining collectively 
with the union, may respond to union pressures for a promotional campaign to 
which all contribute and from which all benefit. This has, in fact, happened in 
the New York City Women's Clothing Industry. Workers in the individual firms 
would be likely to feel that company's advertising plans are of no direct interest 
to them because they seem so meager in size and effect, but pitched on an industry 
basis they may be of importance because of their greater impact on sales, output, 
and employment. 
N. CHA..\!BERLAIN &: J. KUHN, CoLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING 91 (2d ed. 1965). 
201. 379 U.S. at 223. 
202. 379 U.S. at 226. 
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the majority's declaration that the words "plainly cover termination 
of employment"203 undoubtedly triggered many of Justice Stewart's 
remarks. 
Significant, too, is the language of Judge, now Chief Justice, 
Warren Burger, in the lower court opinion which the Supreme 
Court affirmed in Fibreboard. Writing for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, Judge Burger observed that the statutory definition in the 
Taft-Hartley Act of subjects about which parties were required to 
bargain was framed in "the broadest terms possible"; in his judg-
ment: 
The use of this language was a reflection of the congressional aware-
ness that the act covered a wide variety of industrial and commercial 
activity and a recognition that collective bargaining must be kept 
flexible without precise delineation of what subjects were covered so 
that the Act could be administered to meet changing conditions.20' 
As is apparent, Judge Burger's interpretation of the phrase "wages, 
hours, and other conditions of employment" stands in contrast to 
that developed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion. 
Until recently, the NLRB has relied upon the majority opinion 
in Fibreboard in giving broad content to the duty to bargain. Not 
only were other subcontracting cases encompassed, but so were addi-
tional bargaining subjects once thought to be reserved to manage-
ment.205 In 1971, however, the Board acquiesced in General Motors 
Corp.206 Responding to a charge of a Fibreboard-type breach of the 
duty to bargain, three members of the Board accepted the Stewart 
view that Fibreboard is to be limited to its facts. Thus, the transfer 
of certain business operations was held to be a sale rather than a 
subcontract, thereby necessitating bargaining over the effects of the 
sale on employees but not over the basic managerial decision.207 
203. 379 U.S. at 210. 
204. 322 F.2d at 414. 
205. McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958 (1970), enforced in part, 463 F.2d 
907 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Metromedia, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 202 (1970); Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969); Wittock Supply Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 201 (1968); General 
Motors Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 827, modified, 171 N.L.R.B. 666 (1968); Winn-Dixie Stores, 
Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced in part, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 935 (1966). Northwestern Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1963), enforced, 
343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965); Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement 
denied, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644, enforcement 
denied on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); 
Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962). 
206. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), petition for review denied sub 
nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Summit Tooling Co., 195 
N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972). 
207. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 3-8, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539-40. The Board relied on 
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Given the courts of appeals' disagreement with the Board over the 
scope of Fibreboard,2°8 and in view of the changed composition of 
the Board, acquiescence was not surprising. Nevertheless, dissenting 
Members Fanning and Bmwn argued: 
With all respect, we submit that the concurrence in Fibreboard and 
the dicta with respect to managerial decisions are not the law of the 
case. The fact is that the Supreme Court has not addressed itself 
directly to the issue here involved, and Fibreboard, while it may be 
considered limited in scope, remains the only Supreme Court pro-
nouncement in this area.209 
The courts of appeals have been even less generous, as only the Fifth 
and District of Columbia Circuits have upheld the Board's early in-
terpretation and application of Fibreboard.210 The remaining five 
circuits that have considered the question have tended to limit Fibre-
board to its particular facts.211 
Given the majority opinion in Fibreboard, it might have been 
expected that the Supreme Court would set the circuits aright by 
confirming the interpretation of Fibreboard employed by the Fifth 
and District of Columbia Circuits and by the Board until the Gen-
eral Motors case. However, the Court's recent decision in the Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass case212 casts a strong shadow over Chief Justice 
Justice Stewart's language about decisions that "lie at the very core of entrepreneurial 
control." 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 5, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539. But the Board considered 
two other factors: the need for secrecy and swiftness in these decisions, and the im-
portance of operational and financial considerations with which employees and their 
unions are not likely to be familiar. It remains to be seen to what extent the Board 
will elaborate these criteria. 
208. See N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 4 n.7, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539 n.7. See also text accom-
panying notes 266-80 infra. 
209. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 10-11, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1541. 
210. See UAW v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967); 
NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 
(1966); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965). 
211. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prod., 416 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Thompson 
Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Co., 380 
F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating &: Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191 
(3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. IOU (1966). See generally Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargain-
ing Unit Work: The Search for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty To Bar-
gain, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 803, 810-12 (1971). It should be noted that what is being 
discussed is bargaining over decisions to subcontract or to automate or the like; the 
Board has long held that bargaining over the effects of such a decision-so-called "im-
pact bargaining"-is required. See, e.g., Town &: Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 
(1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963); Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379 
(1959), enforced, 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961); Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 
(1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Brown Truck &: Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 
N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). Accord, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960). 
212. Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
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Warren's and Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger's interpretation of 
section 8( d). 
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court was asked to decide whether 
bargaining over benefits for retired employees was mandatory under 
the Taft-Hartley Act. The Court per Justice Brennan concluded 
that such bargaining was not required for three independent rea-
sons: (1) retirees are not within the definition of employees utilized 
in section 2(3) of the Act,213 (2) retired employees could not be 
legally encompassed within the bargaining unit under the statutory 
language, and (3) retiree benefits do not so vitally affect active em-
ployees as to constitute a mandatory topic of bargaining subject to 
the restrictions on midterm contract modifications set out in section 
8( d) of the Act. 
None of these reasons necessarily involved any philosophical 
damage to the collective bargaining process. As to the first two, Jus-
tice Brennan acknowledged the relevance of industrial practice, cit-
ing the majority opinion in Fibreboard,214 but he stated that 
industrial experience could not change the law regarding which 
employees could be included in the bargaining unit under the 
Taft-Hartley language.215 As to the third reason, both the court of ap-
peals216 and the Supreme Court217 acknowledged that future retire-
ment benefits of active workers are a mandatory topic for bargaining. 
Thus, the failure to embrace the benefits of already retired workers 
did not represent a narrowing of the mandatory subject area. 
However, in determining whether the benefits of retired em-
ployees so vitally affected the active employees as to present a manda-
tory subject of bargaining under the doctrine of the Oliver case,218 
the Supreme Court for the first time approvingly cited Justice Ste-
wart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard.219 Justice Brennan stated 
213. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1970). 
214. 404 U.S. at 175-76, citing 379 U.S. at 211. 
215. 404 U.S. at 176. 
216. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936, 941 (6th Cir. 1970). 
217. 404 U.S. at 180: "To be sure, the future retirement benefits of active workers 
are part and parcel of their overall compensation and hence a well-established stat-
utory subject of bargaining." 
218. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). A collective bargaining agree-
ment, establishing a minimum rental to be paid by carriers to truck owners who drove 
their own vehicles, was held to cover a mandatory subject even though the Court did 
not determine if the truck owners were themselves "employees.'' This was believed 
necessary because the rental term was "but a direct frontal attack upon a problem 
thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the 
collective bargaining contract.'' 358 U.S. at 294. 
219. Justice Brennan's initial reference to Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was 
in support of the statement that subjects for mandatory bargaining are not immutable 
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that section 8(d) of the Act "does establish a limitation against which 
proposed topics must be measured."220 Using language from Borg-
Warner, Justice Brennan indicated that the limitation generally 
includes only issues which "settle an aspect of the relationship be-
tween the employer and employees."221 Nevertheless, the Court rec-
ognized that, as in Oliver, third-party interests can be relevant to the 
duty to bargain. In each case, the test is whether the third-party 
matter "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of employment of 
bargaining unit employees.222 On the facts before it, the Court con-
cluded that the Board had misapplied this test; Justice Brennan 
stated that the Board's view that retiree benefits vitally affected 
conditions of employment of active employees "simply neglected to 
give the adverb its ordinary meaning."223 This holding, apart from 
the language used to support it and quibbling over the lack of def-
erence to the agency charged with enforcing the Act,224 is not espe-
cially objectionable. 
However, in two other respects the opinion may portend a shift to 
the Stewart position. First, the Court slighted the impact of industrial 
experience on the mandatory bargaining issue. Acknowledging the 
Board's reliance on the widespread industrial practice of bargaining 
over retiree benefits, Justice Brennan summarily dismissed the prac-
tice: "[W]e find nowhere a particle of evidence cited showing that 
the explanation for this lies in the concern of active workers for their 
own future retirement benefits."225 Pointedly omitted from this ob-
servation was any reference to Fibreboard, even though Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion placed heavy reliance on industrial practice as a 
logical factor determining whether or not a subject fell within the 
mandatory category.226 Second, in a potentially important footnote, 
the Court seemed to go out of its way to observe that, in determin-
ing whether an issue was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the 
impact on employee interests may not be the sole test: "Other con-
siderations, such as the effect on the employer's freedom to conduct 
-a proposition for which the majority opinion would have stood equally well. 404 
U.S. at 178. 
220. 404 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added). 
221. 404 U.S. at 178. 
222. 404 U.S. at 179. 
22!1. 404 U.S. at 182. 
224. For instance, notwiths~ding the Court's conclusions, the expertise of the 
Board in classifying bargaining subjects as mandatory or nonmandatory was acknowl-
edged by Justice Brennan. 404 U.S. at 182. 
225. 404 U.S. at 182, 
226. !179 U.S. at 211-12, 
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his business, may be equally important."227 As previously indicated, 
such an argument had been a crucial element of Justice Stewart's 
position in Fibreboard.228 
Justice Brennan's reliance on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard opin-
ion, his acceptance of the limited nature of section S(d), and his 
disregard of Chief Justice Warren's view of the importance of in-
dustrial practice collectively constitute a troublesome harbinger for 
the future of collective bargaining. This development is particularly 
disturbing given the legislative history of the phrase "other condi-
tions of employment" and the healthy approach to this phrase 
adopted by the majority in Fibreboard and Judge Burger in the 
lower court. The duty to bargain existed before the Taft-Hartley 
Act, as did the key statutory phrase. And, as indicated by both Justice 
Harlan's dissent in Borg-Warner and the discussion to follow, the 
legislative history tends to refute Justice Stewart's conclusions rather 
than support them. 
2. Legislative History of "Other Conditions of Employment" 
The first appearance of the phrase "conditions of employment" 
in federal statutes affecting labor occurred in the labor exemption to 
the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.229 However, in labor legislation 
the phrase more often utilized before 1914 and for nearly two de-
cades to follow was "working conditions."230 In 1932, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act231 was enacted-a statute drafted with a broad brush 
in order to eradicate widespread judicial abuses in issuing labor 
injunctions. As defined by the Act, a "labor dispute" included 
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or 
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiat-
ing, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or 
227. 404 U.S. at 179 n.19. The Court indicated that it was not presented with the 
occasion "to consider what, if any, those considerations may be." It should be noted 
that whether or not there are pertinent considerations other than the impact on 
employee interests, there is no basis in the legislative history for the assertion that 
an employer's freedom to conduct his business is "equally important." See text ac-
companying notes 229-58 infra. 
228. 379 U.S. at 223. See text accompanying notes 201-02 supra. 
229. Section 20 of the Act provided in part that "no restraining order or injunction 
shall be granted • • . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or 
conditions of employment •••• " 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970). 
230. See, e.g., the law creating the Labor Department in 1913, 29 U.S.C. § 551 
(1970); the Women's Bureau Act of 1920, 29 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 15l(a) (1970). 
231. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101-15 (1970). 
April 1973] Organized Labor and the Environment 991 
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.232 
A year later, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (NIRA).233 When President Roosevelt recommended this legisla-
tion to Congress on May 17, 1933, section 7(a) of the administration 
bill spoke of compliance by employers with "maximum hours of 
labor, minimum rates of pay, and other working conditions, ap-
proved or prescribed by the President."234 The House of Representa-
tives passed a bill containing the "working conditions" language;235 
however, during Senate consideration of the House bill, Senator 
'Walsh of Massachusetts sponsored an amendment striking "other 
working conditions" from section 7 (a) and inserting in its stead 
"other conditions of employment."236 Although there was no debate 
on the Walsh amendment, Senator '\,Valsh's intent is clear because he 
inserted his views into the Congressional Record. He stated: 
On page 8 the expression "working conditions" is used four times. 
"Working conditions" might be construed as limited to physical 
conditions within a factory. "Conditions of employment" is a much 
broader phrase and might include the problem of night labor by 
women and children and other employment restrictions as well as 
physical conditions of the factory.237 
The Senate agreed to the Walsh Amendment and the House con-
curred in the Conference Committee's recommendation. Thus, sec-
tion 7(a) of the NIRA referred to compliance by employers with 
"maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other condi-
tions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President."238 
The NIRA was passed by Congress to empower the President to 
cut unemployment and increase labor's earning strength. The powers 
given to the President were extensive, prompting the Democratic 
Chairman of the House Committee on Rules, Mr. Pou, to state 
232. Norris-LaGuarclia Act § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970) (emphasis added). See 
also section 2 of the Act, where the freedom to negotiate "the terms and conditions 
of his employment" was declared to be one of the rights that the worker should have 
and which the Norris-LaGuarclia Act was enacted to protect. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). 
233. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195. 
234. H.R. 5755, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1933) (emphasis added), in H.R. REP. 
No. 159, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1933). 
235. See 77 Cor-m. R.Ec. 4373 (1933). 
236. 77 CoNG. R.Ec. 3550 (1933). See also 77 CONG. R.Ec. 4220 (1933) (remarks of Rep-
resentative Kelly). 
237. 77 CONG. R.Ec. 4799 (1933). 
238. Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 199. 
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during floor debate that "the President of the United States is made 
a dictator over industry for the time being, but it is a benign dic-
tatorship; it is a dictatorship dedicated to the welfare of the Ameri-
can people."239 Viewed in this context, an expansive application of 
section 7(a) of the statute, as amended by Senator Walsh, was a 
congressional objective. 
This objective was swiftly carried out. Within four months after 
passage of the NIRA, the National Recovery Administration promul-
gated codes of fair competition that contained a wide variety of pro-
hibitions based on the enabling language of "other conditions of 
employment." These prohibitions included age limits for hazardous 
occupations, restraints on child labor, provisions for worker safety 
and health, limitations on reclassification of workers, and even pro-
visions on company stores and houses.240 
Against this background, the Wagner Act in 1935 created ma-
chinery making it an unfair labor practice for employers to refuse 
to bargain on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment."241 Relatively early in the legislative 
process, the predecessor of section 9(a)242 spoke of collective bargain-
ing "in respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
basic conditions of employment .... "243 Significantly, the limit-
ing word "basic" was dropped from the bill before introduction. 
Furthermore, during all of the hearings and floor discussion on the 
Wagner Act, there was no question or challenge to the use of the 
phrase "other conditions of employment." 
The sponsors made no express statement of the intended inter-
pretation of the bill. Years later, however, during the debate on 
the Taft-Hartley amendments, Senator Wagner offered a retrospec-
tive interpretation. He stated: 
By substituting the narrower term "working conditions" for the 
present broader term "conditions of employment," the bill would 
239. 77 CONG. R:Ec. 4188 (1933). 
240. NATIONAL R:EcOVERY .ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE NA-
TIONAL INDUSTRIAL R:EcoVERY Acr 9 (1935). 
241. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 49 
Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970). 
242. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453, as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
243. S. 2934 (1934) (emphasis added). This version of the Senate bill, while not 
reflected in the Congressional Record, is found in the collected papers of Senator 
Wagner (see note 254 infra). The original bill introduced by Senator Wagner on Feb-
ruary 28, 1934, S. 2926, did not include the word "basic." S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 5(2) (1934), in 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr. 1935, at I, 3 (1949). 
April 1973] Organized Labor and the Environment 993 
narrow the scope of collective bargaining to exclude many subjects, 
such as, perhaps pension plans, insurance funds, which properly be-
long in the employer-employee relationship and in regard to which 
the employer should not have the power of industrial absolutism.244 
During the early 1940's there was considerable debate about what 
constituted "management rights" under the Wagner Act. In 1945, 
the President's National Labor-Management Conference, after a 
long series of meetings, was unable to agree on a system which would 
categorize those items properly encompassed by collective bargaining 
and those items that should be excluded.245 An additional attempt 
to enumerate the collective bargaining subjects to be covered by 
the statute was rejected during the legislative process leading to 
the Taft-Hartley Act. The House bill had deleted all reference in 
section 9(a) to "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment," 
substituting instead a definition of collective bargaining in section 
2(11) that restricted the area of compulsory bargaining to specified 
subjects, such as wages, hours, seniority provisions, or safety con-
ditions.246 The minority report on the House bill noted that "[t]his 
section attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate 
for collective bargaining."247 
The Senate left section 9(a) as it was in the Wagner Act, referring 
to collective bargaining "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment."248 Instead of 
244. 93 CoNG. R.Ec, 3323 (1947). 
245. U.S. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 77, THE PRESI-
DENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 5-30, 1945, at 7, 56-62 
(1946). 
246. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The text of section 2(11) of the bill was: 
Such terms shall not be construed as requiring that either party reach an agree-
ment with the other, accept any proposal or counterproposal either in whole or 
in part, submit counterproposals, discuss modifications of an agreement during its 
term except pursuant to the express provisions thereof, or discuss any subject 
matter other than the following: (i) wage rates, hours of employment, and work 
requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-
off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer, and assign-
ment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices gov-
erning safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of employment; 
(iv) vacation and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative and procedural pro-
visions relating to the foregoing subjects. 
It is noteworthy, also, that an attempt to add pension plans, group insurance benefits, 
and hospitalization benefits to the list failed. 93 CoNG. R.Ec. 3712 (1947). This illustrates 
the importance of flexible statutory langnage, Group insurance and hospitalization 
benefits have been bargained about for years; they are matters of vital concern to 
employees and are both part of the effective wages of employees and the employees' 
"conditions of employment." See, e.g., W.W. Cross&: Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st 
Cir. 1949) (group insurance); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), 
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pensions). 
247. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947). 
248. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1947). 
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fashioning a limiting definition of collective bargaining, the Senate 
bill added section 8(d). That section picked up the language from 
section 9(a) and states, among other things, that collective bargaining 
"is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and 
the representatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith in respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment ... .''249 In the Conference Committee, 
the Senate bill was accepted, and the flexible approach toward 
bargaining subjects was maintained.250 As evaluated by Judge Major 
of the Seventh Circuit in the Inland Steel Co. case:251 
We do not believe that it was contemplated that the language of 
Sec. 9(a) was to remain static. Congress in the original as well as in 
the amended Act used general language, evidently designed to meet 
the increasing problems arising from the employer-employee rela-
tionship. As was said in Weems vs. United States . .. : "Legislation, 
both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an 
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, 
be necessarily, confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. 
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth."252 
To some, the vital principle of the Wagner Act was a laissez-
faire bargaining philosophy. This view of the duty to bargain is 
captured by the widely quoted remarks of Senator Walsh: 
When employees have chosen their organization, when they have 
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort 
them to the door of the employer and say, "Here they are, the legal 
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those 
doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire 
into it.253 
Senator Wagner undoubtedly concurred in his colleague's ap-
praisal of the intended effect of the statute, but his aspirations for 
249. Id. § S(d). 
250. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947). 
251. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 
960 (1949). 
252. 170 F.2d at 254, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). At 
issue in Inland Steel was whether an employer could make unilateral changes in 
pension and welfare policies of unit employees. It was held that unilateral changes 
were not permitted, since the policies constituted a mandatory subject for bargaining. 
The court rejected the company's argument that since the pension plan did not take 
effect until retirement, the plan did not affect the employees during the term of their 
employment. 
253. 79 CONG. R.Ec. 7660 (1935). These remarks were referred to by Justice Harlan 
in his dissent in Borg-Wagner, 356 U.S. at 354. 
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the legislation ran deeper. Wagner's objective was more than to es-
cort the parties to the bargaining table; he wanted to change their 
status into something which approached a bargaining partnership. 
This hope is reflected in his papers and speeches.254 For example, in 
1926, Wagner stated: "In place of the old relation of master and 
servant the new day demands a partnership between corporate 
industry and organized labor."255 Wagner also prophesied the in-
creasing importance of organized labor in the United States, con-
cluding that "necessarily the whole present relationship of organized 
labor to industry must change."256 In 1937, Senator Wagner sum-
marized his feelings in this way: 
I believe that Labor and Industry can and should be left entirely to 
solve their own problems, upon a basis of partnership, and that the 
function of the federal government is to protect only the basic in-
dustrial liberties upon which such a partnership must be founded.257 
254. The Lauinger Library of Georgetown Universty is the receptacle of the col• 
lected papers of Senator Wagner (1877-1953). The papers were given to Georgetown 
University in 1952 after sitting in disarray in the basement of the Old Senate Office 
Building since June 28, 1949, when Senator Wagner resigned from the Senate due to 
ill health. From 1952 until the early 1960's, the papers were stored in the basement of 
the Riggs Library of Georgetown University, disturbed only by an occasional scholar. 
It has been only since the beginning of 1972 that any effort has been made to cata-
logue the papers, and these efforts remain far from complete. 
In 1968, J. Joseph Huthmacher, a professor of history at Georgetown University, 
published an "unofficial" biography entitled: SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RlsE 
OF URBAN LIBERALISM. The primary source of the book was the collected papers, a 
source which Professor Huthmacher stated in his preface was poor because "[Wagner] 
left behind little in the way of personal reflection." Id. at vii. Since the completion of 
this book, the papers have been generally undisturbed by researchers. 
An examination of the Wagner papers by two of the author's labor seminar 
students confirmed Professor Huthmacher's appraisal of the documents as a research 
source. There were few position papers or draft bills on the development of the initial 
Wagner Act, although there was some very general correspondence pertaining to cer-
tain sections of the Act with key people of the day (such as Secretary of Labor Perkins, 
National Recovery Administration Administrator Johnson and General Counsel Donald 
Richberg, union leaders, and civil rights leaders); none of these letters contains specific 
formulations of basic sections of the Act. Strikingly, there is no correspondence relevant 
to the Act between the Senator and President Roosevelt or Mayor LaGuardia, two of 
Wagner's closest political allies. Professor Huthmacher suggests in his preface that 
the reason for this is "that in the age of telephone and rapid transportation, poli-
ticians simply do not communicate very much with each other on paper-to history's 
loss." Id. at x. There are also very few handwritten notes of the Senator on any 
subject in the papers and none that pertains to the Act. 
Nevertheless, the papers do yield a "feel" for the labor attitudes of the era and for 
the philosophical objectives of Senator Wagner as he strove to enfranchise the labor 
movement. Possibly other attributes of the papers will surface as the cataloguing is 
completed and the documents become amenable to more systematic scrutiny. 
255. Address by Senator Wagner, New Responsibilities Of Organized Labor, New 
York State Fedn. of Labor Convention, Rochester, N.Y., Aug. 28, 1926. 
256. Id. 
257. Address by Senator Wagner, Yale Law School, April 16, 1937. 
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Surely one of the industrial liberties underlying such a partner-
ship is the freedom to insist upon bargaining over a broad range of 
conditions of employment, according to the relative impact of those 
conditions on the parties and their degree of interest in dealing with 
them. To prevent this from happening is clearly out of keeping with 
the spirit of Senator Wagner's legislation and its subsequent amend-
ments.25s 
3. The Response of the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals 
The NLRB has not pursued the "hands off" policy articulated 
by Senators Wagner and Walsh. But neither was the Board skimpy 
in its pre-1971 approach to the subjects over which there must be 
bargaining.259 The general attitude of the Board was to construe the 
duty to bargain broadly and to expand the bargaining territory to 
encompass new concerns of significance to the workers. As Justice 
Harlan observed: 
The most cursory view of decisions of the Board and the circuit 
courts under the National Labor Relations Act reveals the unsettled 
and evolving character of collective bargaining agreements. Provi-
sions which two decades ago might have been thought to be the 
exclusive concern of labor or management are today commonplace 
in such agreements. The bargaining process should be left fluid, free 
from intervention of the Board leading to premature crystallization 
of labor agreements into any one pattern of contract provisions, so 
that these agreements can be adapted through collective bargaining 
to the changing needs of our society and to the changing concepts 
of the responsibilities of labor and management.260 
The NLRB decision in the Fibreboard case261 illustrates Justice Har-
lan's point. Theretofore, subcontracting had been viewed as the 
exclusive preserve of management. The Board further held in Adams 
Dairy, Inc.262 that a dairy's decision to change its delivery system in 
order to sell its trucks and replace its drivers with independent con-
tractors should have been bargained with the union. In Winn-
258. In fact, Wagner stated in 1937 that it was wrong to expect the government to 
do the job of bargaining: "[I]t is a mistake to treat industry and labor as the immature 
children of a parental state." Address on CBS Radio, June 4, 1937. 
259. It may not be irrelevant to observe that since the enactment of the Wagner 
Act, the Board has operated under a Democratic administration for 25 of 38 years. 
260. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 358-59 (1958) (con-
curring and dissenting opinion). 
261. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). 
262. 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement denied, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), 
vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644, enforcement denied on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). 
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Dixie Stores, Inc.263 the Board concluded that bargaining should be 
held concerning an employer's decision to close its cheese processing 
plant in favor of an independently operated packaging process, and, 
in Ozark Trailers, lnc.,264 a decision to close a facility was held to be 
bargainable due to the attendant loss of jobs and the importance of 
job security to the Warren opinion in Fibreboard.265 
Nevertheless, as previously indicated, the Board has yielded in 
recent cases to the views of the courts of appeals.266 The tension 
between the Board and the courts of appeals over Fibreboard had 
become pronounced. The estrangement extended not only to major 
"entrepreneurial" issues, but also to minor disputes about what are 
"conditions of employment." Illustrative of the latter disputes is a 
series of cases dealing with food prices at employers' cafeteria or 
vending machine facilities. In Westinghouse Electric Corp.,261 the 
trial examiner ruled that the company had violated sections 8(a)(l) 
and 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act268 by refusing to bargain with 
the union about changes in cafeteria food prices.269 On review, 
the Board concluded that bargaining over every food price change 
was impracticable, but bargaining was required in response to a 
"specific union request for bargaining about changes made or to be 
made."270 Before the Fourth Circuit, a three-judge panel upheld 
the Board's order by a vote of two to one.271 However, on review en 
bane, the three-judge panel's decision was reversed, and enforcement 
of the Board's order was denied.272 
The incident which precipitated the dispute in Westinghouse 
Electric was an increase by the caterer of five cents in the price of 
hot food entrees and an increase of one cent in the price of carry-out 
coffee.278 In the view of the full Fourth Circuit, this decision did not 
substantially affect conditions of employment and, therefore, was 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The court stated that the 
NLRB was 
263. 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced in part, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 935 (1966). 
264. 161 N.LR.B. 561 (1966). 
265. See !179 U.S. at 210-11. 
266. See text accompanying notes 206-11 supra. 
267. 156 N.LR.B. 1080, enforced, !169 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), enforcement denied 
on rehearing en bane, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967). 
268. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (5) (1970). 
269. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1083-93. 
270. 156 N.LR.B. at 1081. Members Jenkins and Zagoria dissented. 
271. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891 (1966). 
272. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (1967). 
273. 387 F.2d at 545. 
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apparently unwilling to acknowledge that in determining whether 
a given matter should be deemed a mandatory bargaining subject, 
the courts, as well as the Board itself, have recognized a legal dis-
tinction between those subjects which have a material or significant 
impact on wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, and 
those which are only indirectly, incidentally, or remotely related to 
those subjects.274 
This distinction was pivotal in the court's view, because "practically 
every managerial decision has some impact on wages, hours, or other 
conditions of employment . . . .''275 In reaching its conclusion, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected the Board's view that Congress had used the 
phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in its "broadest 
sense.'' Instead, the court relied on Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion in Fibreboard to the effect that the phrase is restricted to a 
limited category of issues subject to compulsory bargaining.276 
In light of the legislative history of the phrase "other conditions 
of employment," continued reliance on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard 
analysis is unfortunate and, in many cases, unnecessary. For instance, 
it would not offend the legislative history of the statutory phrase to 
engraft upon it a materiality or substantiality test. Simply in order 
to have a manageable bargaining process, mandatory bargaining 
should be limited to those subjects that are of real significance to 
the workers. From this point of view, the result reached in Westing-
house Electric may be acceptable. 
If a materiality standard is to be applied, however, it is important 
that the test be qualitative, not quantitative. This point was noted 
by Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit in his dissenting opinion in 
McCall Corp.277-another cafeteria price decision in which the 
Board's bargaining order was not enforced. Judge Sobeloff thought 
that the availability or nonavailability of reasonably priced food on 
an employee's working premises was "an important 'physical dimen-
sion' of any employee's working environment" and a mandatory 
bargaining subject.278 "The monetary amount in a given case is 
irrelevant; the test of 'materiality' ... is a qualitative, not quantita-
tive, test."279 His suspicion that McCall or Westinghouse Electric 
might have been decided differently if there had been sharp food 
price increases rather than modest ones seems instinctively sound. 
274. 387 F.2d at 547. 
275. 387 F.2d at 548. 
276. 387 F.2d at 545-46, citing 379 U.S. at 220-24. 
277. McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970). 
278. 432 F.2d at 189. 
279. 432 F.2d at 189. 
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And surely Judge Sobeloff is correct in suggesting that the nature of 
the bargaining issue should control, not the monetary amount in-
volved. 280 
4. The Industrial Experience 
In evaluating a "qualitative materiality" standard, it is useful to 
consider industrial bargaining experience. In the large industrial 
unions, basic wage and fringe benefit packages may be negotiated 
at the national level and national attention may focus on these issues. 
At the local level, however, bargaining proceeds on a remarkably di-
verse collection of topics, many of which may seem utterly trivial 
to outsiders even though they can significantly affect the quality of 
life for the industrial worker. Examples may be drawn from the 
local bargaining results achieved by the UAW at various GM plants 
in the 1970 negotiations. The local bargaining demands and settle-
ments reached between the UAW. and GM during this period in-













Parking Jots be cleaned once per week. 
Agreed, on a scheduled basis.282 
Plastic trash barrels be used. 
Agreed to experiment with plastic trash can liners.283 
Booster batteries and cables and wrecker service be 
provided for employees during winter. 
Agreed to provide battery boosters and cables.284 
Transportation be provided to and from main cafe-
teria for lunch for employees assigned to work outside. 
Rejected. 285 
Ice cream machine be provided in tool rooms. 
Agreed.286 
Waterless hand soap be supplied for garage mechanics 
and oilers. 
Agreed.287 
280. The NLRB did not acquiesce in the Fourth Circuit's views, but continued 
to apply the principles enunciated in its own opinions in Westinghouse Electric and 
McCall Corp. See, e.g., Package Mach. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 77 L.R.R.M. 1456 
(1971), enforcement denied, 457 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1972). 
281. These excerpts were obtained from the materials referred to in note II5 supra. 
The demands were categorized as pertaining to "working conditions" or as "miscella• 
neous." 
282. Cadillac Motors Plant. 
283. Id. 
284. Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Flint. 
285. Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw. 
286. A.C. Plant, Flint. 
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Weekly cafeteria menus be posted by all time clocks 
and bulletin boards. 
Management will request cafeteria to comply.288 
Picnic tables be placed throughout the plant. 
Fifteen picnic tables purchased.289 
All vending machine items be time- and date-stamped. 
Sandwiches will be date-stamped.200 
Chewing tobacco be made available in vending 
machines. 
Agreed.291 
Electric hand dryers be installed at all wash-up loca-
tions and toilets. 
Rejected.292 
Almost all of the above examples might be considered nonmanda-
tory subjects for bargaining if a quantitative substantiality test is 
used along the lines suggested by the en bane opinion in Westing-
house Electric. For instance, posting cafeteria menus on a weekly 
basis is surely no more significant than a slight increase in cafeteria 
prices. Yet, management listened to all of the above demands-and 
more-because all of them were of real significance to the quality 
of the working environment of the employees and affected their at-
titudes toward their jobs. Admittedly, some of the demands which 
might have proved costly, such as electric hand dryers in washrooms, 
were rejected by management. Since they were probably regarded as 
luxuries by the employees, no major issue was made of them, but at 
least bargaining took place. 
It may be said that these examples merely reflect voluntary 
bargaining in which any enlightened management will engage for 
employee relations purposes. But this observation begs the question. 
The point is that industrial practice-an important element of 
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Fibreboard-supports these de-
mands as mandatory bargaining subjects, as do the legislative history 
of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley amendments, and the inter-
pretation of that history as reflected in the NLRB decisions in 
Westinghouse and McCall. 
Local bargaining may soon encompass some aspects of the out-
plant environment. Already there have been instances of bargaining 
288. Chevrolet Plant, Norwood. 
289. Chevrolet Truck Plant. 
290. Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Warren. 
291. Fisher Body Plant, Mansfield. 
292. General Motors Assembly Div. Plant, Wilmington. 
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over the impact of fallout from the employer's plant on employee's 
cars in outside parking lots.293 Bargaining may develop with regard 
to the impact of employer pollution on nearby recreational facilities 
and similar matters.294 If so, this bargaining, as well as the local ex-
amples described above, can and should be accommodated by the 
Taft-Hartley Act. 
5. Summary Reflections on Fibreboard 
As a bargaining relationship becomes more stable and longstand-
ing, the spectrum of subject matter dealt with at the bargaining table 
tends to broaden.295 Occasionally these experiences approach the 
partnership concept contemplated by Senator Wagner.296 In other 
situations, even though there is no partnership, management never-
theless engages in bargaining on subjects which might not, in many 
courts, be regarded as mandatory. Bargaining occurs because it is 
politically expedient in terms of public and employee relations. 
This is particularly true at the local level, as has been documented 
by the experience between GM and the UAW. 
In the company town or captive community, an employer is rela-
tively more powerful than in the urban industrial setting and may 
resist the partnership concept since it would mean relinquishing a 
significant bargaining advantage without clear legal or economic 
compulsion to do so. Thus, in geographic settings where employees' 
lives are most affected by their employers, voluntary bargaining on a 
cooperative basis over whatever subjects are of real concern to the 
workers will rarely occur. This is exactly why employers operating 
remote lumber camps are obliged under the Taft-Hartley Act to 
bargain over matters that have not been construed as mandatory in 
less remote communities;297 and the analogy between the urban in-
dustrial setting in today's economy and the captive community sug-
gests that distinctions heretofore applied may not remain appropriate. 
293. See note 119 supra. 
294. Cf. the picnic table demand in text accompanying note 289 supra. 
295. See C. RANDLE, CoLLEcnVE BARGAINING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 132 (1951). 
296. For instance, in the ladies' garment industty, collective bargaining contracts 
"specify the conditions under which •an employer may reorganize his business, or enter 
into another partnership, or send material to other firms for fabrication • • • ." Id. 
at 131. As early as 1926, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and Hart, Shaffner, and 
Marx reportedly worked together to arrange for "a more minute subdivision of labor 
than formerly, the substitution of machine work for many hand operations, a reduc-
tion in the number of styles and increased efficiency in routing material through the 
plant.'' Id. 
297. See NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953); Weyer-
hauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949). 
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The proper question is one of the relative qualitative impact on 
the workers. Whenever geography, technology, or other factors 
yield new circumstances that significantly affect the workers, bargain-
ing should follow.298 This may require an adjustment of the tradi-
tional prerogatives of management and labor, but as a UAW repre-
sentative noted: "The whole history of bargaining is one of workers 
taking away management rights .... They would not have made 
any progress if they hadn't."299 
The majority opinion's interpretation in Fibreboard of "other 
conditions of employment" is sound. To the extent that the majority 
opinion has been overshadowed by the Stewart concurring opinion, 
the majority views should be resuscitated. It is hoped that the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass opinion will not do permanent damage to the 
limber approach to the duty to bargain employed in Fibreboard by 
Judge Burger and Chief Justice Warren. 
Collective bargaining must be maintained as a malleable vehicle 
that can adapt to changing conditions. One such changing condition 
is the impact of out-plant environmental pollution on the workers. 
In company towns and in captive communities, where bargaining 
over a broad range of issues is mandatory, bargaining on out-plant 
pollution should also be mandatory. In urban industrial settings, 
where the impact of an employer's out-plant pollution on employees 
is great,300 the statutory language and legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act dictate the same result. 
B. Individual Refusals To Perform Environmentally Injurious 
Work as Concerted, Protected Activity 
Gilbert Pugliese's environmental encounter with his employer 
has already been summarized.301 Pugliese refused to continue to per-
form what had previously been part of his job-punching a button 
which released thousands of gallons of oil into the Cuyahoga River. 
Pugliese settled his case out of court and was reinstated. But 
had he not succeeded, would he have had recourse under the Taft-
Hartley Act? A strong case under existing authorities can be made 
for the proposition that any discipline or discharge of Pugliese by 
298. For a discussion of changes occasioned by technology, see D. BOK &: J. DUNLOP, 
LABOR AND THE .AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970), particularly ch. 12, entitled: Frontiers of 
Substantive Bargaining. Layoffs due to environmental requirements are as attributable 
to technology as layoffs due to automation. 
299. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 1970, § A, at 6, col. I. 
300. See notes 45.53 supra and accompanying text. 
301. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra. 
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Jones and Laughlin would have constituted a violation of section 
8(a)(l) of the Act.302 However, the results in a particular case may 
differ depending on whether a union is involved. If there is no 
union, recourse to the NLRB and successful prosecution of a section 
8(a)(l) charge are entirely feasible. If there is a union, under present 
law employees may have to tum exclusively to the union for help. 
This might result in the successful processing of grievances, to the 
point of arbitration if necessary, but if the union is unsympathetic 
and can devise a nonarbitrary reason for declining to press the griev-
ance, the employees could be left without a remedy. While this result 
is by no means certain under existing law, it is a sufficient possibility 
to prompt a suggestion for ameliorative legislation.303 
However, it is useful to explore first the scope of concerted activi-
ties protected by section 7 of the Act304 in those cases uncomplicated 
by the presence of or resistance by a union. The effect of a union 
on the scope and protection of those rights can then be more 
meaningfully considered. 
I. Concerted, Protected Activity 
Jill Severn was employed by the Washington State Service Em-
ployees Council and the Service Employees Union (SEU) Local No. 
6, in May 1969 as an organizer of nursing home and hospital em-
ployees in the Seattle area.306 She was competent at her job, and at 
the same time she was personally active in social causes not directly 
related to her employment. As president of an organization known 
as Radical Women, she participated in a picket line sponsored by 
another labor organization on strike against a photo-finisher in 
Seattle.306 This picketing activity, which occurred early one morning 
prior to her normal working hours, was covered by the local press. 
President Hare of Local 6 of the SEU, after reading the news story, 
told Severn that this type of activity reflected badly upon the union 
and she should either choose to work for the union or for Radical 
Women, but not for both. Severn did not make this election, but no 
302. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1970). 
303. See text accompanying notes 386-400 infra. 
304. Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970): "Employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection •••• " 
305. Washington State Serv. Employees State Council No. 18, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 
at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1467 (1971). 
306. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467. 
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discipline was imposed.807 Later, Severn participated in a demon-
stration at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport under the auspices of the 
Central Contractors' Association, an organization active in promot-
ing job opportunities for blacks. Many of the demonstrators, in-
cluding Severn, were arrested for criminal trespass, and on November 
7, 1969, Severn's arrest was reported prominently in the morning 
newspaper.308 President Hare told Severn that he was much dis-
turbed, contending that "her participation in the outside organiza-
tion would make her ineffective as an organizer because the employers 
whose employees she was organizing would point to her as someone 
who would likely be sent to jail."809 Severn responded that the em-
ployees she was organizing were about fifty per cent black, so that her 
outside activity in support of minority employment would not be 
harmful. Hare and Severn were unable to resolve their differences, 
and Severn was discharged. a1o 
The NLRB, adopting the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the trial examiner, ordered reinstatement of Jill Severn 
on the grounds that her discharge constituted an interference with 
protected, concerted activities under the Taft-Hartley Act.811 Citing 
the Phelps Dodge decision of the Supreme Court,812 the trial ex-
aminer concluded that the necessary element of "concert" under the 
Act was present, even though Severn was the only employee of Local 
No. 6 at the demonstration: The employees acting in concert need 
not all work for the same employer.313 In addition, citing the 
Second Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss 
Chocolates Co.,314 the trial examiner concluded that Severn was 
protected even though the demonstration at the Seattle-Tacoma Air-
port was not aimed at the hiring practices of her own employer.815 
Thus, according to the NLRB, an individual's exercise of con-
science can be protected under the Taft-Hartley Act when these acts 
are supported by other employees, whether or not of the same em-
307. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467. 
308. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467. 
309. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468. 
310. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468. 
311. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 1-2, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1469. 
312. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) 
313. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4-5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468. 
314. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing 130 F.2d 503 (1942). 
315. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468-69. The trial examiner also 
noted that there was no substantial evidence that Severn's activity "was truly inimical 
to Respondents' business activities as a labor organization." 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5, 
76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing NLRB v. Local 1229, !BEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
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ployer, assuming that no substantial interference with the business 
interests of the employer taking disciplinary action transpires. 
Furthermore, the exercise of conscience need not be related to the 
employment practices of the employee's own company. 
When the circumstances of the worker's own employment are at 
issue, protection under the Act is even more secure. For instance, 
in KPRS Broadcasting Corp.,816 a secretary named Carole Wise was 
held by the Board to have been protected under section 8(a)(l) of 
the Act when she spoke up at a shareholder meeting in defense of 
another employee, disputing claims by the corporate owners that 
the employee was a "militant." This action, in the view of the 
Board, allied Ms. Wise ·with the other employee's efforts to secure 
improved working conditions, for which retaliation by the company 
was not permitted.317 
Even though, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, "concerted activities 
for the purpose of mutual aid or protection are not limited to union 
activities,"318 there must be some element of concert. Often, as in 
the case of Gilbert Pugliese, an exercise of conscience may be initi-
ated by the individual action of an employee, although it may be 
accompanied or quickly followed by sympathetic action by other 
employees. These initial individual actions are not necessarily unpro-
tected; protection will depend on the factual circumstances. Indi-
vidual complaining does not constitute protected activity.319 How-
ever, when individual complaining coalesces with some expression 
inclined to produce group or representative action, the activity be-
comes protected.320 
The thinness of the dividing line between the two types of cases 
is illustrated by decisions holding that a single employee's encourage-
ment of individual fellow workers to present grievances is unpro-
tected,321 but a single employee attempting to induce his coworkers 
316. 181 N.L.R.B. 535 (1970). 
317. 181 N.L.R.B. at 536. Consider, too, the first NLRB decision in Tanner, which 
did not focus on the impact of the union, but which held that protests by a small 
group of employees in the unit to induce their employer to hire more blacks were pro-
tected under section 8(a)(l). Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, vacated and 
remanded, NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967). See also 
note 353 infra. 
318. Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (1953). 
319. Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967); Mushroom Transp. 
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d 
Cir. 1951); Southwest Latex Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 358 (1969); Gulf Container Corp., 161 
N.L.R.B. 734 (1966). 
320. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 935 (1970). 
321. NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971); Mushroom Transp. 
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to join in a petition regarding a common grievance is protected.322 
Protection is also accorded if the individual is presenting grievances 
on behalf of others.323 
In the Ninth Circuit's Signal Oil decision,324 an employee's re-
mark, expressing sympathy with a threatened strike, was held to be 
concerted since, even though aimed at only one nonunion listener, 
it was related to group action. The employer had argued that in 
order to be protected, comments had to be made pursuant to a 
"plan," "joint scheme," or "pre-existing group understanding," with 
the specific design of urging those to whom it was addressed to 
engage in "group action." This argument was rejected by the 
court.a21> 
The various attitudes of the courts of appeals toward what con-
stitutes "concerted" activity were surveyed recently by the Third 
Circuit in NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.326 A nonunion employee's 
attempt to secure holiday pay, which he believed to be due him 
under the collective bargaining agreement, was held unprotected. 
The "constructive" concerted activity theory, utilized by one court 
to sanction any individual action to enforce a collective agreement,327 
was rejected.328 The court relied in part upon language from the 
Seventh Circuit that "'it is necessary to demonstrate [at least] that 
the activity was for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group 
action to correct a grievance or a complaint.' "329 Seven years earlier, 
in the Mushroom Transportation case,330 the Third Circuit had 
extended this concept to include not only group action but also "talk 
looking toward group action."331 
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 
(4th Cir. 1949); Union Carbide Corp., 171 NLRB 1651 (1968). 
322. Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953). 
323. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1969); Signal 
Oil &: Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum 
Elec. Co-op, 285 F .2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). 
324. Signal Oil&: Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (1968). 
325. 390 F.2d at 342. The employer relied on Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 253 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 
1958); Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255 (1965); General Elec. Corp., 155 
N.L.R.B. 208 (1965). Instead, the court, 390 F.2d at 342, relied upon NLRB v. J.G. 
Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1943), where it was held that "[a] discharge of 
a non-union employee because of a ••• belief that he was sympathetic to, or active in, 
a union, violates sections [8(a)(l) and (3)] •••• The fact that the alleged union 
activity extends 'outside his own employment' is immaterial." 
326. 440 F.2d 881 (1971). 
327. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). 
328. 440 F.2d at 884-85. 
329. 440 F.2d at 884, quoting Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (1967). 
330. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (1964). 
331. 330 F.2d at 685. The Third Circuit in Northern Metal indicated that Mush-
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These comments by the Seventh and Third Circuits highlight 
the fact that the group objective need not pertain to the entire 
collective bargaining unit; a group effort to vindicate an individual 
employee's grievance may suffice. Thus, leaving aside the impli-
cations of the presence of a union, Gilbert Pugliese might qualify 
for reinstatement under section 8(a)(l) of the Act in view of the 
sympathetic reaction of some of his fellow workers who made a group 
effort to see his individual grievance satisfied. Moreover, what Pug-
liese was asked to do as a part of his job was not merely unconscion-
able by his own measure; it was unlawful under the Refuse Act of 
1899.832 
2. Refusal To Engage in Unlawful or Unconscionable 
Activities as Concerted~ Protected Activity 
It is hardly a radical notion that employees should be protected 
from discipline or discharge for refusing to perform unlawful acts. 
This proposition has been applied by the Board in a variety of 
situations. 
The Board has ruled that an employer violated the Act by at-
tempting to induce an employee to give false testimony to a Board 
agent.333 Similarly, the Board has held that an employee's refusal 
to sign a false statement, regarding overtime payment found to be 
due her after a Labor Department investigation, is protected, con-
certed activity.334 And in another situation, the Board found that 
an employer had violated the Act by requiring employees to sign 
a petition exonerating the company of any wrongdoing.335 
Related decisions hold that it is protected, concerted activity 
for employees to take steps to see that statutes are complied with 
by reporting alleged violations to appropriate authorities. Reporting 
possible violations goes beyond mere "griping" or complaining about 
working conditions, which may be unprotected. Thus, in Gibbs Die 
Casting Aluminum Corp.,336 an employer was found to have vio-
room Transportation represented the extent of its willingness to stretch the concerted, 
protected activity concept of section 7. 440 F.2d at 884. 
332. Ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)). 
333. Dubois Fence &: Garden Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1966). This same result had 
been reached in Oregon Teamster Security Plan Office, 119 N.L.R.B. 207 (1957), with 
the Teamsters as the employer asking the employee to give false testimony or to avoid 
testifying at all. In National Springs Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 148 (1966), the Board held it 
a violation for the employer to threaten reprisal against the author of an affidavit to 
the Board. 
334. Gem Knits, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 449 (1969). 
335. Fennel's Auto&: Body Works, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 35 (1968). 
336. 174 N.L.R.B. 75 (1969). 
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lated section 8(a)(l) by laying off three employees who had com-
plained to local health department officials about excessive methy-
lene chloride fumes in the plant. It was held that the employees were 
engaged in protected, concerted activity even though the employee 
making the actual complaint did not inform the department that 
she was acting on behalf of other employees or advise any coworkers 
that she had filed a complaint.837 
In Illinois Ruan Transport Co.,838 the Board held that an em-
ployee could not be discharged for taking his truck to an ICC 
inspection station for a safety check. This case, together with other 
decisions on which the Board relied,339 establishes the proposition 
that an employee may not be denied the right to speak with public 
authorities regarding conduct of his employer that violates public 
regulations, and any discharge or discipline based on an employee's 
effort to present such a grievance would constitute an interference 
with concerted activity, protected under section 7. This position 
has judicial support.340 
More often, however, the courts have examined the problem of 
unlawful acts from the perspective of employees who engage in 
unlawful behavior, rather than from the point of view of those who 
refuse to do so. The courts have been consistent in concluding that 
illegal activities by employees are not protected by the Taft-Hartley 
Act. An early, firm statement on this point was made by the Supreme 
Court in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,341 and there are 
numerous subsequent authorities to the same effect.342 In these de-
cisions, the unprotected, illegal employee activity has involved vio-
lence or other demonstrative antisocial conduct. 
337. 174 N.L.R.B. at 78-79. See also Kansas Refined Helium Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 1037 
(1969), where an employee's attempt to have the trial examiner's recommended order 
posted on the bulletin board was precluded from being the basis for disciplinary action. 
338. 165 N.L.R.B. 227 (1967), enforcement denied, 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1969). The 
court of appeals denied enforcement because the employer had other, valid reasons for 
the discharge. Although the court found it unnecessary to reach the point, it was 
assumed, arguendo, that such a visit to the ICC would by itself be a protected, con-
certed activity. 
339. 165 N.L.R.B. at 231-32, citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1265 
(1966); Socony Mobil Oil, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1965), enforced in part, 357 F.2d 
662 (2d Cir. 1966). 
340. In Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court upheld 
the Board's finding that an employer had illegally fired an employee for writing a 
letter to the state health department concerning unsanitary conditions in the plant 
restroom. 
341. 306 U.S. 240, 254-55 (1939). 
342. See, e.g., Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 
1969); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1967); Titan Metal 
Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B.196 (1962). 
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If these physical elements are absent, but the employee behavior 
remains unlawful, protection under the Act will still be denied. 
For instance, in American News Co.,343 the Magazine Mailers' and 
Deliverers' Union of North Jersey bargained for and won a wage 
increase from the American News Company but struck when the 
increase was suspended because of wartime wage restraints. The 
Board concluded that "a strike prosecuted in order to compel an 
employer to violate the [Stabilization] Act of October 2, 1942, is 
not within the concerted activities protected by section 7."344 
Based on logic, policy, and the foregoing authorities, the con-
clusion in American News can be fairly adapted to Gilbert Pugliese's 
situation. Thus, refusing an employer's order to violate the Refuse 
Act of 1899 is within the concerted activities protected by section 7. 
Had the dumping of oil by Jones and Laughlin into the Cuya-
hoga River not been unlawful, would Pugliese's refusal nevertheless 
have been protected? The issue becomes one of differing mores and 
a question of whose conscience is entitled to prevail.345 The principal 
issue in this context is the precise duty of loyalty, if any, owed by 
an employee to his employer.346 When the Supreme Court dealt with 
this issue in the Jefferson Standard case,347 it disapproved of con-
certed activities by television technicians who sponsored and dis-
tributed "second-class city" handbills designed to impugn the techni-
cal quality of their employer's product. The Court noted that the 
employees' attack related to no labor practice of the company, made 
no reference to wages, hours, or working conditions, but instead at-
tacked policies "of finance and public relations for which manage-
ment, not technicians, must be responsible."348 In the Court's judg-
ment, "nothing could be further from the purpose of the Act than 
to require an employer to finance such activities."349 
343. 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). 
344. 55 N.L.R.B. at 1312. 
345. This dilemma recurs throughout society in a wide array of situations. A recent 
illustration taken from the military is the problem in Viet Nam concerning the per-
sonal responsibility of soldiers carrying out superior orders which, while not clearly a 
violation of military law, are to the individual soldier morally indefensible. Consider, 
too, the defense extended by the courts to conscientious objectors who otherwise 
would be forced against their consciences to participate in immoral conduct. See, e.g., 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Granted, the Constitution is operative in 
these cases, but the analogy to forcing employees to do acts which are by their per-
sonal moral codes unconscionable is clear. See also note 353 infra. 
346. See generally Blumberg, supra note 54. See also Blades, Employment at Will vs. 
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. 
L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967). 
347. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
348. 346 U.S. at 476. 
349. 346 U.S. at 476. Even under these circumstances, Justice Frankfurter, joined by 
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However, in the Jefferson Standard case, the employees' acts 
verged on misrepresentations to the public. The employees were left 
unprotected because of the caustic and aggressive appeal to the 
public, which made no reference to a labor dispute and resulted 
in undue business damage to their employer.850 Operating on what 
the Court perceived as fair play, the behavior was left unprotected. 
It is quite another matter for an employee to refuse to perform work 
he views as unconscionable. There may be no interference with the 
employer's legitimate business interests in this situation. Surely 
there is none if the employee can be assigned to other work and the 
dispute thereby ended. Even if the dispute reaches the point where 
the employer is requested to remedy the unconscionable conditions, 
the employee should be protected so long as no substantial business 
of the employer is disrupted. This test was applied to Jill Severn's 
case, and it is a reasonable minimum standard.851 
3. The Effect of a Uriion on the Scope and 
Protection of Section 7 Rights 
The broad mandate of section 7, giving employees the right to 
engage in or refrain from organization, collective bargaining, or 
other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, has been 
the central source of individual rights created by the Taft-Hartley 
Act. However, in particular situations these section 7 rights are 
tempered by the majority-rule principle of section 9(a),852 which 
states that the selected employee representative is the exclusive col-
lective representative for all employees in an organized bargaining 
unit. Tension between these two sections arises when a minority of 
union members or nonunion employees in the organized unit engages 
in concerted activities without union approval. To what extent does 
the vesting of exclusive bargaining power in the union limit 
minority employee rights? Or, putting the question another way, are 
individual members of an organized bargaining unit, such as Gilbert 
Justices Douglas and Black, filed a strong dissent, concluding that the majority had 
misconstrued "legislation designed to put labor on a fair footing with management." 
346 U.S. at 480. 
350. 346 U.S. at 476. 
351. See text following note 315 supra. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 7010), 
added by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 
Stat. 103: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, 
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 
352. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
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Pugliese, required to channel their concerted activity exclusively 
through their bargaining representative, with no concurrent or sub-
sequent recourse if the bargaining representative proves unhelpful? 
In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.,353 the Ninth Circuit 
denied protection to activity which was admittedly concerted, be-
cause the picketing employees had failed to discuss their grievance 
with the union before initiating action designed to increase the 
hiring of blacks by their employer. A review of the choices open to 
the Tanner court and the few pertinent cases subsequently decided 
suggests that the principle enunciated in Tanner may be given wide 
application. 
When a union is operating in a collective bargaining unit, sec-
tion 9(a) advances industrial stability by assuring the employer that 
his only bargaining adversary will be the authorized representative 
and that he need not deal with factions whose demands might con-
flict with those of the majority. This concept was central to the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Allis-Chalmers case354 in which fines 
by a union against its members who had violated the union's consti-
tution and bylaws by crossing picket lines during a strike were up-
held. Relying on fair representation cases, 355 the Court spoke of the 
importance of majority rule and the concomitant loss of some indi-
vidual rights in the bargaining process that employees in the unit 
must suffer.856 
The Court in Allis-Chalmers invoked the majority-rule principle 
to dispose of a problem between individual employees and their 
union. Usually, however, the problem of majority rule and minority 
protests has arisen in the context of bargaining demands. Probably 
353. The Tanner case originally came before the .Board in 1964, which held that 
the employer had violated section 8(a)(l) by discharging two employees who had en-
gaged in the protected, concerted activity of protesting their employer's alleged racially 
discriminatory hiring practices. 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964). The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the Board's finding that the concerted activities of the employees were protected under 
section 7 of the Act. However, the court remanded the case for the Board to consider 
whether any such activities should be channeled through the established collective 
bargaining representative pursuant to the requirements of section 9(a). 349 F.2d I 
(1965). On remand, the Board reaffirmed its original finding, reasoning that section 
9(a) was irrelevant since the employees were not "acting in derogation of their 
established bargaining agent" by seeking to end "morally unconscionable" behavior. 
166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967). The Ninth Circuit finally held that by failing in their 
"obligation" to speak first with the union representative, the employees were deprived 
by section 9(a) of the protection otherwise provided for concerted activity. 419 F.2d 216 
(1969). 
354. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). 
355. 388 U.S. at 180, citing Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1959). 
356. 388 U.S. at 180-82, 
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the most well-known decision of this type is NLRB v. Draper 
Corp.,357 decided nearly thirty years ago by the Fourth Circuit. A 
group of employees struck to protest alleged delaying tactics by their 
employer in contract negotiations with the certified union. The 
union did not call, authorize, or sanction the strike, which the court 
characterized as "wildcat" and refused to protect under section 7. 
The court stated that "employees must act through the voice of the 
majority or the bargaining agent chosen by the majority" in order 
to promote effective bargaining.358 Clearly, the court feared that 
extending protection to minority action would lead to a breakdown 
of the collective bargaining process, and, no matter what its goals, a 
protected but unauthorized strike would erode the representative 
status of the certified union. This viewpoint prevailed in a number 
of subsequent decisions.359 
Despite the general disapproval of minority strikes, the Fifth 
Circuit introduced a more flexible approach in 1964 in NLRB v. 
R.C. Can Co.360 The court held that minority action could be pro-
tected when taken in support of union objectives. The court recog-
nized the importance of bargaining with an exclusive agent, but laid 
greater stress on the competing interest of allowing union members 
to "speak effectively in behalf of their own organization and the aims 
and objectives which it collectively seeks to assert in their behalf."361 
The court fashioned the following test: If the minority's action was 
"in criticism of, or opposition to, the policies and actions" previously 
adopted by the majority, such "diverse, dis·sident action is not pro-
tected .... If, on the other hand, it seeks to generate support £or 
an acceptance of the demands put forth by the union, it is pro-
tected . . . . "862 
In the Tanner case, the Ninth Circuit had its choice, but rejected 
R. C. Can in favor of Draper, which it viewed as "more in accord 
with the concept of orderly bargaining premised upon democratic 
union processes."363 The court in Tanner limited somewhat the 
plenary sweep of Draper by reserving as premature the question 
of what action the minority group might take if the majority (the 
357. 145 F.2d 199 (1944). 
358. 145 F.2d at 203. 
359. NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); Plasti-Line, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 
(7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951). 
360. 328 F.2d at 974. 
361. 328 F.2d at 979. 
362. 328 F.2d at 979. 
363. 419 F.2d at 221. 
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union) refused to press for the requested objective.364 If this were 
to happen, the focus would shift to the duty of fair representation 
and the principles enunciated in Vaca v. Sipes.365 In Vaca, the Su-
preme Court articulated and applied the test that "[a] breach of the 
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's 
conduct toward a member of a collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or in bad faith."366 
The treatment of the concerted minority action question in 
Tanner has recently been reinforced by the decision of the Fifth 
Circuit in NLRB v. Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.367 The case involved a 
minority walk-out without consultation with union officials, who 
later disapproved of the strike. The Fifth Circuit, which had pre-
viously constructed the R.C. Can approach, now dismissed it as "of 
doubtful viability" since it had not been referred to in subsequent 
Fifth Circuit cases and because it had been rejected in Tanner.868 
The court was concerned about the breadth of the R.C. Can test: 
If union objectives are characterized in general terms-such as wages, 
job security, conditions of employment and the like-one can assume 
that in a great majority of instances minority action will be consis-
tent with one or more of those objectives. If R.C. Can is not applied 
with great care it would allow minority action in a broad range of 
situations and permit unrestrained undercutting of collective bar-
gaining. 369 
The court in Shop-Rite did not completely discard the R.C. Can 
test, but limited it to minority action toward a "specific, previously 
considered and articulated objective."370 Realistically, this narrower 
proposition substantially eviscerates R.C. Can.371 
364. 419 F.2d at 221. The court later noted: 
We think it arguable that in cases where employees, not acting through the 
union, initiate in a peaceful and non-disruptive manner an activity which would 
otherwise be protected under section 7, but is not by reason of section 9(a), the 
employer has a duty to tell them that the matter must be taken up through the 
union, and, if the employer does not do so, he has waived his right to object on 
that ground, so that section 7 becomes fully operative. We do not decide this 
question; we think it is for the Board to decide in the first instance. 
419 F.2d at 222. 
365. 386 U.S. I'll (1967). 
366. 386 U.S. at 190. 
367. 430 F.2d 786 (1970). 
368. 430 F.2d at 790-91. 
369. 430 F.2d at 790. 
370. 430 F.2d at 790. 
371. The court in Shop-Rite did offer a final disclaimer: "We do not hold that there 
cannot be circumstances in which an employee or minority group of employees, may 
engage, without reference of the matter to union processes, an action which is pro-
tected under section 7 •••• " 430 F.2d at 791. 
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In a case now working its way through appeal, it appears that 
the NLRB has accepted the Tanner-Shop-Rite rationale. The Em-
porium372 involves the discharge of two employees for picketing their 
employer's store because of alleged racial discrimination against em-
ployees. Although it was the "official" union position that employer 
discrimination existed, the union's approach was to process the 
charges through traditional grievance and arbitration channels. The 
employees were seeking more rapid results, and they embarked on 
a public education and boycott campaign. The trial examiner's re-
port, adopted by the Board, found: 
It would be absurd to say that because they [the pickets] and the 
Union had a common ultimate objective, these four employees were 
somehow implementing or strengthening the Union in its position. 
They were acting outside the agreement and contrary to the Union's 
advice and urging. 378 
The Tanner-Shop-Rite doctrine has important implications for 
employees such as Pugliese who resist the polluting activities of their 
employer in circumstances where a certified bargaining represen-
tative is present. If the objective of the resistance is to effectuate a 
change in conditions of employment which would pertain to the 
entire bargaining unit, these employees must tum to their union 
for help. If the union is amenable, a contract provision could be 
sought to give employees the desired protection.874 If the union 
declines to pursue this objective, there would likely be no recourse 
under Vaca v. Sipes since the union's refusal would almost certainly 
be free from arbitrariness, bad faith, and discrimination. Thus, as-
suming that the protection sought does not constitute a "specific, 
previously considered and articulated objective" of the union, the 
employee may be left without recourse, unless the employer has 
waived his right in the manner discussed in Tanner.875 
Faced with this dilemma, an employee in Pugliese's position 
could take a stand resulting in discharge or discipline and then 
request the union to process a grievance upon his behalf seeking 
reinstatement. Since almost all union contracts have a "just cause" 
provision limiting discharges, a grievance of this type would gen-
erally be appropriate.876 There is considerably less likelihood that 
372. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971), appeal pending, No. 71-1656 (D.C. 
Cir.). 
373. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 19, at -, 77 LR.R.M. at 1670. 
374. See text accompanying notes 414-19 infra. 
375. See note 364 supra. 
376. Even so, the economic burden on any worker in this situation highlights the 
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the union would refuse to process this grievance in good faith on 
nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory grounds; in fact, this might well 
be a type of grievance the union would be actively interested in 
supporting. 
Two further distinctions must be recognized. First, it may be that 
an employee such as Pugliese will be chiefly interested in ending his 
personal involvement in continued pollution by his employer; his 
objective is to be relieved of the task of pressing the "pollution but-
ton," even though he realizes that others in the unit will continue to 
be required to do it.377 Second, it is possible that the objective 
sought, whether personal to a single employee or a broader goal 
with ramifications for the entire bargaining unit, concerns a matter 
outside the scope of what has traditionally been mandatory bargain-
ing subject matter. 
The Ninth Circuit in Tanner dealt with both of these points 
by concluding, in both opinions, that picketing by employees in 
support of a policy of nondiscriminatory hiring did "relate to terms 
and conditions of employment."378 Instead of referring to non-
discriminatory hiring as a mandatory subject for bargaining, the 
court simply called it a "proper subject" of collective bargaining.879 
The court may have been choosing its words very carefully since the 
Board and the courts have been ambiguous about whether "condi-
tions of employment" must be involved for activities to be protected 
by section 7 to the same extent as in determining mandatory subjects 
for bargaining. This ambiguity stems from section 7 cases in which 
no organized bargaining units exist and the duty to bargain is not 
pertinent. For example, Jill Severn's activity on behalf of Radical 
Women and minority hiring in the construction trades was pro-
tected under section 7. Yet her activity could not have been charac-
terized as involving "conditions of employment" in a bargaining 
sense. Applying the tests of Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Borg-Warner, 
nothing vitally affecting her fellow employees was at issue and no 
aspect of the employer-employee relationship was settled. 
Surely the scope of section 7 is not reduced by the existence of 
a union, notwithstanding the implications of Allis-Chalmers. Em-
importance of seeking, in contract negotiations, provisions of the type discussed at 
text accompanying note 420 infra. 
'!,77. This was in fact Pugliese's situation during his first round with the company. 
He was content for a considerable period of time not to be personally required to 
dump the oil, although others in the unit continued to perform this task. See text 
following note 56 supra. 
378. 349 F.2d at 4; 419 F.2d at 218. 
379. 419 F.2d at 218. 
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ployees·do become subject to majority rule when a union is certified; 
but if employees have majority support in the unit, they should be 
able to engage in activity for mutual aid or protection to the same 
extent as if no union were present since they theoretically will be 
able to direct union policy in pursuit of their objectives (except for 
matters waived by a collective bargaining agreement). When there 
is no union, often there is no inquiry of any kind as to whether the 
activity relates to "terms and conditions of employment." No in-
quiry was made as to Jill Severn, indeed, it could not have been 
since the Board noted in Severn's case that activity for mutual aid 
or protection need not even relate to one's own employer. 
The Ninth Circuit's finding of unprotected activity was based, 
on the language of section 9(a) of the statute. That section designates 
certified unions as "exclusive representatives ... in respect to rates 
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment," with the proviso that individual employees or groups of 
employees have the right to present individual grievances to their 
employers without the intervention of the union as long as the 
union has the opportunity to be present.380 The court in Tanner 
observed: "There appears to be a difference between collective bar-
gaining and presenting grievances, else why did the Congress limit 
the provision in section 9(a) to grievances?"881 One effect of this 
difference, in the court's opinion, was to restrain employees from 
bargaining indirectly through the grievance procedure over subject 
matter which should be left to the negotiation and administration 
of the collective bargaining contract. "Thus, the desire of employees 
for non-discriminatory hiring, while a proper subject for collective 
bargaining, may not be a proper basis for a grievance."882 However, 
this proposition should operate in the other direction as well. To 
paraphrase the court's language: Employer discipline over a refusal 
to do work which yields unconscionable pollution, while possibly not 
a proper subject for collective bargaining, may still be a proper basis 
for a grievance. 
In fact, the Tanner court was conscious of this distinction. In 
its second opinion, the court noted that the desire of the employees 
for nondiscriminatory hiring related to a condition of employment 
"affecting the entire bargaining unit"-a condition which was not 
"personal" to the two employees who were picketing. 383 The court 
380. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
381. 349 F.2d at 5. 
382. 349 F.2d at 5. 
383. 419 F.2d at 21~. 
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also explained some of its previous decisions upholding individual 
employee action notwithstanding the presence of a union on the 
basis that the activity involved the presentation of grievances under 
section 9(a).884 In one of these earlier decisions, the court had ex-
pressly rejected an employer's argument that under section 7 activi-
ties for "other mutual aid or protection" must be related to "the pur-
pose of collective bargaining."880 
The conclusion that emerges from the language of sections 7 and 
9(a), as they have been construed by the Board and courts, is that 
activity for mutual aid and protection by a minority of employees 
which is not aimed at all employees in the unit-which is not bar-
gaining-oriented but "personal"-remains protected, notwithstand-
ing the presence of a union and the application of the Tanner and 
Shop-Rite decisions. Othenvise, employees should be advised that 
the presence of a union means not only the loss of individuality 
which attends majority rule, but also a diminution of the substantive 
scope of their protection under section 7. 
4. Statutory Protection for Individual Refusals To 
Contribute to Unlawful Employer Activities 
The case law clearly establishes that unlawful employee conduct 
is unprotected.886 Conversely, it follows that a concerted refusal to 
obey an employer's order to violate the law is protected. But, where 
there is a union, any such refusal by employees may have to be sent 
under Tanner and Shop-Rite through union channels from which a 
satisfactory resolution may never emerge. This problem would be cir-
cumvented by statutory protection which would provide that a 
refusal by an employee to perform work that directly contributes to 
a violation of the law would not be deemed a strike and would be 
protected under section 7. 
There is direct precedent for such an approach in section 502 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act.887 That section provides, in part, that work 
stoppages by employees "in good faith because of abnormally danger-
ous conditions for work at the place of employment" shall not be 
deemed a strike under the Taft-Hartley Act. Illustrative of the ap-
plication of this section is the decision of the Third Circuit in Phil-
384. 419 F.2d at 219 n.l, discussing Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB, 
206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 
1966). 
385. NLRB v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966). 
386. See text accompanying notes 341-44 supra. 
387. 29 u.s.c. § 143 (1970). 
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adelphia Marine Trade Association v. NLRB.888 In that case, a group 
of longshoremen refused to unload one ship by a method that they 
thought was abnormally dangerous. The Trade Association did not 
contest the NLRB's finding of abnormally dangerous conditions, but 
argued that its subsequent lockout of all longshoremen "was justified 
because its purpose was to compel the union to abandon a 'quickie 
strike,' and to compel the submission of the dispute to arbitra-
tion. "389 The court stated: "The short answer to this is because the 
union's activity was found to come within the ambit of section 502, 
it was not a strike in violation of the contract, but, on the contrary, 
was protected activity."890 
In order for protection designed along the lines of section 502 
to be meaningful, however, the subjective good faith belief of the 
employees as to the existence of abnormally dangerous or unlawful 
conditions should be sufficient to invoke the statute. It is this issue 
-whether an objective or subjective test is to be applied-that has 
dominated the litigation under section 502. In NLRB v. Knight 
Morley Corp.,891 a subjective test was applied: all that need be shown 
is that the workers could reasonably consider the working conditions 
to be abnormally dangerous.392 In later decisions, however, the 
NLRB and the Eighth Circuit have concluded that an objective test 
for abnormally dangerous working conditions is appropriate. 898 
Furthermore, as the Board has recently stated, 
Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances which change 
the character of the danger, work which is recognized and accepted 
by employees as inherently dangerous does not become "abnormally 
dangerous" merely because employee patience with prevailing condi-
tions wears thin or their forebearance ceases.394 
Even under the Board's approach, employees should be protected 
388. 330 F.2d 492, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 (1964). 
389. 330 F.2d at 495. 
390. 330 F.2d at 495. 
391. 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). 
392. 251 F.2d at 759. The condition in question was an unusually unpleasant com• 
bination of dust, grit, heat, and humidity inside _the plant, due in large part to 
malfunctions in the blower providing the Yentilation required by Michigan's statute. 
251 F.2d at 756. 
393. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964); 
Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473 (1963). In Fruin-Calnan, the construction 
of section 502 by the Sixth Circuit in Knight Morley was expressly rejected. 330 F.2d 
at 892. In the Curtis Mathes case, decided before Knight Morley, an opposite result 
was reached on virtually identical facts. 
394. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.LR.B. No. 51, at 20, 80 L.R.R.M. 1780, 1782 
(1972), citing NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964). 
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from extraordinary danger that exists above and beyond the normal 
hazards of their work. Yet, such protection will have little significance 
unless activated by the good faith belief of the employees as to the 
nature of the extraordinary danger. These points were recognized 
recently by the Third Circuit in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine 
Workers.8911 In conjunction with a dispute between the union and 
the employer over a reduced air flow in a mine shaft, it was discovered 
that certain foremen had been making false entries on the log book 
recording the air flow.896 When these foremen were reinstated, the 
employees, led by the union, walked off the job. The employer sought 
to deal with the situation under those sections of the contract provid-
ing for final and binding arbitration of "any local trouble of any 
kind" at the mine.397 Acknowledging the strong federal policy in favor 
of arbitration, the court nevertheless reached the following conclu-
sions: 
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordi-
nary disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to submit 
matters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened society en-
courages, much less requires, them to do so. If employees believe that 
correctible circumstances are unnecessarily adding to the normal 
dangers of their hazardous employment, there is no sound reason for 
requiring them to subordinate their judgment to that of an arbitrator, 
however impartial he may be.sos 
The suit in Gateway Coal was not brought under section 502, but the 
court supported its conclusion by referring to section 502 and by 
citing its earlier decision in Philadelphia Marine Trade Association 
and the Sixth Circuit's Knight Morley decision.399 Nevertheless, the 
opinion, although salutary in outcome, may not persuade the Su-
preme Court, which has taken the case on certiorari.400 
A revival of the subjective test utilized in Knight Morley could 
ameliorate the problem of the Tanner doctrine. If a minority of 
employees protest what they in good faith believe to be abnormally 
dangerous working conditions, their activity cannot be deemed a 
395. 466 F.2d 1157 (1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S., Feb. 26, 1973). 
396. 466 F.2d at 1158. 
397. 466 F.2d at 1159. 
398. 466 F.2d at 1160. 
399. 466 F.2d at 1160. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co. v. 
NLRB, 330 F.2d 885 (1964), was not cited. However, the dissenting judge observed that, 
as he read the statute, section 502 "requires a third party, a court, to determine the 
reasonableness of the union's belief in the abnormally dangerous condition." 466 F.2d 
at 1162. 
400. 41 U.S.L.W. 3462 (Feb. 26, 1973). 
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strike and would be protected even if the employees did not elect to 
go to the union first. Applying a subjective standard to section 502 
or granting statutory protection for an employee's refusal to obey an 
employer's order to contribute to unlawful activity is not contrary to 
the Tanner rationale. Tanner rests on the necessity of preserving the 
exclusivity of the union's role as the bargaining representative-a 
role undercut by activities of a minority of employees seeking to 
secure additional benefits or to apply pressure on the employer. The 
union, however, has no power to countenance violations of the law 
by its employees. Nothing the union could negotiate or arbitrate with 
the employer would solve this problem, short of agreement to accept 
the employee's refusal to perform the illegal act. Also, as Gateway 
Coal recognizes, "no enlightened society" should encourage, much 
less require, employees to arbitrate a matter of life or death. The 
same should be true of violations of the law. Forced negotiation or 
arbitration of these problems is materially different from requiring 
employees to subordinate their economic demands to those articu-
lated by the chosen collective bargaining representative. 
Perhaps section 502 suits will be exempted by the courts from the 
Tanner-Shop-Rite doctrine. But, absent this development, statutory 
protection of an employee's refusal to contribute to a violation of the 
law, either by amendment to section 502 or by independent legis-
lation, would be helpful. Any such legislation would probably cir-
cumvent Tanner and Shop-Rite by inference, although express 
language to this effect could easily be incorporated. 
V. ILLUSTRATIVE AND RECOMMENDED CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
The extent to which out-plant environmental matters can be 
brought to the bargaining table will vary according to the type of 
contract language sought. Some of the attempts which have been made 
by labor have been previously discussed. Those provisions, and other 
ideas, need now to be considered against the legal backdrop of legis-
lative history and case authority giving content to the duty to bargain. 
A. The 1AM Environmental Shutdown Provision 
Under the established holdings of the NLRB, the provision 
negotiated by the 1AM concerning environmental shutdowns401 
clearly covers a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is unnecessary 
to apply Fibreboard in analyzing this provision since the object of 
401. See text accompanying note 76 supra. 
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the provision is not the decision to shut down, but the impact of the 
shutdown on the workers. Although the shutdown or layoff would be 
caused by economic problems precipitated by governmental require-
ments, this should be treated the same as shutdowns for other 
economic reasons. Bargaining is required over the impact of partial 
plant closings and complete plant shutdowns.402 
B. The United Farm Workers Economic Poisons Provision 
As earlier indicated,403 the United Farm Workers' contract has a 
provision that combines general ecological recitations with provisions 
concerning the use of pesticides that directly affect the worker's 
health as well as the welfare of the public. There should be no 
question that this provision represents a mandatory bargaining sub-
ject, even under the views of the courts of appeals. Justice Stewart in 
Fibreboard acknowledged that safety issues concerning the lives of the 
workers during their working experience were encompassed by the 
duty to bargain.404 
C. The Steelworkers and Glass Bottle Blowers General Policy 
Provisions 
It is not realistic to consider the provisions concerning general 
environmental policy negotiated by the Steelworkers or Glass Bottle 
Blowers405 as involving a strike issue; whether either is construed as 
a mandatory bargaining issue is academic. It is likely, nevertheless, 
that management would cooperate in fashioning such a provision, and 
the presence of this type of provision in a collective bargaining agree-
ment would be a first step that might in succeeding contracts lead to 
more substantive arrangements. Moreover, it is possible that the 
contract provision would generate meaningful grievance and arbitra-
tion cases. 
D. The Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers Comprehensive 
Proposal 
Some parts of the proposal of the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill 
Workers400 should be regarded as mandatory subjects of bargaining 
402. See General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), 
petition for review denied sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
note 211 supra. 
403. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra. 
404. 379 U.S. at 222. 
405. See text accompanying notes 142 & 152 supra. 
406. See text accompanying notes 132-41 supra. 
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under existing law, such as the environmental layoff protection. 
Other parts, such as the contract provision for disclosure of financial 
records to support an employer's claim of high pollution abatement 
costs ( other than as a part of required bargaining over threatened 
layoffs or suspensions), would be met with claims of managerial pre-
rogatives. It can be argued that all such information is relevant to 
job security as information to be used by a union to avert layoffs. But 
this is what Justice Stewart's opinion in Fibreboard was all about 
-the fact that an issue affects job security is not enough in all cases.407 
The same problem occurs with regard to the provision of the 
Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' proposal earmarking a 
percentage of investment and profits for environmental research.408 
This type of provision not only raises a management prerogative 
question, but also requires an allocation by management of capital 
funds-exactly the sort of thing that Justice Stewart was talking about 
in Fibreboard409 and that was picked up subsequently in the Darling-
ton case.410 Yet, this is an example of a provision where Justice 
Stewart's narrow interpretation is harmful. If employees wish to press 
for these demands and if their lives are significantly affected, 411 the 
law and times should adjust. Employer prerogatives are not written 
in stone, and this provision would settle an aspect of the employer-
employee relationship.412 It is a condition of employment on which 
407. 379 U.S. at 222-23. 
408. Compare the one-half cent per hour industry contribution for environmental 
research won by the United Rubber Workers in 1970. Pearlstine, Labor's Pollution 
Campaign Goes Up in Smoke, Wall St. J., April 19, 1971, at 14, col. 3. 
409. 379 U.S. at 223. 
410. Textile Union Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1963), involved 
the decision by a board of directors to close down a plant rather than recognize the 
newly elected union. Faced with the question whether this action constituted violations 
of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3), Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, asserted: 
Whatever may be the limits of § 8(a)(l), some employer decisions are so peculiarly 
matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations 
of § 8(a)(l), whether or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they 
also violated § 8(a)(3). Thus it is not questioned in this case that an employer 
has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action on 
concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than discrimina-
tory reasons. 
380 U.S. at 269. 
411. Whether or not employees are vitally affected, to use Justice Brennan's Pitts• 
burgh Plate Glass term, is an inquiry in all cases as a practical matter. The substantial• 
ity of the impact of the subject on the employees necessarily is a factor in evaluating 
the subject as a potential strike issue. 
412. As previously discussed, the Court in Borg-Warner apparently used this test 
as a means for determining what would or would not be a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. The ballot clause being proposed by the company was excluded because 
"[i]t settles no terms or condition of employment-it merely calls for an advisory vote 
of the employees. It is not a partial 'no-strike' clause. A 'no-strike' clause prohibits 
the employees from striking during the life of the contract. It regulates the relations 
between the employer and the employees." 356 U.S. at 350. 
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bargaining should be required to the extent pressed by either party 
at the bargaining table. 
The Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' approach has one 
strategic advantage. By intermingling clearly mandatory provisions 
with arguably nonmandatory ones, the burden is shifted to the em-
ployer to winnow out the nonmandatory features. This may prove a 
delicate process, both from a legal and political standpoint. Manage-
ment might choose to resolve such a problem by bargaining on the 
entire proposal until a resolution is reached, instead of picking the 
proposal apart on jurisdictional grounds.413 
E. Suggested Provisions for Individual Employee Protection 
Three general types of provisions can be negotiated to protect 
the individual employee.414 One would provide that no discipline or 
discharge of employees could be imposed for reporting an employer's 
pollution violation. This provision should clearly be mandatory 
under the Taft-Hartley Act. It is akin to the "just cause" provisions 
that have been around for years. There should not be particularly 
strong employer opposition to this type of provision. 
Another possible provision would prohibit discipline or discharge 
for a refusal to perform work that directly contributes to unlawful 
pollution. This provision should also be mandatory under existing 
law. Employees can refuse to perform unlawful acts.415 Conversely, 
employees are not protected if they are engaged in unlawful behavior 
or seek unlawful goals.416 This provision can also be construed as an 
aspect of familiar "just cause" contractual language. Here, as in all 
of the contract provisions discussed, the grievance and arbitration 
process could play a significant role. 
Finally, a third section could provide that no employee could be 
disciplined or discharged for refusing to perform work that directly 
contributes to improper pollution. Once again, this could be a part 
of the "just cause" provision, and the term "just cause" might be 
defined in the contract to exclude this type of behavior. The employ-
ees' interest in being able to refuse this type of work is clearly a con-
dition of employment-not only would it be a "bone of conten-
tion"417 between the employer and the employees, but also it would 
41!1, As later indicated, this strategic feature also attends the conglomerate proposal 
suggested at text accompanying note 420 infra. 
414. These provisions are hypothetical; to the author's knowledge they have not 
been negotiated in practice. 
415. See text accompanying notes !1!1!1-40 supra. 
416. See text accompanying notes !141-44 supra, 
417. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 676 (1949). 
1024 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:935 
be related to job security. Moreover, this type of provision directly 
involves the employer-employee relationship, and, in the language of 
Borg-Warner,418 echoed in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,419 it would settle 
an aspect of the employer-employee relationship. Admittedly, this is 
a subject to be negotiated and would call for a rule of reason. If the 
essence of an employee's job unavoidably involves environmentally 
harmful acts that the employee views as unconscionable (though not 
unlawful), and if no transfer is feasible, the employee might be law-
fully fired. But in any case, construction of the contract provision 
would be required, and useful advantage might be taken of the 
grievance and arbitration procedures. Moreover, in the process the 
employer may be sensitized to environmental considerations not 
previously considered-a salutary by-product of including this type 
of provision in the bargaining mainstream. 
F. A Suggested Conglomerate Provision 
The following provision is suggested as a model for handling 
environmental problems through collective bargaining.420 
(a) An employee shall in no way be penalized for refusing to perform 
a job or task, if his refusal is based on a good faith claim that the job 
or task will contribute to an unlawful or unduly hazardous pollution 
condition. Upon any such refusal, the employee shall be given suitable 
work elsewhere in the plant, if such work is available. If no suitable 
work is available, the employee shall be sent home, and the time lost 
by the employee shall not be paid for by the company. 
(b) If the plant is closed partially or completely by any government 
agency for an alleged violation of a pollution control standard, all 
employees affected by the closing shall receive full compensation at 
their regular rate of pay for any time lost for a period of __ days 
or until such time as the employees secure suitable employment else-
418. 356 U.S. at 350. 
419. 404 U.S. at 178. 
420. Although hypothetical, the various parts of this conglomerate provision have 
been adapted from a number of sources, such as Leonard Woodcock's environmental 
blackmail legislative proposal (see text accompanying notes 79-85 supra), the Pulp, 
Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' outline for an environmental protection committee 
(see text accompanying notes 135-36 supra), and various contract provisions designed 
to deal with health and safety problems. The health and safety provision after which 
paragraph "(a)" in the text is fashioned was negotiated by the UAW in Philadelphia 
in a contract between Local No. 1069 and the Vertol Division of Boeing Aircraft 
Company. That provision included the following language: 
An employee shall not be discharged for refusing to work on a job if his refusal is 
based on a claim that said job is not safe or might unduly damage health •••• 
Pending such determination, the employee will be given suitable work elsewhere 
in the plant, if such work is available. If no suitable work is available, he will 
be sent home. The time lost by the employee shall not be paid for by the com-
pany. 
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where, whichever is shorter. The company shall provide assistance in 
relocating employees and, wherever possible, shall retain the em-
ployees on the payroll by transferring them to other company opera-
tions. Employees shall not be paid for any time lost after having been 
offered suitable alternative employment, if such employees decline to 
accept such employment. 
(c) There shall be established a joint union-management committee, 
consisting of three union and three company representatives to be 
known as the Environmental Committee. The committee shall estab-
lish minimum pollution standards which shall be within ten per cent 
of then existing federal standards. The committee shall hold meetings 
at least once each month, for the purpose of jointly inspecting, in-
vestigating, and reviewing pollution conditions, and for the purpose 
of making joint recommendations to eliminate unhealthy or unde-
sirable conditions. A written record shall be kept of all matters han-
dled by the committee. In the event of a tie vote, the issue may be 
submitted to the decision of a representative from [ a local environ-
mental protection group]. Time spent on work of the committee 
shall be paid time. 
(I) Any committee representative may arrange for an inspection 
of facilities or a review or analysis of information by appropriate 
officials of government or independent agencies, provided that any 
such inspections shall be made in the presence of union and com-
pany representatives and that all reports, advice, recommendations, 
opinions, or findings, whether verbal or documentary, shall provide 
equal opportunity for comment and be equally available to the 
union and company. 
(2) The committee shall serve as a Community Dispute Settlement 
Center, applying the techniques of mediation, fact-finding, and if 
feasible, arbitration to complaints from the community. The com-
mittee shall have authority to advertise its existence by means of 
local media outlets, such advertising to be conducted not less than 
once each month. 
(d) There shall be established an Environmental Fund for purposes 
of pollution control and environmental protection, to be administered 
and disbursed by the committee, and to be funded by either the union 
or the company at their discretion, or by the terms set forth in this 
contract. A treasurer, appointed by the committee, shall submit a 
financial report once every three months. The fund shall be audited 
by a certified public accountant once each calendar year, and the 
audit shall be prominently displayed in the plant and offices of the 
company. 
(e) Upon determination by the committee that, for a consecutive 
period of not less than three days, normal and continuing production 
operations have caused pollution levels to exist in excess of committee 
standards in either customary work areas or in areas of company-
provided leisure or convenience facilities such as lunch areas or park-
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ing lots, the company agrees to contribute$-- to the Environmental 
Fund, and an additional $ __ for each successive day in which the 
standards are exceeded. In making such determinations, the commit-
tee shall have access to the company's monitoring equipment or shall 
be authorized to secure and operate its own monitoring equipment. 
(f) The union agrees that all production operations necessary for 
the continuing operation or installation of antipollution devices or 
procedures will be permitted throughout the period of any and all 
strikes. The category of jobs covered by this provision will be desig-
nated by the committee. The designations to apply throughout a 
given strike will be those established at a time six months prior to 
strike action. 
(g) The union agrees to enforce a fine of not less than $ __ to be 
paid to the Environmental Fund by any employee found by the 
committee to have violated, without authorization, company pollu-
tion regulations or regulations and procedures established by the 
committee, including reasonable standards limiting personal actions 
such as discarding personal refuse. 
(h) The company and the union agree that there shall be no reprisal 
against anyone who volunteers information concerning company or 
employee actions related to pollution to any third party. 
As indicated by the preceding discussion, some parts of this 
conglomerate provision clearly fall within the mandatory bargaining 
range, while others cannot be so clearly categorized. This contract 
proposal, like that of the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers 
discussed above, has a tactical advantage. Just as riders on congres-
sional bills often succeed as compromise means of securing passage 
of the basic legislation, some of the "riders" in the conglomerate 
provision might· be successfully bargained over in the process of 
hammering out a final provision to deal with environmental prob-
lems. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the aggregate, organized labor's involvement in environmental 
problems has not been momentous. The reasons for this limited 
activity are varied, including the persistent fear, at the local level in 
particular, of job losses; the need to apply limited union resources 
to priorities that seem more immediate to the worker in the work 
place; the existence of other organizations and agencies designed to 
spend all of their energies on environmental problems; and presumed 
limitations on the legal possibilities within labor's jurisdiction. 
However, recent developments have weakened some of these 
excuses, and others appear insubstantial upon close analysis. The job 
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scare is usually exaggerated; it may be nonexistent at the national 
level, and legislative or contractual protection can be achieved and 
should be sought for workers at the local level. The emergence of 
OSHA should boost considerably the health and safety protections 
for the workers in the plant, thereby facilitating a diversion of some 
resources to health and safety conditions outside the plant. Certainly 
it is now recognized that the environmental protection agencies can-
not do the entire job, and for political reasons many of them will 
operate in circumscribed ways. 
Some of the legal alternatives open to organized labor under the 
Taft-Hartley Act are clear. Contract provisions to protect against job 
losses in cases of environmentally required shutdowns can be sought. 
Provisions can be negotiated to protect workers against reprisal when 
they report unlawful polluting activities of their employer to an 
environmental protection agency. Contract protection can also be 
negotiated to provide that a refusal by a worker to perform work 
which contributes to unlawful pollution by his employer shall not 
constitute just cause for discipline or discharge. 
Other Taft-Hartley Act alternatives are not as clear but deserve to 
be tested. At the bargaining table, a general provision dealing with 
community environmental problems such as the one achieved by the 
Steelworkers in a Canadian agreement421 should be sought. Because 
of the provision's generality, management may not raise the Borg-
Warner issue to test whether the provision must be bargained about. 
Even if this issue is raised, there is the chance that the provision will 
be classified as mandatory, particularly if it arises in the setting of the 
company town or the captive community. At the same time, environ-
mental language can be inserted in provisions that have long been 
accepted as mandatory bargaining issues. The United Farm Workers 
Organizing Committee provision on pesticides is illustrative, even 
though that organization operates outside the jurisdiction of the 
Taft-Hartley Act.422 Any number of variations in contractual lan-
guage can and should be experimented with. As noted by Chamber-
lain and Kuhn: 
I£ any conclusions can be reached as to the "appropriate" subject 
matter of collective bargaining, then, it is that one cannot label 
certain matters as bargainable and exclude others as beyond the 
union's interest. Such labels do not often stick. With changing eco-
nomic, social, and political relationships, issues which were once of no 
concern to the workers, presumably because they were beyond their 
421. See text accompanying note 152 supra. 
422. Taft-Hartley Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). 
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control, or those not immediately affecting their welfare become of 
direct interest, with the possibility of control discovered or created. 
One may question whether the impact of the union on any given 
sphere of business operation is desirable or undesirable, just as one 
may wonder whether the influence of a trade association is beneficial 
or not, but this is a question to which the answer cannot be readily 
found simply by dividing all business matters into the classifications 
of those which are bargainable and those which are not bargain-
able. 423 
If there is no union, employees who are disciplined or discharged 
because of refusals to perform work which is environmentally in-
jurious should file section S(a)(I) charges, alleging interference with 
protected, concerted activities. If there is a union, and if there is no 
"just cause" provision of the type previously mentioned, these em-
ployees should file the same charge, arguing that the Tanner case is 
inapplicable. Alternatively, if there is a "just cause" provision-
either a generic one or one particularized to environmental concerns 
-these employees should file a grievance and seek the active backing 
of their unions. If the unions will not cooperate, employees should 
call in the press, seek the support of fellow employees, contact the 
federal and state environmental protection agencies, and perhaps 
call in an OSHA inspector.424 
For those few unions that have the resources and have demon-
strated a willingness to press for legislation on environmental prob-
lems, there are several possibilities. The UAW's campaign to secure 
legislative protection for workers laid off, discharged, or otherwise 
adversely affected by environmental shutdowns should be supported. 
Also, new statutory protection, analogous to section 502 of the Act, 
could be sought so that a refusal to perform unlawful activities will 
not be deemed a strike. This protection would be especially mean-
ingful in those states where employees may be individually liable 
for performing acts which contribute to unlawful pollution.425 Such 
employees are in a thoroughly untenable position when the regular 
performance of their jobs could lead to individual criminal sanctions. 
Finally, unions can be influential through empirical activities. 
Fact gathering of the type engaged in by the OCAW as a prelude to 
OSHA, and by the UAW on occupational health and safety and 
423. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note 200, at 106-07. 
424. An unfair labor practice charge based on an alleged breach of the duty of fair 
representation could be filed as well, but success under the Yaca case would be unlikely 
unless the union has been completely irresponsible. See text accompanying notes 365-66 
supra. 
425. See text accompanying note 167 supra. 
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environmental matters, can yield powerful data with which to con-
front employers, environmental protection agencies, or the press. 
But the collective data should not be allowed to gather dust; it must 
be analyzed, utilized, and periodically updated. 
It is worth reiterating that the various suggestions put forth in 
this Article are intended to supplement, and not to substitute for, 
independent energies directed at environmental problems. Moreover, 
there are a great many employers who are responding voluntarily to 
eliminate adverse environmental consequences of their commercial 
and industrial operations. But in those lamentably numerous in-
stances where substantial pollution remains, it is time to realize that 
the workers are genuinely, often predominantly, affected by their 
employers' pollution outside the plant as well as inside, and that 
there is a high degree of interconnection between the internal and 
external environments. A handful of unions and employers have 
recognized these facts, and others will as well as time passes and en-
vironmental conditions worsen. It is hoped that the unions will 
recognize one thing more-that attention by organized labor to com-
munity environmental problems represents, in the long run, an 
exercise in enlightened self-interest. 
APPENDIX A 
February 23, 1970 
To All UAW Local Union Presidents and Chairmen of Bargaining 
Committees in the United States and Canada 
Greetings: 
As you know the UAW Executive Board has suggested for con-
sideration by the delegates to the forthcoming Constitutional Con-
vention in April that the problem of pollution become a matter for 
collective bargaining in 1970 negotiations. Moreover, the UAW has 
already been hard at work developing and promoting protective 
legislation on this problem. It will be one of the priority objectives 
of the UAW, both at the bargaining table and in the legislative 
branches of government in the United States and Canada, to seek 
to protect UAW members and the millions of other workers against 
environmental, occupational safety and health hazards which each 
year become increasingly a danger to life and limb. 
In order to better prepare ourselves for 1970 negotiations on this 
subject and to promote strong protective legislation, we will need 
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information which, within the Union, can be supplied only by you 
and your fellow Local Union officers. 
There are three basic types of in-plant pollution: noise pollution, 
particulate matter or dust pollution, and pollution from toxic fumes 
or gases. 
There are about 6,000 potentially dangerous chemical substances 
used in modem industry today which can adversely affect the health 
of workers. There are only the weakest forms of protective standards 
concerning 450 of these chemicals. It is extremely important that we 
know what kinds of toxic materials are being used today in plants 
under UAW contract. Your Local Union Safety Committee or the 
stewards and committeemen should be helpful to you in obtaining 
the information required for response to questions #2 through #39. 
Industry is one of the worst polluters of the air, the water and the 
land. The harmful effects upon the environment, upon the public 
welfare and the health of the nation is [sic] already receiving wide 
publicity. The health of thousands of our members is day by day 
adversely affected by the industrial pollution inside the plants. In-
dustry has not taken sufficient protective action to eliminate pollution 
and its harmful effects. This is why it is necessary for the Union to 
make this a matter of collective bargaining and for this purpose it is· 
essential that we have maximum information concerning industrial 
pollution in each of the plants under UAW contract. Your Local 
Union Conservation-Recreation Committee should be involved in 
compiling the requested data for response to questions #40-#54. 
Your stewards and committeemen could be most helpful as well in 
collecting information for you. 
By helping us assemble this inventory about the environmental, 
occupational safety and health problems in your plant, you will be 
making an important contribution to the UAW effort to improve 
working conditions and to formulate strong federal legislation which 
will protect workers everywhere on their jobs and where they live. 
The need for collecting this information is urgent. Please return 
the questionnaire, properly filled out, to Solidarity House, attention 
of the President's Office, promptly. 
Fraternally, 
Walter P. Reuther, President 
Olga M. Madar, Director 
Department of Conservation and 
Resource Development 
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U.A.W. 
ENVIRONMENTAL, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Local No. _______ Address: __________ _ 
No. of bargaining units ______ _ 
•Names of Companies-Type of production and number of members 
I. Are the companies that you hold contracts with covered by the 
Walsh Healey Act? (The Walsh Healey Act covers all companies 
which do work for the Government in excess of $10,000 per year. 
Please indicate if you know or believe your plant is in that 
category.) 
2. The standards for chemicals, sound and particulate matter are 
known as Threshhold [sic] Limit Values. Are these values posted 
for your members to see? 
3. Do the companies measure them with monitoring equipment to 
see that they are not exceeded? 
4. How often? Daily __ Weekly __ Monthly __ Yearly __ 
Never __ 
5. Do the companies allow the Union to see the results of their 
tests? 
6. Does the Union ask that monitoring be done on a regular basis? 
7. Does your Local Union do monitoring? 
7. [sic] Are special medical tests given to UAW workers on a regular 
basis? 
8. How often? 
9. Are these tests required by your contract? 
10. Are the results given to the individual? 
1 I. Are the results given to the Local Union? 
12. What kind of medical tests are performed? (For example: urine 
for lead, etc.) 
13. What type of safety or health programs does the company have?· 
14. What suggestions do you have for improvements? 
15. Do they have Doctors on duty? 
16. How many? 
17. All shifts? 
18. Do they have nurses on duty? 
19. Howmany? 
20. All shifts? 
21. To the best of your knowledge, list the harmful substances used 
by your members in the manufacturing process. 
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22. What substances seem to be giving your members the most 
trouble in the workplace? (For example: gases, particulate mat-
ter, noise, chemicals, etc.) 
23. What needs to be done? 
24. Should the employer provide more information about the nature 
of these dangers to health or safety? 
25. How often are your plants visited by a safety inspector-state 
or federal? 
26. Does your local ever spot check the safety or health engineering 
equipment used by members? 
27. What is the result? 
28. If an inspector has visited your plant, has he discussed his find-
ings with the union? 
29. If not, why not? 
30. Have you been able to get copies of his reports? 
31. Please state your views on the problems your local union has 
faced regarding safety. 
32. Have there been accidents in the plants where the employees 
were unable to protect themselves from harm? 
33. Also list diseases developed by your members and other facts 
bearing on the question of health damage. 
34. How has management responded to union requests for better 
safety or health conditions? 
35. Does your plant employ personnel solely for safety or health 
protection purposes? 
36. Do you have a joint union-management safety committee in 
your plant? 
37. If yes, list names and addresses of local union members who 
serve on this committee. 
38. List names and addresses of any members who serve as safety 
people for your local union. (If same as above, indicate "same".) 
39. Are they recognized by the company? 
40. Do your members know if their plant is contributing to pollu-
tion of the surrounding air, water and land? 
41. Please describe how this occurs and about how much pollution 
results. (Waste products flushed into rivers, gases or dust released 
into the air.) 
42. Do any of your members know of examples where their lives 
have been directly affected by pollution caused by your plant? 
(Recreation facilities such as water or land destroyed, impaired 
or othenvise diminished in value for others.) 
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43. Please list examples. 
44. Does your plant have devices that purify wastes before they are 
discharged into the air or water? 
45. Are they maintained in working order? 
46. Has your plant been "Cited" for air or water pollution violations 
by any Governmental enforcement agency? 
47. Describe violation or violations. 
48. Are your members assigned job tasks by plant management and/ 
or supervision which results in air or water pollution? 
49. If so, specify: 
50. Are emissions from your company's smokestacks present in plant 
parking lots where your members park their cars during their 
work hours? 
51. If emissions are present, are there ill effects to your members' 
cars? 
52. List examples: 
53. Does your local union have a Conservation-Recreation Commit-
tee? 
54. If yes, please list names and addresses of Committee members. 
NOTE: PLEASE RETURN TO UAW, SOLIDARITY HOUSE, 
ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. 
Name of Local Union Officer returning Questionnaire 
Local Union office held: 
APPENDIX B 
Ecological and Environmental Resolutions Considered at the Ninth 
Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, Bal Harbour, Florida, 
November 18-24, 1971. 
I. RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY OCA w 
Environmental Protection 
RESOLUTION NO. 72-By Delegates A. F. Grospiron, B. J. 
Schafer, Eldwood D. Swisher, Anthony C. Sabatine, Angelo Augus-
tina; Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union. 
WHEREAS, It is not necessary in this statement to reiterate the 
many ways by which modern man is polluting his environment. These 
have been well publicized and discussed in recent years. It is clear to 
all that pollution is making life less pleasant, is causing sickness, and 
indeed is threatening the very survival of the human race, and 
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WHEREAS, On many occasions labor unions have contributed 
significantly to the current efforts to stop pollution. Union members 
are well informed on the subject because they work in the industrial 
plants which contribute to pollution. They are the first to be exposed 
to the toxic and noxious fumes, vapors, liquids and solids which 
escape from the factories into the general environment, and 
WHEREAS, On some occasions organized labor faces a conflict 
of interest between environmental clean-up on the one hand and 
economic security and prosperity on the other hand. This conflict is 
particularly poignant when employers assert that certain facilities 
must be closed, causing unemployment, when anti-pollution mea-
sures are deemed to be too expensive, and 
WHEREAS, We believe that these conflicts can be resolved and 
must be resolved. The position of organized labor must be that en-
vironmental protection must have the highest priority, that pollution 
must be stopped at all costs, and 
WHEREAS, In most cases existing industrial facilities can be so 
modified and improved as to eliminate polluting emissions. In most 
cases the owners can accomplish this through the expenditure of rea-
sonable amounts of money. In most cases this will mean more, not 
less, employment because labor is required in the building, installa-
tion and day-to-day operation and maintenance of pollution control 
devices, and 
WHEREAS, In some few cases it may be economically unsound 
to continue operations of obsolete, economically marginal facilities. 
There is no doubt that pollution control laws and regulations will 
force the shutdown of some places of employment. Of course the 
number of plants which actually must be closed will be far fewer than 
the number threatened by owners and managers who seek to escape 
compliance with environmental protection orders, and 
WHEREAS, Whenever the closing of a facility does prove neces-
sary, the workers displaced must be given economic protection and 
assistance. This must be considered one of the necessary costs of end-
ing pollution, to be absorbed by the economy, private and public, as 
all other costs are absorbed; therefore, be it 
RESOLVED: By the AFL-CIO Convention that it does support 
a full and effective elimination of environmental pollution at what-
ever cost is necessary, and be it further 
RESOLVED: 
1. That whenever environmental protection measures force the 
partial or full closure of a facility with resultant job losses, displaced 
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workers shall be protected in their economic well-being. Such protec-
tion can take the form of early retirement with adequate pension, 
extended severance pay, transfer to jobs in other facilities of the com-
pany involved, job retraining and job placement, and others. The 
costs should be borne by the employer where feasible. Whenever an 
employer demonstrates conclusively that it is not feasible for him to 
bear the costs, government must assume the responsibility. 
2. That employers be inhibited from using the threat of unem-
ployment as a method, avoiding compliance with pollution control 
standards by the passage of legislation providing that any employer 
making such a threat be subject to injunction forbidding the layoff 
of any worker until the necessity of such layoff or layoffs has been 
proven, with burden of proof on the employer and with public hear-
ings and opportunity for cross-examination of employer witnesses 
provided. 
3. That emissions standards be established without delay, based 
in principle on zero pollution; that such standards be uniform for all 
50 States, Puerto Rico, and Canada; and that the standards be given 
the force of law. 
4. That all federal, state and local government jurisdictions pro-
vide penalties of sufficient severity and that these penalties be en-
forced for violations of emission standards by individuals and 
corporations. 
5. That victims of pollution, public and private, be entitled to 
sue polluters for triple damages plus replacement in kind. 
6. That all waste waters be freed of such metallic toxicants as 
mercury, copper and chrome, and that all burdens of salts, organics 
and biologically active impurities be reduced to a level no higher 
than that of the receiving waters; that thermal pollution be regulated 
and that such other safeguards be established so that the waters re-
ceiving wastes be unaltered ecologically. 
7. That the industrial practice of dispersing waste gases by such 
devices as overly tall stacks, be discouraged and that emphasis be 
placed upon process and apparatus improvements. 
8. That the practice of injecting fluid wastes into subterranean 
disposal wells be immediately disallowed and that all such practices 
now authorized by state permits be revoked. 
9. That city and county control boards be restricted in granting 
variances from lawful control orders. 
IO. That statewide zoning be applied to the location of factories, 
plants and industries. 
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11. That all states mandate class actions to replace the common-
law principle of nuisance and to permit suits against polluters by 
persons otherwise unable to demonstrate direct injury. 
12. That states provide penalties equivalent to a minimum of 
ten years' taxes against industries which "run away" from a state to 
avoid compliance with pollution standards and that such a penalty 
be a lien against the treasurer of the offending firm; that the United 
States Departments of Labor and of Health, Education and Welfare 
immediately establish guidelines by which it may reasonably be de-
termined when an industry "runs away" rather than comply with 
environmental standards. 
13. That no tax concessions of any manner be granted to any 
plant required to install devices, change processes or alter raw ma-
terials for the purpose of complying with an order to abate pollution 
and comply with control standards. 
14. That any business activity using municipal facilities for the 
treatment of wastes or disposal, including sewerage and sewage treat-
ment, be assessed weighted and equitable charges. 
15. That no plant or business shall permit noise, light or radia-
tion, in addition to gases, solid wastes and fluids, to escape into sur-
rounding neighborhood. 
16. That the affiliates, staff and officers of the AFL-CIO encour-
age constructive legislation for environmental control, support and 
aid politicians concerned with environmental protection, and exert 
their families' influence in the market place by purchasing and using 
products, materials, packaging and devices which are proven not to 
contribute to pollution or to the degradation of our environment, 
and to assist and encourage all organizations involved in the fight to 
maintain a viable ecology. 
Referred to Committee on Resolutions. 
II. RESOLUTIONS p ASSED 
Resolution No. 124: The Environment 
The challenge of pollution is far from met, although there has 
been some improvement over the past two years. 
In the administration of federal anti-pollution legislation, we 
urge that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration be 
transferred from the Department of Commerce to the Environmental 
Protection Agency. The administration of the Refuse [ Act?] should 
also be transferred from the Corps of Army Engineers to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, with responsibilities extended to cover 
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intra-state as well as inter-state navigable waters, underground waters, 
lakes, esturaries [sic], the contiguous coastal areas, and appurtenant 
land. 
Changes in industrial processes, to abate air and water pollution, 
may cost jobs in one area and gain them in another sector. Workers, 
however, are badly in need of protection against environmental black-
mail by management and possible misrepresentations of job loss re-
sulting from the cost of complying with a government abatement 
order and where companies threaten to leave and relocate in another 
state or locality, whose laws and enforcement programs are softer on 
polluters. 
Therefore, the federal air and water pollution acts should be 
amended to provide national emission standards on all existing sta-
tionary sources of both air and water pollution. The amendment 
should provide that any employer, alleging that an abatement order 
will cause layoffs, dismissals, or cessation of operations, must prove its 
case before an administrative hearing called by the federal agency 
involved. Any company, in those circumstances, which fails to dem-
onstrate such relationship, would be subject to civil penalties. Any 
worker or workers' representative, using the protections and rights 
of the act, must be protected from management sanctions by non-
discrimination provisions in the federal air and water pollution con-
trol acts. 
If an actual job-loss is demonstrated, federal manpower training 
and other special programs should assist the workers. 
Because of air pollution and the tremendous drain on energy 
fuels by internal combustion engines for automotive vehicles, we 
once again urge that the National Air Pollution Control Adminis-
tJ;ation give top priority on developing alternative sources of power 
for such vehicles, particularly in the field of steam power. 
Although the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments streamlined the 
enforcement process, the federal, regional and state enforcement 
efforts have not been adequate. There should be a concerted crack-
down on all violators of emission standards. 
The AFL-CIO supports amendments to the federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act which would: 
Cover all navigable waters, underground waters, lakes, coastal 
areas, contiguous coast areas, soil wash from all sources, feed lots, 
sanitary landfills, and associated land problems affecting water qual-
ity. 
Empower the federal government to establish national emission 
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standards. All industrial concerns releasing effluents into water would 
be required to measure and report the kinds and quality of such 
effluents to the federal government. 
Provide for issuance of immediate abatement orders enforced by 
federal court orders. Civil and criminal penalties for violators should 
be stiffened. The 1899 Refuse Act should be made an important en-
forcement tool. 
At least $3 billion each year for the next five years, should be 
appropriated by Congress for federal grants to assist municipalities 
in construction or modification of sewage treatment plants. 
Such a program could create more than 250,000 new jobs, many 
in areas of high unemployment, with a multiplier effect, adding as 
many as 300,000 additional new jobs. To assist needy communities, 
the present 66 percent federal matching ceiling should be increased 
to 80 percent. 
Each state plan should require river basin planning as the foun-
dation of its abatement program as a condition of receiving federal 
approval and financial assistance. 
The nation is in need of a national land-use policy as an impor-
tant and logical next step to improve and enhance the quality of our 
environment, and at the same time, provide for sound use and devel-
opment, consistent with the economic and social needs of the Ameri-
can people. 
Such a national land use policy should include the following: a 
federal grant-in-aid program to assist state and local governments in 
establishing or improving their land-use programs and managements, 
and adopting broad land-use laws and programs; a federal program 
to improve land-use planning and operations on federally mmed 
lands; developing data on major land-use and planning trends; 
strengthening federal, state and local soil conservation programs. 
We continue to support the family farm ownership, the break-up 
of huge land monopolies, and strict enforcement of the excess acreage 
provisions of federal reclamation laws. 
We urge an expansion of the federal role and increased emphasis 
in solid wastes technology, in particular those dealing with separa-
tion, recycling and re-use of solid wastes. A broad and systematic pro-
gram should give full consideration to human values, including the . 
jobs of workers in the private sector as well as those employed in the 
disposal field. 
Resolution No. 125: Energy 
The AFL-CIO.has time and again, over the past decade, called 
for a comprehensive natural resources and energy policy, integrated 
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with a full-employment economic policy which would protect and 
preserve the environment, protect the interests of the consuming 
public, and eliminate duplication of functions and waste among the 
scattered federal resources departments and agencies. 
A long-range national energy policy is needed that will influence 
the percent of America's future energy requirements supplied by oil, 
natural gas, coal and uranium. Such a policy should develop a rational 
pattern of research, development and conservation of energy re-
sources, resolution of problems of costs, supply, monopolization, pol-
lution, and the necessary restructuring of the federal agencies en-
gaged in these fields. 
Just as the President is now advised by a statutory Council of 
Environmental Advisers, a similarly constituted Council on National 
Energy Policy should be created by Congress. The council's functions 
should include a close consultative relationship with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, annual reports to Congress on the state 
of the nation's energy posture, projections of energy resources and 
needs, and recommend research and development programs to help 
solve present and future problems of competition, new and improved 
technologies, consumer protection and foreign supply. 
·we urge the establishment by Congress of long-range programs 
to develop our enormous oil shale resource, and utilizing domestic 
coal reserves by converting them into supplies of low-pollution nat-
ural gas. 
The creation of TV A-type development agencies are needed in 
order to most effectively achieve the national objectives of abundant 
low-cost supply of such new energy fuels, guard against monopoly, 
provide a federal cost yardstick to protect consumers, conserve the 
resources and prevent environmental damage. 
·we have long urged high priority to development of a feasible 
breeder reactor technology. We support congressional authorization 
of a demonstration breeder reactor to be constructed and operated 
by the Atomic Energy Commission, with the most meticulous pro-
tection against the terrible hazards of plutonium, one of the most 
dangerous materials. This should be done with full participation by 
the nation's scientific community, and protection against breeder 
reactors close to population centers. 
While we endorse the recent strengthening by the Atomic Energy 
Commission of its standards, governing release of airborne radioactive 
materials to the general environment, we insist that such reductions 
be made to apply to all radiation workers as well. 
We cannot emphasize too strongly the need for more resources 
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to be placed into the effort to achieve sustained energy from the 
fusion of the heavy hydrogen atom. The difficult problems that still 
lie ahead must be more rapidly resolved. Fusion power would make 
it possible to achieve an almost limitless supply of energy from the 
oceans. 
The continuation of major and minor power brownouts and 
blackouts, in the past six years, underlies the need for legislation of 
the kind that the AFL-CIO has urged since 1959. Such a program 
would create a low-cost, reliable bulk power supply system for the 
United States, open to participation by all electric systems. The fed-
eral government should regulate the creation and operation of re-
gional power supply systems. I£ such agencies £ail to carry out the aims 
of the program, the federal government should build and operate 
them. 
Once again, we urge Congress to investigate the increasing control 
over major energy sources by giant integrated corporations, the ac-
companying decline in competition, and the failure of the Federal 
Power Commission and the Department of the Interior to provide 
adequate protection of the public against energy monopolies. 
